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The thesis of this Article is that the decisional law
involving GATT "like" product provisions understands the
concept of likeness as tied to the theory of comparative
economic advantage. The thesis is developed by first
analyzing the specific language and negotiating history of the
relevant provisions. This is followed by an examination of the
opinions of the GATT dispute panels evaluating the meaning
and objectives of the term "like." From the perspective of
conventional interpretive assessment like is said to have a
broad meaning in the context of GATT's basic obligations, and
a narrow meaning in the context of its exceptional provisions.
The fundamental point of the GATT decisional law linking the
concept of likeness with comparative economic advantage is
also used to survey, in a very preliminary way, other GATT
provisions and panel decisions not dealing with the term like.
This preliminary survey suggests that comparative advantage
may be the single theory unifying all of GATT law.
*Professor of Law and Director of the Comparative and International Law
Center (CILC), University of Tulsa; J.S.D. (1987) and W.B. Cutting Fellow in
International Law (1980-81), Columbia University.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During 1991, trade in goods between members of the world
community amounted to $3.4 trillion1 and represented slightly
less than one-fifth of total world output.2 As trade measured by
value has nearly doubled since 19803 and, during that same pe-
riod, has exceeded the growth of world output by a factor of
1. U.N. World Economic Survey 1992, U.N. Doe. E/1992/40, ST/ESA/231
(1992) at 50, Table I.1 [hereinafter World Economic Survey]. Recent information
suggests a $3.7 trillion figure for total world trade in 1992. See GATT Says 1992
World Trade Growth Accelerated, But 1993 Trend Uncertain, 10 Int'I Trade Rep.
(BNA) 560 (Mar. 31, 1993).
2. For 1990, total world output was approximately $21 trillion (U.S. 1988),
World Economic Survey, supra note 1, at 6, Box 1.1, and was 1/2% below that in
1991. Id. at 1. Table 1.1.
3. See Id. at 50, Table 111.1 (noting the value of world exports in 1982 ran at
$1.80 trillion (U.S.)).
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almost three to one,4 it would seem the world is moving with ever
greater celerity toward a highly interdependent international
economic system. Self-sufficiency and insularity eventually may
become hallmarks of the past. Standards of living, and develop-
ment in general, may wind up depending as much on how states
fare in the world market as on how they manage their own
domestic sources of production.
The movement toward a global economy heightens the
significance of the standards that govern international trade.
Historically, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT or
General Agreement)5 has played a key role in this regard. The
standards GATT establishes can be divided in innumerable ways.
Distinguishing standards addressing products that are "like" or
the same from standards that address products without requiring
this connection, merits special attention. The worth and im-
portance of distinctions separating tariff from nontariff standards,
obligational from exceptional standards, import from export
standards, or internal from border standards, seems doubtlessly
perceptible. The like or non-like product delineation, however,
encompasses all of these alternative ways of dividing up the
provisions of the General Agreement. Consequently, the
delineation based on "likeness" would appear to set forth the
most comprehensive route for acquiring a basic understanding of
many of the technicalities of the legal regime governing
international commercial relations, while at the same time
providing insight into the regime's central goal or objective.
This Article explores the concept of likeness in some detail.
The essential challenge is to illuminate the meaning of this
concept by determining whether some unifying theory runs
through the panel decisions involving the various like product
provisions of the GATT. To that end, Part II of this Article
categorizes each of the like product provisions and proceeds to
analyze them from a purely textual perspective. With this task
completed, Part Im considers the travaux preparatoires, or
4. See Id. at 6, Box 1.1 (noting a $5-6 trillion (U.S.) growth in world output
from 1980 (using 1988 dollars) to 1990, or a rate of increase around 33%). Over
roughly the same time, however, it was noted, supra note 3, that world export
trade has grown by nearly 100%, from $1.80 trillion (U.S.) in 1982 to $3.46 trillion
(U.S.) in 1991. See also 1991: A Poor Yearfor World Trade Growth but U.S. Excels
as an Exporter, Focus: GATT NEWSLETTER (Information and Media Relations
Division of GATT, Geneva, Switz.), Apr. 1991, at 1 (showing yearly percentage
figures by which world trade has outstripped world output from 1982-1991).
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The current amended version appears
in IV GATT Documents, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (hereinafter
BISD).
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negotiating record, surrounding the adoption of the General
Agreement to gain additional insight on the essence of each of
these provisions. Part IV forms the heart of the Article. It focuses
on the fundamental rules about likeness stated by the GATT
panel decisions concerned with this concept. It also distills the
language of these decisions to determine what theory, if any,
allows them to be viewed as standing for some single, unitary
proposition. Part V of the Article, the conclusion, steers away
from the usual effort at summation. As several of the GATT like
product provisions have not benefited from panel examination,
this Part instead attempts to draw on what is known from
decided cases to offer some speculation on how the unaddressed
provisions might be interpreted. It ends with a few thoughts
about whether the non-like product provisions of the General
Agreement are capable of sharing in any theory holding the like
product provisions together.
Before beginning the substantive discussion, several
important pieces of information bear reference. First, seventeen
GATT provisions employ the term like. Several others, including
a few in the General Agreement's explanatory Addendum, use
terms of a related or associated sort. Further, between 1947 and
1990, there have been twenty panel decisions involving the
general concept of likeness, but only as utilized in six of the
seventeen provisions. Finally, the provisions employing like fall
into three specific categories: those referencing "product(s)" that
are like; those referencing "commodities" or "merchandise" that
are like; and those referencing some formulation clearly
suggesting a concept of likeness beyond what one might term
sameness" or "identity."
I. TEXTUAL APPRAISAL OF LIKE PRODUCT PROVISIONS
The three categories of like will be examined from a textual
perspective to determine if any unifying theme binds the catego-
ries into a single coherent body. Prior to commencing this effort,
it should be noted that within the three categories, there exist two
distinct focuses. Moreover, each separate focus is not discretely
correlated with only one of the three specific categories; rather,
they often cut across the individual categories. The two focuses
speak in comparative terms. Each one either makes central
reference to an imported item, or central reference to an item
produced domestically in the state of importation. That is to say,
the various provisions of the General Agreement dealing with the
concept of likeness focus either on an imported item's likeness to
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some other item, or on a domestically produced item's likeness to
an imported item.
Of the provisions displaying the former type of focus, several
call for a comparison of the imported item with items imported
from other states of supply,8 others with items sold in the state
from which the imported item was actually exported, 7 and still
another with other items imported into the state concerned from
the same supplying state.8 Of the provisions that focus on
domestically produced items in the state of importation, the
second of the two focuses referenced above, none calls for a
comparison between anything but the domestically produced and
the imported items. Given that, the provisions sort themselves
out as being concerned either with a practice in the importing
state that treats domestically produced items differently from
imported items,9 or with injury being inflicted on a domestic
production industry as a consequence of imported items being
supplied.1 0 Bearing in mind this distinction between focus on
imports versus focus on domestic items, the three categories or
groups-of GATT provisions dealing with product similarity will be
examined from a textual vantage.
A. Like Products
In the "like product" group both focuses are present. Several
instances of provisions focusing on the domestically produced
item in the state of importation exist.1 1 The focus on the
imported item is represented both by provisions dealing with
comparability between items imported from a particular state of
supply and items sold in the home market of that same state,
1 2
as well as by the varied comparability between imports from
distinct states of supply.13
Working in reverse order, there would seem to be no reason
to view the textual references to likeness between imported
products from two distinct states of supply as having different
connotations depending upon the precise provision of the GATT
in which the references appear. Article I(1) obligates GATT
6. See Id. arts. I(1). XIII(1), and IX(1).
7. See Id. arts. VI(1), VI(4). XVI(4), VI(7), XI(2)(c)(i)-(ii), and XI(2)(c) ("in any
form").
8. See Id. arts. VII(2)(a)-(b).
9. See Id. arts. 1(2), 111(2) [first sentence], 111(2) (second sentence], 111(4). and
XI(2)(c)(i)-(ii).
10. See Id. art. XIX(1)(a)-(b).
11. See Id. arts. 1(2). 11[(2), nI(4). and XI(2)(c)(i)-().
12. See td. arts. VI(1), VI(4), and XVI(4).
13. See Id. arts. I(1), XIII(1). and X(1).
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parties to accord to a product from or destined for another
contracting party, customs and internal or national treatment no
less favorable than the like product from or destined for any other
state (even though not a GATT party) is accorded. 14 Article XIII(1)
prescribes the same approach for prohibitions or restrictions on
imports or exports. 15  While Article IX(l) also repeats that
approach, it appears to speak of a most favored nation (MFN)
obligation concerning equality of treatment in marks of origin as
the obligation relates to imports, but not as it may also relate to
exports. 1 6
Obviously, like product(s) could have the same meaning In
each and every respect. The thrust of Articles I(1), XIII(1), and
IX(l) seems to be to avoid actions that put GATT parties inter se,
or in relation to non-GATT trading partners, in a different position
from the one that would obtain under the natural efficiencies of
production possessed by each state. In view of that, identity
would appear to be an inappropriate understanding of likeness.
The simplest and most superficial changes in an item would
provide a basis for variant treatment that could easily result in an
14. Article I(1) provides:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or In connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect
to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all
rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and
with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Id. art. I(1).
15. Article XIII states:
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting
party or on the exportation of any product destined for the territory of any
other contracting party or on the exportation of any product destined for
the territory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the
like product of all third countries or the exportation of the like product to
al third countries is similarly prohibited or restricted.
Id. art. XIII(i).
16. Article IX provides: "Each contracting party shall accord to the products
of the territories of other contracting parties treatment with regard to marking
requirements no less favourable than the treatment accorded to like products of
any third country." I&. art. IX(l).
While IXCI) is concerned with marks of origin requirements affecting imports,
the language of Article I(1) dealing with "all rules and formalities in connection
with importation and exportation" would seem to require MFN treatment on marks
of origin requirements aimed at exports. Id. art. I(1) (emphasis added).
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alteration of the normal competitive situation and inconsistency
with the goal of these three MFN provisions.
The fact that products can be considered like, even though
they are not entirely identical, raises the possibility that likeness
also exists every time one item can take the place of another.
Without prejudging whether likeness includes this possibility,17 it
is undisputed that one GATT party disadvantages another GATT
party whenever it accords that party less favorable treatment on
the grounds that the product involved is not sufficiently identical
to another, but is merely able to take the place of some product
from or destined for another state. For example, either a higher
import duty will have to be paid, thus presumably increasing the
consumer cost beyond what it otherwise would have been, or
some export requirement will have to be complied with, thus
upwardly affecting the price to be absorbed by the recipient state.
If favorable treatment does not accompany products that are
interchangeable with others, then the benefits of natural
efficiencies can be rendered nugatory. Therefore, were one to
ascertain the meaning of like with reference to nothing more than
Articles I(1), XIII(1), IX(l), and the basic goal or objective they
seek to promote, it would be perfectly reasonable to conclude that
likeness encompasses products that can be used in place of
others, that is, products that are interchangeable.
A better grasp of likeness can be obtained by examining the
provisions on like products that call for a comparison between a
product imported from a particular state of supply and a product
sold in the domestic or home market of that supplying state. This
is the other way in which the focus on imported items is
represented in the like products provisions. 18 The relevant GATT
Articles are VI1), VI(4), and XVI(4). Article VI(1) deems that the
unfair practice of dumping exists whenever an imported item is
sold at a price below what the like product would fetch when
destined for consumption in the home market of the state of
exportation or, in the absence of sales in that market, for export
to a third state.19 Article XVI(4) prohibits export subsidies on
nonprimary products (i.e., manufactured or industrial items)
when the subsidization results in "bi-level pricing," sales for
17. See Infra text accompanying notes 72-73.
18. See supra note 12 (discussing this focus).
19. GATT, supra note 5, art. VI(1) (indicating dumping exists whenever the
price of an imported item "is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary
course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the
exporting country....").
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export at a price below the price on sales for consumption in the
domestic market. 20
Article VI(4) declares that neither dumping nor
countervailable subsidization exists simply because a low export
price results from the state of supply exempting exports from
duties or taxes that are borne by the like products when sold for
consumption in the home market, or because such duties or
taxes happen to be refunded.2 1 Though not directly tied to Article
XVI(4), the obvious effect of Article VI(4) is to insulate from
countervailing duty (CVD) treatment any bi-level price resulting
from an exemption or refund of duties or taxes. 22
The comparison of the price at which a product sells for
export with the price at which the like product sells for
consumption in the state of supply (or, as in the case of Article
VI(1), in a third state, when there are no sales in the state of
supply) obligates GATT parties to refrain from employing
practices that place imported products in a different price
position than if they had been consumed in the home market.
This is clearly the case with regard to Articles VI(1) and XVI(4).
Both articles respect the price a product carries, if that is the
price it would have borne had it never been exported. The effect
20. Article XVI states:
Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date
thereafter, contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or
indirectly any form of subsidy on the export of any product other than a
primary product which subsidy results in the sale of such product for
export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31 December 1957 no
contracting party shall extend the scope of any such subsidization beyond
that existing on 1 January 1955 by the introduction of new, or the
extension of existing, subsidies.
Id. art. XVI(4).
For the history of bringing this "standstill/prohibition" into force, see JOHN H.
JACKSON. WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 372-74 (1969).
21. Article VI(4) provides:
No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to anti-dumping or
countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from
duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for consumption
in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of the refund of such
duties or taxes.
GATT. supra note 5, art. VI(4).
22. It should be observed that, even though Article VI(4) of GATT is here
connected with Article XVI(4) on export subsidies granted on nonprimary
products, Article V1(4) would also seem to apply in the context of Article XVI(3),
dealing with export subsidies on primary products. See (d. arts. VI(4), XVI(4), and
XVI(3).
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is that exports are to carry the price which reflects the natural
productive efficiencies of each supplying state. Neither the state
of supply nor the state of importation shall take any actions to
affect that outcome. This complements the like product
provisions, which compare the treatment accorded imported
products from one state with the treatment accorded imported
products from another. Thus, the competitive relationship
obtained between imports from different states, a relationship
based largely on the price position of the product determined with
reference to the home market, is to remain unaltered.
Article VI(4) presents a bit of a wrinkle in this approach.
Articles VI(l) and XVI(4) suggest that nothing is to happen to
distort the export price compared to the domestic price in the
state of supply. Yet Article VI(4) prohibits a state of importation
from responding to a practice in the state of supply of providing
relief to the sales of goods for export from the taxes or duties
normally charged on the sales of a like product when sold for
domestic consumption. This practice would appear inconsistent
with the idea that an exported product should carry its normal
home market price. Relieving goods of taxes or duties can result
in exports being sold at a price below the domestic sales price.
The price of real concern, however, is the one a seller would offer
to sell the item in the state of supply, not the price the consumer
who actually purchases it would have to pay to complete the
transaction. In virtually every case, the latter figure will include
something for the government. In this sense, then, Article VI(4) is
entirely consistent with Articles VI(1) and XVI(4). Moreover, it
also complements those like product provisions which seek equal
treatment among various states of supply. It does this by its
directive against responsive antidumping or CVD action. This
directive has the same thrust as Articles VI(1) and XVI(4), for it
maintains prices determined with reference to the home market
as the basis for the competitive relationship among trading
partners.
As to the implication of this complementarity between Article
VI(4) and the other provisions, some small ray of additional
guidance for the meaning of like products would seem to be
provided. The increment of guidance emerges from the fact that
Articles VI(1) and XVI(4) appear to warrant slightly different
approaches. Though both seek the maintenance of a product's
home market price, the former includes not only the like product
formula for securing that objective, but also an artificial
constructed price formula which may be employed whenever
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using the like product method is not appropriate. 23 Article
XVI(4), on the other hand, provides no fallback method for
determining subsidization on nonprimary products. 24 Thus, it
might be suggested that, since dumping can be determined even
though no domestic sales of nearly identical products exist,
Article XVI(4)'s reference to like in the subsidization context
should be subjected to a somewhat looser reading than indicated
by Article VI(1)'s reference to the term.
The merit of this suggestion is that it seeks to prevent the
evisceration of the prohibition on export subsidies on nonprimary
products. This is done by acknowledging that in the dumping
context, when no domestic sales of nearly identical products
exist, resort is had to a less attractive, though nonetheless
available, cost-plus profit approach. It would produce a strange
result to refrain from subjecting Article XVI(4)'s reference to like
to a broader reading and to insist that likeness has the same
meaning in both Articles VI(1) and XVI(4). Trading partners
cognizant of a constructed price formula for determining dumping
may reasonably infer that like means very closely similar. If they
took the same approach with regard to subsidization, the home
market price of an imported item could be substantially
benefited, in the event sales in the supplying state's market
happened to be of products that could not be considered to share
the same degree of very close similarity. Conversely, if those
trading partners read Article VI(1) in a loose fashion, to comport
with a reading of Article XVI(4) designed to avert the problem just
referenced, the presence of the constructed value formula for
determining dumping would be all but ignored. An exception,
perhaps, would exist if no sales of even remotely similar products
occurred in the home market.
A very similar point can be made about Article VI(4).
Supplying states normally would be expected to have no reason
to offer a tax exemption, or refund a tax already collected, unless
the beneficiary product is identical to or very closely
approximates the one sold in the home market that is subjected
to a tax. Presumably an exemption or refund scheme would be
premised on the idea that, if an item sold domestically and
subjected to a tax or duty were taken and sold for export, it
would not be subject to the tax or duty. Thus likeness seems to
have a stricter meaning here as well than in the context of Article
XVI(4). Supporting this narrow reading of Article VI(4) is the fact
23. See Id. art. VI(1)(b)(ll).
24. See td. art. XVI(4). referencing only export subsidies on nonprimary
products that result in sales "for export at a price lower than the comparable price
charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market."
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that the state of supply may depart from the normal course and
grant an exemption or a refund to a specific item exported and
not sold domestically (e.g., pears), while taxing domestic sales of
all items in the larger, generic grouping (e.g., fruit) to which the
exported item belongs. Under these circumstances reading
likeness as referring to products that are able to take the place of
others would effectively allow the state of supply to earmark
certain items (e.g., pears) for export sale only, and use tax
revenues on dissimilar yet interchangeable products (e.g., apples)
to undercut the usual productive efficiencies that other trading
partners might possess on the subsidized item. Only a strict
meaning of likeness avoids this inconsistency with the basic goal
of Article VI(4).
Likeness in Article XVI(4) could be understood to include
products a little less similar, a little more removed from precisely
identical, than the products included in the concept of likeness in
Articles VIM1) and VI(4). That seems to say something about
whether it is accurate to read like products as used in the six
GATT provisions reviewed so far as having a common meaning
that covers any product capable of taking the place of, or that is
interchangeable with, another. That was certainly the suggested
reading given to those Articles (I1(), XIII(1), and IX(l)), which
focused on comparing imports from different states.25 The
shared theme of maintaining the naturally occurring efficiencies
of production exemplified by traded products 2 6 present in
Articles VIM), VI(4), and XVI(4), the provisions focused on
comparisons with home markets, suggests the same reading.
However, it has been suggested that the inclusion of an
alternative dumping formula connotes that home market or third
state price is to be used, perhaps, only when there exists some
reasonably close degree of identity or similarity with the imported
products. This certainly indicates that Article VI(1)'s use of like
does not encompass products that are nothing more than capable
of being used in place of or interchanged with others. The normal
expectation about the employment of a tax or duty exemption or
refund program for exported products would further confirm that
indication with regard to Article VI(4).
The third and final group of like product provisions compare
the imported item with items produced domestically in the state
of importation. Their emphasis on assuring that a traded product
be able to carry to the territory of a state of importation consumer
attractiveness flowing from naturally obtained productive
25. See Id. arts. I(1), XIII(1), and IX(l). See also supra text accompanying
notes 14-18.
26. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
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efficiencies is clear. As has been seen, the principal thrust of the
imports-to-imports grouping is to make sure that, between
foreign suppliers, every state is on an equal footing. The import-
to-home market grouping, captured by Articles VI(1), VI(4), and
XVI(4), reinforces this same objective and goes beyond it, to
assure equality between imports generally and production within
the importing state itself. The grouping of imports-to-importing
state production provisions centers exclusively on the latter
objective. In calling for a comparison between products that are
imported from abroad and those produced in the state of
importation itself, the grouping focuses on an equality between
imports and domestic production.
Four provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade fall into this final grouping. The best known are: Article
111(2), the first sentence of which prohibits importing GATT parties
from imposing internal charges on imports in excess of those
imposed on "like domestic products;"2 7 and Article 111(4), which
prohibits similar discriminatory treatment through laws,
regulations, or requirements affecting internal sale,
transportation, distribution, or use.2 8 Perhaps almost as well
known is Article XI(2)(c)'s prohibition on import quotas for
agricultural or fisheries products not necessary to the
enforcement of government measures restricting the production
or marketing of the like domestic product or removing temporary
27. Article Ill(2) provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party Imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess
of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.
Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or
other internal charges to Imported or domestic products in a manner
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
GATT, supra note 5, art. 111(2).
28. Article 111(4) states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential
internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of
the product.
Id. art. III(4).
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surpluses of the like domestic product. 29 The provision in this
category that has escaped much of the attention surrounding the
others is Article II(2). Article II generally proscribes the
imposition of customs duties in excess of those referenced in the
appropriate tariff bindings.3 0  Paragraph 2 of that Article,
however, allows the bindings to be exceeded by charges that
represent internal taxes levied by the importing state on any like
domestic product.3 1
Obviously, all of these provisions are aimed at protecting the
natural efficiencies reflected in products produced and then
marketed between trading states. Just as the trading states are
to refrain from actions designed to alter the variations in
consumer attraction towards different suppliers that are
generated by these efficiencies, they are also to refrain from
actions which alter the attraction extant between imports and
indigenous products. Articles 111(2), 111(4), XI(2)(c), and H(2) are all
directed at prohibiting a state of importation from pursuing
measures that disrupt the market consequences flowing from the
production situation which would normally obtain in each GATT
29. Article I provides:
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to
the following: ...
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product,
imported in any form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental
measures which operate:
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product
permitted to be marketed or produced, or, if there Is not
substantial domestic production of the like product, of a
domestic product for which the imported product can be directly
substituted; or
(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product,
or, if there Is no substantial domestic production of the like
product, of a domestic product for which the imported product
can be directly substituted, by making the surplus available to
certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at prices
below the current market level or.
Id. art. XI(2)(c)(i)-(ii).
30. See Id. art. II(1).
31. Article II(2)(a) states:
Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from
imposing at any time on the importation of any product:
(a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with
the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like
domestic product or in respect of an article from which the imported
product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part ....
Id. art. II(2)(a).
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party. Individual genius and entrepreneurship are encouraged
and rewarded; external intervention is frowned upon. Those
whose products stimulate consumer demand should not be
disadvantaged through intrusions aimed at leveling competition
or creating market distortions.
Clearly, then, the concept of like domestic products further
informs our understanding of the notion of likeness. In short, 'it
appears to track the stricter or narrower meaning evident in
Article VI() and (4). In essence, this meaning allows states to
avail themselves of the attractions incident to their own initiative,
enterprise, and natural efficiencies. In the context of requiring no
less favorable treatment for imports than that accorded to like
products produced domestically in the state of importation, the
reference to like domestic products in Articles 11(2), 111(2), 111(4),
and XI(2)(c) would seem to indicate that opportunities to
implement discrimination incongruous with natural efficiencies of
production proceed from anything but a restrictive notion of
likeness. Specifically, it is not difficult to imagine importing
states succumbing to discriminatory protective pressures to
neutralize attractions of an import enjoying a host of productive
efficiencies. The broader the notion of likeness in Articles 11(2),
I(2), I(4), and XI(2)(c), the more pervasive and disruptive the
protection is likely to be. By keeping the meaning of likeness
narrow, problems of that sort can be minimized.
B. Like Commodity or Merchandise
Two GATT Articles use phraseology different from like
products or like domestic products. Article VI(7) of the GATT
refers to "like commodity,"32 and Article VII(2)(a) and (b) to "like
32. Article VI(7) provides:
A system for the stabilization of the domestic price or of the return to
domestic producers of a primary commodity, independently of the
movements of export prices, which results at times in the sale of the
commodity for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged
for the like commodity to buyers in the domestic market, shall be
presumed not to result in material injury within the meaning of paragraph
6 if it is determined by consultation among the contracting parties
substantially interested In the commodity concerned that:
(a) the system has also resulted in the sale of the commodity for
export at a price higher than the comparable price charged for the
like commodity to buyers in the domestic market, and
(b) the system is so operated, either because of the effective
regulation of production, or otherwise, as not to stimulate exports
unduly or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of other
contracting parties.
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merchandise."3 3 The questions are: whether the fact these two
provisions employ a word configuration distinct from that seen in
the provisions examined in the preceding section alters the
textual conception of likeness sketched so far; and whether (apart
from the use of like commodities or merchandise, instead of like
products) the manner by which Articles VI(7) and VII(2)(a) and (b)
regulate the trade topics with which they deal suggests a different
understanding of likeness than has already been seen.
At the outset, it should be observed that these two GATT
provisions illustrate only one of the aforementioned focuses.
Though all the GATT likeness provisions either focus on imported
items or domestic items,3 4 Articles VI(7) and VII(2)(a) and (b)
focus solely on imports. Article VI(7) declares that a commodity
under a price support plan in an exporting state shall be
presumed in some cases not to cause a dutiable injury when it is
imported by another state, even though the export price is below
that charged for the like commodity in the exporting state's
markets.3 5 As duties responding to unfair trade practices are
designed to offset price differentials between an item in its export
mode and in its home market mode, Article VI(7) necessarily
must focus on the imported item. The same is true of Article
VII(2)(a) and (b). They provide that, for customs duty purposes,
imports are to be valued on the basis of the actual value of "the
imported merchandise" or of "like merchandise,"3 6 and that value
is generally the price at which "such or like merchandise" is sold
Id. art. VI(7)(a)-(b).
33. Article VII(2)(a)-(b) reads:
(a) The value for customs purposes of imported merchandise should
be based on the actual value of the imported merchandise on which
duty is assessed, or of like merchandise, and should not be based on
the value of merchandise of national origin or on arbitrary or
fictitious values.
(b) "Actual value" should be the price at which, at a time and place
determined by the legislation of the country of importation, such or
like merchandise is sold or offered for sale in the ordinary course of
trade under fully competitive conditions. To the extent to which the
price of such or like merchandise is governed to which the price of
such or like merchandise is governed by the quantity in a particular
transaction, the price to be considered should uniformly be related to
either (i) comparable quantities. or (ii) quantities not less favourable
to importers than those in which the greater volume of the
merchandise is sold in the trade between the countries of exportation
and importation.
Id. art. VII(2)(a)-(b).
34. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
35. See supra note 32 for the language of GATT Article VI(7).
36. See supra note 33 for the language of GATT Article VI(2)(a).
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in the ordinary course of business. 37 With valuation, the focus
could hardly be on anything but imports. Even if it was
permissible to base valuation on the value of domestic items
produced in the state of importation,3 8 that figure would only be
significant for disclosing the value to be ascribed to an import.
Next, does the switch in terminology from products to
commodity or merchandise, and does the manner by which
Articles VI(7) and VII(2)(a) and (b) regulate the concerns they
address, change what has already been said about likeness?
Consider first the move from the word products to the words
commodity and merchandise.
By presuming that a program to support the economic
position of a commodity avoids injury of a dutiable nature to a
state importing the supported commodity, Article VI(7)'s use of
like product rather than like commodity has no impact on the
meaning of likeness. The term commodity must be seen in the
context of GATT Addendum Note 2 to paragraph 3 of Article XVI.
Article XVI(3) strikes at GATT party subsidies that increase
exports of any "primary product" to the point of giving the
subsidizing state more than an equitable share of the product's
world trade.3 9 Note 2 of the Addendum to Article XVI(3) provides
that exporting state price support programs on primary products
shall not, in some cases, be considered subsidies capable of
violating Article XVI(3), even though they result in exports from
the state of subsidization at a price below that charged for the
like product in the exporting state's markets.40 Primary product
37. See id. art. (2)(b).
38. See Id. art. (2)(a) ("and should not be based on the value of merchandise
of national origin").
39. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies
on the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly
or indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to increase the export of any
primary product from its territory, such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner
which results in that contracting party having more than an equitable share of
world export trade in that product, account being taken of the shares of the
contracting parties in such trade in the product during a previous representative
period, and any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting such
trade in the product.
40. Note 2 to § B, 3 of Article XVI reads:
A system for the stabilization of the domestic price or of the return to
domestic producers of a primary product independently of the movements
of export prices, which results at times in the sale of the product for export
at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to
buyers in the domestic market, shall be considered not to involve a
subsidy on exports within the meaning of paragraph 3 if the CONTRAcTING
PARTIS determine that:
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is defined, in large measure, as an item in its natural form or that
has undergone the most minimal processing.4 1 Any primary
product that has been subjected to substantial transformation
(e.g., wheat into pasta)4 2 would not qualify for the liberal
treatment accorded subsidization by Note 2 of the Addendum to
Article XVI(3). In that case, while the price support program may
be violative of paragraph 3's strict standard, Article VI(7) provides
that, if certain determinations are made through consultation
between substantially interested contracting parties, a
presumption exists that the importing state has suffered no
injury4 3 for which it may respond with a retaliatory duty. The
effect is to use dialogue to temper the inclination of importing
states toward unilateral action. More importantly for present
purposes, the connection between Articles VI(7) and XVI(3)
indicates that a commodity could be considered nothing other
than a primary product in an advanced stage. Accepting this
understanding of the word commodity, the fact that Article VI7)
calls for a comparison between commodities that are like, while
Note 2 of the Addendum to Article XVI(3) calls for a comparison
between products that are like, means the switch from one to the
other has no real affect on the meaning of likeness. The thrust of
the wording is directed at stages of preparation alone.
Nor does the other possible reading of the meaning of
likeness change the relationship between Article VI(7) and Note 2
to paragraph 3 of Article XVI. That reading points to the fact the
(a) the system has also resulted, or is so designed as to result, in
the sale of the product for export at a price higher than the comparable
price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market; and
(b) the system is so operated, or is designed so to operate, either
because of the effective regulation of production or otherwise, as not to
stimulate exports unduly or otherwise seriously to prejudice the interest of
other contracting parties.
Notwithstanding such determination by the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
operations under such a system shall be subject to the provisions of
paragraph 3 where they are wholly or partly financed out of government
funds in addition to the funds collected from producers in respect of the
product concerned.
GATT, supra note 5. art. XVI, § B, 3, note 2.
41. Note 2 also states:
For the purposes of Section B. a "primary product" is understood to
be any product of farm, forest or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural
form or which has undergone such processing as is customarily required
to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade.
Id.
42. See European Economic Community-Subsldles on Exports of Pasta (U.S.
v. EC), BISD 31st Supp. 259 (1985) (pasta is not a primary product).
43. See supra note 32 for the language of GATT Article VI(7).
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latter provision contains not only reference to products, rather
than commodities, but an additional proviso, not found in Article
VI(7), preventing recourse to Note 2's escape from Article XVI(3)
when the subsidy provided is in whole or in part from government
funds. 44 In the context of Article VI(7), the proviso seems to
indicate that, while there may be instances in which the chance
of imposing a responsive duty is nonexistent because of Article
VI(7's presumption of no injury, if the subsidization generating
the controversy is funded out of government monies, then the
exporting state is still bound to refrain from using the practice to
secure more than an equitable share of the world trade.
Restated, Article XVI(3) limits the subsidization, even though the
remedy of a countervailing duty may not be available under
Article VI. Obviously, Article VI(7)'s switch from like product to
like commodity in this situation has no real relevance for the
meaning of likeness.
Article VII(2)(a) and (b)'s switch from like product to like
merchandise seems to warrant the exact same conclusion about
the impact on the meaning of likeness. The term merchandise is
a generic term that encompasses both product as well as
commodity. Merchandise is any item or good sold by a merchant,
no matter how that item or good happens to be characterized. In
fact, paragraphs (1), 4 5 (3),46 and (5)47 of Article VII, in
44. See supra note 40 (final sentence) for the relevant portion of note 2.
45. Article VII(1) states:
The contracting parties recognize the validity of the general principles
of valuation set forth in the following paragraphs of this Article, and they
undertake to give effect to such principles, In respect of all products
subject to duties or other charges or restrictions on importation and
exportation based upon or regulated in any manner by value. Moreover,
they shall, upon a request by another contracting party review the
operation of any of their laws or regulations relating to value for customs
purposes in the light of these principles. The CoNTRAcTiGo PARTIES may
request from contracting parties reports on steps taken by them in
pursuance of the provisions of this Article.
GATT, supra note 5, art. VII(l).
46. Article VII(3) provides: "The value for customs purposes of any imported
product should not include the amount of any internal tax, applicable within the
country of origin or export, from which the imported product has been exempted
or has been or will be relieved by means of refund." Id. art. VII(3).
47. Article VII(5) declares:
The bases and methods for determining the value of products subject
to duties or other charges or restrictions based upon or regulated in any
manner by value should be stable and should be given sufficient publicity
to enable traders to estimate, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the
value for customs purposes.
Id. art. VII(5).
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confirmation of this understanding of merchandise as an
expression of inclusiveness, refer to the subject of valuation of
imported products. Paragraphs 2(a) and (b) provide that the
valuation is to follow certain standards and is to value imported
merchandise or like merchandise. The apparent connotation is
that the standards for determining value apply to all
merchandise, that is all imported goods or items sold by one
entity to another. This would seem to mean that, accepting the
existence of the earlier distinction between products and
commodities, 48 the system of valuation established in Article
VII(2)(a) and (b) is inclusive enough to encompass all items,
whether considered products or commodities. Consequently, the
drafters use of merchandise, instead of products, in paragraphs
2(a) and (b) of Article VII would seem to be of little relevance to
the meaning of likeness. The only relevance of this change in
language would seem to be as a reflection of a decision to employ
as broad a term as possible when dealing with the subject of
import valuation.
This conclusion is not weakened by the fact that previously
discussed Article VI(7) references like commodity, while several
other Article VI provisions refer to like product.49 One might view
use of both merchandise and product in the same article as not
suggesting that the former term is inclusive of the latter, when
another article of the General Agreement uses product and
commodity to mean two distinct and exclusive things.50 Article
VI's use of product and commodity, however, does not distinguish
between the two terms. That results from the relationship
between Article VI(7) and Note 2 of the Addendum to Article
XVI(3). 51 Moreover, even if one accepted the distinction as
deriving from Article VI alone, there is no reason to thereby
extrapolate that merchandise and product, as used in Article VII,
are entirely exclusive terms. The conclusion that such exclusivity
would automatically have some relevance to the meaning of
Article VII(2)(a) and (b)'s use of the word like would seem
especially strained.
Even if the switch from products to commodity or
merchandise proves of little significance to the meaning of
likeness, the same may not be true of the manner in which
Articles VI(7) and VII(2)(a) and (b) regulate the concerns they
address. Let us examine Article VI(7)'s regulation of domestic
48. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
49. See GATT, supra note 5, art. VI(1)-(6).
50. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45 for a discussion of the
difference between product and commodity.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45 on Articles VI7J and XVI(3).
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price stabilization schemes on primary commodities, and Article
VII(2)(a) and (b)'s regulation of calculations of actual value of
merchandise imported by one state from another, to ascertain
whether their approaches will help illuminate the concept of
likeness.
Article VI(7) appears geared toward an objective quite similar
to that observed in Articles VI(1), VI(4), and XVI(4), specifically,
getting exports to carry their home market price with them, so as
not to allow some trading states to artificially and unfairly
advantage the items which they sell abroad. As examined earlier,
Articles VI(1), VI(4), and XVI(4) did this by insisting that unfair
trading occurs whenever one sells for export at below home
market price, unless it is caused by consumption tax exemptions
or refunds, or whenever nonprimary products benefit from export
subsidies that result in bi-level pricing. These trading practices
can trigger responsive antidumping or CVD action by the state of
importation.5 2 Article VI(7) is not as wholly wedded to the same
objective. While it no doubt would like implementation of
domestic price stabilization plans to always avoid the possibility
of lower export prices than domestic home market prices for the
like commodity, it allows for a lesser degree of success. This is
done by providing for a presumption of no dutiable injury when
consultation between parties substantially interested in the
commodity determines that the support plan also occasionally
results in an export price below the market price of the supplying
state.
Article VII(2)(a) and (b) appears to be aimed at another goal.
It declares that for customs purposes imports are to be valued on
the basis of the actual value of what is imported, or of merchan-
dise like that imported, and that actual value is considered the
price at which it is sold or offered for sale in the ordinary course
of trade under fully competitive conditions. Article VII(2)(a) and
(b) thus seeks to establish a uniform international benchmark for
valuation, not a standard that assures items traded between
states will take with them their home or domestic market price.5 3
52. See supra text accompanying notes 18-26 (describing Articles VI(1), VI4)
and XVI(4).
53. Notes 1-4 of the Addendum to paragraph 2 of Article VII of the GATT
make clear that price information is to be represented by the Importer's Invoice
price, plus other figures that are appropriate to factor-in to the price calculation
(e.g., non-included charges for legitimate costs, as well as abnormal or special
accounts). Additionally, they also allow the exclusion from consideration of sales
involving interrelated business partners and sales where price is not the sole
consideration. The importing state Is at liberty to use either the invoice price
information of the importer whose merchandise is actually being valued, or
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To be sure, there is some overlap between these two goals. In
seeking to have internationally traded goods carry the price they
have in the state of supply, it is imperative to have a figure rep-
resenting import price against which the home market price can
be matched. Such a figure allows one to then determine the
existence of unfair trading practices like dumping and sub-
sidization producing bi-level pricing. Article VII(2)(a) and (b)
supplies just that kind of figure. Article VII(3) provides that value
is to be determined without reference to exemptions or refunds of
taxes granted by the supplying state,54 acknowledging the overlap
by paralleling the language of Article VI(4), which is totally
focused on products carrying their home market price.
Additionally, however, Article VII(2)(a) and (b) goes further and
supplies a figure that can be used for the distinct and unrelated
task of levying run-of-the-mill tariff duties. It thereby attempts to
limit the occasions for abuse of GATT tariff bindings.
Given Article VII(2)(a) and (b)'s primary objective of
establishing a universal standard for valuation, and Article VI(7)'s
objective of getting traded products to take with them their home
market price, it might be asked: Does either provision inform the
meaning of likeness beyond the preceding discussion of the
General Agreement's other relevant provisions? The obvious
point is that the objective of Article VII(2)(a) and (b) indicates that,
no matter how likeness is construed, it should be given a uniform
meaning by every GATT party. It would be intolerable to have a
situation in which some states compute value on the basis of like
meaning precisely identical in every respect, others as meaning
different yet very similar, and still others as meaning entirely
distinct but interchangeable. Less obvious, but of greater
significance, is what the objective of a universal standard for
valuation implies about what the uniform meaning for likeness
should be. In this context, recall the overlap between Article
VII(2)(a) and (b)'s goal of a benchmark standard for valuation, and
the notion of getting products to carry their home market price.
Since the reason for the latter goal is tied to the notion of allowing
trading states to capitalize on their own indigenous efficiencies, it
would seem strange to construe like to mean only items that are
exactly the same in every respect. A state exporting goods to an
importing state that calculates value on the basis of the invoice
price for like (meaning identical) merchandise could thereby
advantage itself over other states exporting to the same state.
Simply by changing one or two characteristics, so as to
general invoice price information regarding like imported merchandise. See GATT,
supra note 5, art. VII, 2, notes 1-4.
54. See supra note 46 for the text of Article VII(3).
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distinguish the exported item from those otherwise supplied by
itself or third states, a state may be able to secure a reduced duty
that will enable its goods to compete favorably with other items.
55
This problem would be minimized if like were construed to mean
goods very closely similar, though not entirely identical, to the
imported goods of concern. In that situation, changes in some of
the characteristics of an exported item, to distinguish the items
supplied by one state from those supplied by others, would not
put the state of importation fixing value in a position to use a
figure that results in a lower duty, thereby conceivably allowing a
particular supplying state to be advantaged through artifice
rather than through industriousness. 56 Perhaps all the importing
state needs to do is calculate value according to the invoice price
of closely similar goods supplied by the same exporter. That
would bring the duty imposed more in to line with what Is
suggested by the extant level of efficiencies.
Article VI(7) is geared to the notion of exported products
carrying their home market price and would seem to support a
reading of like which is flexible enough to include products very
closely similar to each other. This stems from the fact that Article
VI is designed to regulate practices resulting in unfair price
advantages, and paragraph 1 of Article VI strikes at these
practices whenever they involve goods that very closely
approximate each other.5 7 Thus, if Article VI(7) endeavors to
accomplish its objective by blessing only those domestic price
stabilization plans that periodically result in export prices above
55. This could happen because the duty imposed on the imported item might
be based on a value calculated through use of the invoice price on sales by the
same exporter to an importer in a third state. In the event the invoice price for
such sales of the same product are used to calculate the amount of duty owed, it
is quite possible the invoice price, and thus the duty owed, would be lower than
the corresponding amounts relative to the competing exporting states. On the
permissibility of using third state prices for calculating value, see GATT Article
VII(2)(b)'s reference to "at a time and place determined by the legislation of the
country of importation." GATT, supra note 5, art. VII(2)(b) (emphasis added).
56. To construe "like" as meaning "identical" could result in such an
advantage if supplying state A competes with state B in its shipmfnts to and sales
in state C of an item here called W. Were A to begin shipping W Ias well as W to
state C. and also ship W as well as W to a third state, tales of W to a particular
importer in C wo.uljd be valued according to sales of W to importers in the third
state or sales of W to other importers in C Itself. To the extent that the invoice
price for such sales is below that for W. state A may be advantaged over state B,
since B ships what is a diffefent item at a higher invoice price. Moreover, C will
not value1 A's shipment of W at the invoice price for A's shipment of W because.
again. W is not "like" (identical) to W. Beyond the import duty ramifications of
construing like narrowly, the implications for dumping and antidumping are
obvious.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
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what is charged on the supplying state's market for the like
commodity and are operated to avoid unduly stimulating exports,
then all other plans must fall within the basic test of Article VI(1).
Because Article VI(1)'s test conceptualizes like as meaning both
identical and closely similar, Article VI(7)'s use of like should be
read in the same manner. It would be inappropriate to go further
and read it to also include goods that are interchangeable. 58
That would put a state with a price stabilization plan on a single
item sold in both the domestic market and abroad for exactly the
same price in the position of being charged with an unfair trading
practice if it sold a nonqualifying, entirely different (though
interchangeable) item abroad at any lower price. Not only would
this be incongruous with the objective of having all products
carry their home market price, for the lower price of the
interchangeable item may be the same as the price of that item in
the supplying state. It would also be contrary to the language of
Article VI(7). In speaking of a price stabilization plan for "a
primary commodity . . . which results . . . in the sale of the
commodity for export at a price lower than the comparable price
charged for the like commodity" (emphasis added)59 in the home
market, Article VI7) does not envision a price comparison
between an exported stabilization item and a nonqualifying item
that can be used in its place.
C. Directly Competitive or Substitutable
If one were to categorize the provisions of the General
Agreement falling under this heading from the standpoint of the
two focuses mentioned at the outset of this section,60 all would
fall into the grouping that centers on the domestic products.
Furthermore, all would call for a comparison of imported-to-
domestic goods; that is, they all look at whether the imported
item can be considered directly competitive with or substitutable
for some particular product produced in the state of
importation.6 1 The articles of concern, of course, are Articles
XIX(1)(a) and (b), 111(2), and XI(2)(c}(i) and (ii). It may be recalled
that Articles I(2) and XI(2)c)(i) and (ii) have already been
discussed. 62 Presently, however, attention will not be devoted to
58. It should be recalled that Articles I(1), XIII(1), and IX(l) are able to
support a reading of like that covers interchangeable items. See supra text
accompanying notes 13-18.
59. See supra note 32 for the full text of Article VI(7).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
61. See supra notes 6-10 for a discussion of the categories of comparison.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
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the previously seen first sentence of Article Ill(2), but rather to
the Note in the Addendum to the second sentence of Article Il(2).
Article XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) will be considered from the vantage of the
language in the concluding clause of its provisions, not from that
of the opening language's reference to like products, seen earlier.
Clearly then, what is now examined Is sufficiently distinct from
the previous analysis of Articles 111(2) and XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) to
hold forth the possibility of adding a further gloss to our
understanding of the concept of likeness.
First, Article XIX(1)(a) and (b) will be considered. The
prescription contained in this provision of the GATT entitles a
state of importation to take what has been characterized as
escape or safeguard action,6 3 action which would otherwise be
inconsistent with GATT obligations regarding things like
quantitative limitations 64 or tariff rates in excess of those bound
under negotiated agreement.65  To avail itself of such
opportunities, the importing state must make findings on several
matters, the most important for current purposes being injury to
domestic producers of like or "directly competitive" items.6 6 The
idea is to allow states to raise barriers whenever unanticipated
increases in imports accompanied by serious disruptive
consequences to competitive domestic producers occur.6 7
Though not specifically spelled out, many subscribe to the notion
63. See JOHN H. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 616 (1977).
64. See GATT, supra note 5. art. XI(1).
65. See Id. art. II(1).
66. Article XIX(l(a) states:
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the
obligations by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff
concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that
contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions
as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that
territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall
be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as
may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the
obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
Id. art. XIX(1J[a).
67. Compare Marco C. Bronckers, The Non-Discriminatory Application of
ArticleXIX GATT: Tradition or Fiction?, LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION, 1981/2, at
35, 39-41 with Mark Koulen, The Non-Discriminatory Interpretation of GATT Article
XIX(1): A Reply, LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION, 1983/2, at 87, 89-111 (on
whether the barriers are to be against all states supplying the product of concern,
or only those supplying the increased quantities).
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that these barriers are to be imposed only as temporary, stop-gap
measures.
68
Article XIX(l)(a) and (b) is principally designed as an
exemption from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. As
there are a variety of ways by which parties to any international
agreement might be exempted by the terms of the agreement from
its obligations, the method reflected in the language of Article XIX
suggests that the article's principal task is in line with many of
the other GATT provisions already reviewed. Specifically, Article
XIX speaks of an importing state that raises barriers to protect
against injury from increased imports being subject to retaliation
by affected supplying states through the suspension of equivalent
concessions and obligations. 69 This language indicates that the
signatories of the General Agreement are not in a position to
escape their GATT obligations with impunity. While one might
appropriately act to protect endangered industries from imports,
one must expect that the overall standing of the trading
relationship Is not to be upset. To the extent that the efficiencies
in a state of supply give it a product that consumers in a state of
importation find more attractive than what is produced
domestically, action taken to protect the domestic producers
against those efficiencies are to be offset by retaliatory measures
aimed at restoring the status quo ante. This emphasis on
promoting the natural productive efficiencies of trading partners
68. The language of XIX(1) itself speaks of "for such time as may be
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury." See supra note 66 for the text of
Article Xlx(I). Since injury can be prevented or remedied either by continuing the
barriers in place forever, or using the barriers to obtain breathing room for
improving the economic situation of the affected industries, it would appear that
the temporary nature of escape action Is not unequivocally dictated. But see
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, POLICY PERSPECTIVES
FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS (REY REPORT). reprinted In JOHN
H. JACKSON & WILLIAM DAEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS, at 644-45 (2d ed., 1986).
69. Article XIX(3]{a) provides:
If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to
the action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or
continue the action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action
is taken or continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be free,
not later than ninety days after such action Is taken, to suspend, upon the
expiration of thirty days from the day on which written notice of such
suspension is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the application to the
trade of the contracting party taking such action, or, in the case envisaged
in paragraph l(b) of this Article, to trade of the contracting party
requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent concessions or
other obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which the
CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove.
GATT, supra note 5, art. XIX(3)(a).
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is further buttressed by the aforementioned notion of escape
action being merely temporary in nature. Presumably then, at
some juncture the scales of business dealings extant between
rival commercial states are to be allowed to function unfettered.
Though Article XIX does not demand the kind of capricious
adherence to natural efficiencies that results in the immediate
elimination of industries that are irrationally organized, it
certainly looks towards either greater rationalization or towards
transferences of economic potential to more competitive
enterprises.
Article 111(2), second sentence, and Article XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii),
final clause, have objectives that are not overfly economic in
character. In this sense they are quite like Article XIX(1), the
principal objective of which is to provide for an exemption from
the obligations of GATT, but in a fashion that promotes
productive advantages displayed by states possessing them. The
second sentence of Article III(2) deals with states applying,
though equally to imports as well as like domestic products,
internal taxes or charges that afford protection to domestic
production. The GATT's Addendum to Article 111(2) indicates that
in the event of such equal application, the second sentence would
be violated only if no similar tax were also imposed on "directly
competitive or substitutable" domestic products.70  Article
XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii), final clause, envisages the use of quantitative
restrictions on imports of agricultural or fisheries products. This
language can be used when necessary for the enforcement of
governmental measures limiting the marketing or production
amounts, or removing temporary surpluses, of domestic products
for which imported products can be "directly substituted." Article
111(2) thus deals with equal national treatment for like products
that results in consumers moving away from imports and towards
unlike yet competitive or substitutable domestic products. Article
XI(2)(c) deals with situations in which the GATT's general
prohibition on quotas can be avoided, especially to protect
against imports eroding domestic limits placed on products for
which the imports can be substituted. Directed at these
objectives, both provisions continue the theme apparent in Article
70. See Id. addendum to art. Ill, 2, stating:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of
paragraph 2 would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of
the second sentence only in cases where competition was involved
between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand, a
directly competitive or substitutable product which was not similarly
taxed.
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XIX(1)(a) and (b) of favoring the trade equilibrium produced by
allowing natural efficiencies full play in the international arena.
The Addendum to the second sentence of Article I(2)
accomplishes this by addressing the situation of importing states
treating what may be inferior and less attractive like domestic
products in the same way imports are treated; with the effect
being that consumers are driven to the competitive or
substitutable domestic products that are accorded different
treatment. Article XI(2)(c) does this by allowing importing states
to use quotas against like, as well as substitutable, foreign
agricultural or fisheries items, when coupled with efforts to alter
the normal trade conditions by reducing domestic supplies,
thereby upwardly affecting prices and drawing imports like a
magnet.
Shifting focus from the objectives of Articles XIX(l)(a) and (b),
I(2) (second sentence), and XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) (final clause), and
moving from their theme of supporting the natural economic
efficiencies, inquiry might be made about possible changes in
conceiving of the idea of likeness. Of the provisions examined so
far, Articles 11(2), 111(2) (first sentence), 111(4), VI(I), VI(4), VI(7),
VII(2)(a) and (b), and XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) (first clause) all favor a
conception that includes goods which are identical with, or very
closely similar to, those to which comparisons are made. 7 1
Articles I(1), IX(l), XIII(1), and XVI(4) have the potential to
encompass even goods that can take the place of, or can be seen
as interchangeable with, other goods. 72 By referencing like and
then referring to competitive and substitutable, Articles XIX(l),
111(2) (second sentence), and XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) (final clause) plainly
cover goods that may be distinct in almost every way from the
ones to which they are compared. The proviso is that these goods
must compete with, or be able to substitute for, the other goods.
However, to say that these goods must compete with, or be able
to substitute for, the other goods suggests a parallelism between
Articles XIX(1), I(2), and XI(2)(c) on the one hand, and Articles
I(1), IX(l), XIII(l), and XVI(4) on the other. Both sets of articles
deal with items capable of replacing others. However, the
references to competitive and substitutable appear in provisions
also referencing like, while Articles I(1), IX(l), XIII(1), and XVI(4)
reference like without referencing competitive or substitutable. It
therefore would appear that the concept of likeness either is not
designed to encompass goods that can take the place of, or can
be seen as interchangeable with, others; or it is meant to view the
notion of replaceability in a more sophisticated fashion.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24, 25-59.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18, 24-25.
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On the basis of textual analysis alone, It is extremely difficult
to tell which of these two possibilities is most viable. Either one,
though, would further inform our understanding of the meaning
of the term like. To conclude that competitive and substitutable,
when used in conjunction with like, eliminate the chances of like
by itself being read to encompass interchangeable results in
Articles I(1), IX(l), XIII(l), and XVI(4), covering nothing more than
identical and very nearly identical goods, would completely reject
parallelism. On the other hand, one could conclude that
competitive and substitutable elevate the level of sophistication
regarding distinctions between related goods, which results in the
concepts of interchangeable or replaceable, implicated by Articles
I(1), IX(1), XIII(l), and XVI(4), being distinct from competitive or
substitutable. A certain degree of parallelism is then preserved,
but it is purely asymmetrical. To the extent like is able to
support a reading encompassing goods that can take the place of
others, it is restricted to replacement goods that are by their very
nature the same as those replaced. Competitive or substitutable
goods, however, are without restriction beyond the requirement
that the goods must be capable of replacing others.7 3
D. In Any Form
The language prefacing Article XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii)'s reference to
"directly substituted" states: Article XI(1)'s prohibition on
quantitative limitations does not extend to "[ilmport restrictions
on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form,
necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures"7 4 that
affect the quantities of domestic products. The Note In the
Addendum to paragraph 2(c) of Article XI indicates that "in any
form" is designed to cover the same product as the one under
import limitation, whenever it is in "an early stage of processing"
and still perishable, provided that if it were freely imported it
73. Were this second, or latter, possible reading to be selected, the GATT
like-product common language provisions would fall into three categories: first,
"like" meaning identical or very nearly so; see GATT. supra note 5, arts. 11(2). 111(2)
[first sentence]. 111(4), VI(1), VI(4), VI(7), VII(2(a)-(b), and XI(2](c)(i)-(fl) [first clause];
second, "like" meaning interchangeable goods that are by nature the same; see Id.
arts. I(1), IX(l), XI(l), and XVI(4)); or, finally, "competitive" or "substitutable"
meaning interchangeable goods that are by nature different; see Id. arts. XIX(1),
Il(2) [second sentence explained by the Addendum], and XI(2)(c)(i).(.[) [final
clause]. Meat provides a concrete example of the three categories in action. Top
sirloin from cattle fed only organically grown grains is very nearly similar to that
from those fed growth hormones; poultry is interchangeable with beef, and both
are meats; tofu (soybean curd) can be used as a meat replacement, but is of an
entirely different nature from either beef or poultry.
74. See Id. art. XI(2)(cl.
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would compete with the fresh product and "tend to make the
restriction on the fresh ineffective." 75 The consequence is to allow
importing states, which have acted to affect the quantities of
domestic agricultural and fisheries products, to limit imports of
foreign products that are like or can be substituted for the
domestic. This includes foreign products that have undergone
some processing and are therefore at a different stage in the
nature-to-pantry chain than any of the fresh products restricted.
Without devoting undue attention to the in any form phrase,
it seems reasonably clear that it confirms the objective, goal, or
theme apparent in the other provisions of the General Agreement
surveyed here, to give natural productive efficiencies free reign.
This phrase provides for action that responds to measures
disrupting the equilibrium resulting from that freedom.
Specifically, government regulations affecting downwardly the
quantities of domestic agricultural or fisheries goods can be
buttressed by import limits on even processed foreign agricultural
or fisheries goods that could prove competitive therewith. If this
responsive action were not permitted, the equilibrium resulting
from the regulations borne out of productive efficiencies would be
thrown out of kilter. Domestic prices of the regulated goods
would spiral upwards, thereby attracting imports; and processed
imports would be used to circumvent import limits on
unprocessed fresh items.
Article XI(2)(c)'s use of in any form also seems to confirm the
accuracy of reading paragraph 2(c)(i) and (i)'s reference to directly
substituted in a broad fashion. It goes without saying that the
use of this reference simultaneously with the reference to
likeness implies that substitutable means something vastly more
inclusive than identical or very closely similar. When the phrase
in any form is coupled with this, the plain and simple meaning
would seem to snare as many kinds of goods that could
undermine the basic exception of Article XI(2)(c) as possible.
Substitutable could not possibly be read to require identity or a
high degree of similarity when it is prefaced with a reference as
encompassing as in any form. It cannot be emphasized strongly
enough that this reference applies to agricultural and fisheries
products alone, and even then in only very confined
circumstances. This leaves little doubt about the fact that other
75. See Id. addendum, Note to 2(c), Article XI, which provides: "The term
'in any form' in this paragraph covers the same products when in an early stage of
processing and still perishable, which compete directly with the fresh product and
if freely imported would tend to make the restriction on the fresh product
ineffective."
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kinds of items are left unaffected, and farm and fishery products
receive privileged treatment under the GATT.
III. NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF COMMON LANGUAGE PROVISIONS
Before beginning an examination of the General Agreement's
negotiating history to see whether the record of development of
the provisions containing the term like, or associated
configurations, illuminate the meaning of that word and suggest
a unifying theme or theory, it might be good to briefly review what
the foregoing textual analysis has indicated. First, the likeness
provisions fall into three categories: those dealing with products
that are like; those addressing commodities or merchandise that
are like; and those using a formulation that suggests a concept of
like well beyond the idea of sameness. Second, the provisions
using the concept of likeness focus on either the imported Item's
likeness with another product-most often produced in a third
state of supply-or a domestic item's likeness with the imported
item. Third, the textual analysis suggests Articles 11(2), 111(2) (first
sentence), 111(4), VI(1), VI(4), VI(7), VII(2)(a) and (b), and XI(2)(c)(i)
and (ii) (first clause) use like to connote identity or very close
similarity. Articles I(1), IX(1), XIII(1), and XVI(4) might extend
beyond that to interchangeable items. Articles 111(2) (second
sentence), XI(2)(c)(l) and (ii) (last clause), and XIX(l)(a) and (b),
however, appear to extend beyond identity or close similarity to
encompass entirely distinct yet interchangeable goods. Allowing
natural productive efficiencies to fully evidence themselves
appears to be the basic theme of these various GATT provisions.
The notion of in any form, expressed in the opening language of
paragraph 2(c) of Article XI, corroborates many of these
conclusions.
One other point should be made, concerning the exact
dimensions of the GATT's negotiating history. In essence that
history is reflected in the products of four international
conferences. 76 The first three were to lay the groundwork for the
76. These four conferences were initiated largely as a result of an invitation
from the United States to commence negotiations on a multilateral trade
agreement, see U.S. State Dep't, Press Release, Dec. 16, 1945, reprinted In 13
DEP'T STATE BULL. 970 (1945); and a United Nations Economic and Social Council
resolution, passed during the Council's first session at the request of the United
States, calling for the convening of a United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, with the objective of drafting a Charter for an International Trade
Organization, see Resolution on the Calling of an International Conference on Trade
and Employment, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/22/Rev.1 (1946). To a certain extent,
the movement towards a multilateral effort in the trade area was contributed to by
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last in the series. The opening conference, known officially as the
First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment but often referred to as the
London Conference, was held in London in 1946. At this
conference, delegates worked on redrafting the charter for an
International Trade Organization (ITO) that was submitted to the
Conference by the United States. The second conference involved
deliberations by the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory
Committee, and has been referred to as the New York Conference.
The deliberations occurred in Lake Success, New York in the
Winter of 1947 and resulted in several provisions of the London
Conference's draft ITO Charter7 7 being elaborated into an early
version of the GATT. 78 The last of the ground laying conferences,
which has occasionally been referenced as the Geneva
Conference, but was formally titled the Second Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, was held in Geneva between April and
October 1947.7 9 Work was completed at the Geneva Convention
on the draft ITO Charter by one group of delegates, while another
finalized multilateral trade and tariff negotiations, including the
GATT, with the latter's provisions drawn from the draft Charter
itself.8 0 The fourth and last of the conferences fleshing out the
the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference recommendation that governments
strengthen the International Monetary Fund and International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development objectives by reducing "obstacles to
international trade." See United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference
(Bretton Woods, N.H.), July 1-22, 1944, PROCEEDINGS AND DOcUMENTS 941 (U.S.
Dep't of State Pub. No. 2866, 1948).
77. Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee, U.N. Conference
on Trade and Employment, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33 (1946) [hereinafter
London Report].
78. Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee, U.N.
Conference on Trade and Employment. U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales
No. 1947.11.3 (1947) [hereinafter New York Report); U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.6/W.58
(1947) (first full draft, GATT). (NOTE: Due to the difficulty in accessing these
materials, early United Nations documents hereinafter are cited only by document
number.)
79. Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee, U.N.
Conference on Trade and Employment, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/ 186, U.N.
Sales No. 1947.11.4 [hereinafter Geneva Report).
80. The tariff and trade negotiations at Geneva were conducted by the Tariff
Agreement Committee. The Committee concerned itself with negotiating tariff
concessions and drafting of the GATT. With regard to the latter, the Committee
simply concerned itself with which ITO Charter provisions on general commercial
policy should be included in the GATT. It was not thought appropriate to redraft
the provisions of interest. See U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/TAC/SR-1-28 (1947) and U.N.
Doc. E/PC/T/TAC/PV.7 at 3 (1947). This duplication of provisions on general
commercial policy occurred largely because the delegates from the United States
felt as though they had been authorized by Congress to enter Into a multilateral
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GATT's negotiating history is the so-called Havana Conference,
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, the
conference that the earlier three looked toward. Running from
November 1947 to the end of March 1948, the Conference
reviewed and reworked the draft ITO Charter submitted by the
Geneva Conference delegates. 8 ' Though GATT had been
completed during the Geneva Conference, because its provisions
were drawn from the draft ITO Charter, much of what was said at
Havana is relevant to understanding the various provisions of the
General Agreement. The following relies on materials appearing
in the records of each of these conferences.
A. Likeness Read Restrictively
The narrow, restrictive sense in which GATT Articles 11(2),
Il(2) (first sentence), 111(4), VI(1), VI(4), VI(7), VII(2)(a) and (b) and
XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) (first clause) employ the term like imparts a
meaning of identity or very close similarity. The negotiating
background of some of these provisions lends support to this
textual reading. For instance, at the Havana Conference, Mr.
Morton, the delegate from Australia, suggested that like products
as used in the antidumping and countervailing duties standard of
GATT Article VI refers to products that are exactly the same. 82
The basic idea underlying Article VI was to allow actions to negate
unfair pricing advantages upsetting the normal competitive
relationship obtaining between businesses in a state of import
and those in a state of supply.8 3 Therefore, a narrow reading of
trade agreement but not a multilateral trade organization. See Hearings on
Operation of the Trade Agreements Act in Proposed ITO Before the House Ways and
Means Comm., 80th Cong.. 1st Sess. 19-95, 235 (1947) (concerning limited
authority).
81. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and
Related Documents, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (1948); U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4 (1948).
82. Mr. Morton was responding to an inquiry from Mr. Corea, of Ceylon,
during the thirtieth meeting of Committee III. the body charged with consideration
of provisions on general international commercial policy. See Third Committee
Commercial Policy, Summary Record of the Thirtieth Meeting, U.N. Conference on
Trade and Employment, 3d Comm., 30th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/C.3/SR. 30 at
5 (1948).
83. What eventually became Article VI of GATT was originally found in Article
11 of the United States 1946 Suggested Charter for the ITO. See U.S. Suggested
Charter for an International Trade Organization of the United Nations, Dep't of
State Pub. No. 2598 (1946) [hereinafter U.S. Suggested Charter]. With regard to
that proposal, a predecessor document containing an admonition for an Article 11
type standard, U.S. Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment,
Dep't of State Pub. No. 2411, ch. III(A)(3), at 9-12 (1945) [hereinafter U.S.
Proposals], provided that Its alms were to be effectuated by states avoiding actions
"incompatible with... undertakings designed to promote an expanding volume of
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likeness makes it easier to accomplish this objective. Reading
like to encompass distinctly dissimilar items, on the other hand,
results in protection disruptive to normally prevailing level of
competition.
This restrictive, narrow reading of Article VI's reference to
like is further supported by earlier negotiating records. The
United States furnished the basic negotiating text for the ITO
Charter employed during the 1946 London Conference. Article II,
paragraph 1 of that draft addressed the concerns now dealt with
by GATT Article VI. The language of Article II as examined by the
Technical Subcommittee of Committee II at the London
Conference referenced not only like but also similar products. 8 4
Presumably because of an awareness of the potential, for
disruptive protective action by importing nations, Australia
proposed that the Subcommittee delete any reference to similar
from what eventually became Article VI of the General
Agreement. 85 The absence of any such reference in GATT Article
VI thus leaves no doubt that like does not include goods that are
only similar to others.
The negotiating history of GATT Article XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) (first
clause) suggests a record closely parallel to that of Article VI. At
the twelfth meeting of Committee II during the 1946 London
Conference, the delegate from Chile, Mr. Videla, commented on
the meaning of like that appeared in an early version of the
article.8 6 Reading from a report prepared by Mr. Hawkins, the
. . . trade . . . in accordance with comparative efficiencies of production."
Moreover, at the first of the three preparatory meetings leading up to the Havana
Conference, it appeared the delegates were concerned with the disruption of
normal competition brought about by several dumping practices. These included
price, freight or service, exchange rate, or forced labor practices that resulted in
commercial advantages for benefited products. See First Session of the Preparatory
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/C.I/48 at 1 (1946) [hereinafter London Conference]; U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/C.II/54 at 11 (1946). Ultimately, only price dumping was singled out as
being subject to responsive action. See New York Report, supra note 78, at 13
(product of the second of the preparatory meetings); Report of Conference, United
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/C.III/SR.30 at
6 (1948) [hereinafter Report of Conference], and U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/8 at 74 (1948)
(work of the Havana Conference itself. The thrust of the responsive action
remained nonetheless clear.
84. See London Conference, supra note 83; Draft Report of the Technical
Subcommittee of Committee II (Nov. 16, 1946), U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.Il/54 at 12
(1946).
85. Draft Report of the Technical Subcommittee of Committee ff, supra note 84,
at 13 (1946).
86. The language commented on was that of the United States Suggested
ITO Charter version of what became GATT Article XI(2)(c)(i)-(ii). Its thrust and
terminology was largely identical to the GATT provision. See U.S. Suggested
Charter, supra note 83. at 13.
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United States delegate, Mr. Videla noted that the concept
"definitely does not mean what [it) mean[s] in other
contexts-merely a competing product."8 7 He continued that if a
nation restricted production of domestic apples, it could not also
place importation limits on foreign bananas because they
compete with apples.8 8 Mr. Hawkins suggested exactly the same
kind of approach to the concept of likeness in what eventually
became Article XI of the General Agreement at the fifth meeting of
Committee 11.89
In Article XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) (first clause) like does not simply
mean one item that can be interchanged with another. It appears
to mean that items are alike when they are identical or yery
closely similar. This is the thrust of the comments by both Mr.
Videla and Mr. Hawkins at the London Conference. In line with
this narrow conception is Article XI(2)(c)'s basic objective, to
provide a mechanism for stabilizing fortuitous fluctuations in the
supply of agricultural and fisheries products without creating a
device useable for ordinary protective purposes.90  Taken
together, the interpretive conception of like and the objective of
the inclusive article confirm the conclusion from textual analysis
that GATT favors allowing natural productive efficiencies free
reign. Products that are not affected by some unusual
fluctuation in supply cannot claitm protection under Article
XI(2](c). Even when such fluctuations occur and are addressed
by appropriate governmental measures, they cannot provide a
pretext for using Article XI(2)(c) to limit imports of other kinds of
87. See London Conference, supra note 83; see also U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/C.II/PV.12 at 6 (1946); U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/36 at 8 (comment to
same effect made by Mr. Hawkins, United States, at the 5th meeting of Committee
II).
88. See U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/PV.12, supra note 87, at 6.
89. The United States delegate was responding to an inquiry from Mr.
Speekenbrink, of the Netherlands, regarding whether like meant "products used
for the same purpose." See U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/PV.2 at 20 (Speekenbrink's
inquiry); U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/PV.5 at 27 (Hawkins' response).
90. See Report of Conference, supra note 83; U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/8 at 91-92
(1948) (noting the basis for invoking XI(2){c) related to supply rather than price
fluctuations); see also The Geneva Charter for an International Trade
Organization, Dep't of State Pub. No. 2950 at 6 (1947). With respect to Article
XI(2)(c)'s agricultural and fisheries exceptions, it is there stated:
First, imports may not be restricted unless the domestic product is
also restricted. This rule is necessary to prevent the use of quotas for
ordinary protective purposes. Secondly, the domestic product must be
restricted to approximately the same degree as the imported product. This
requirement, which is related to the first, is necessary to prevent countries
from applying their restrictions in such a way as to boost domestic output
by cutting down on imports.
[Vol. 27:33
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foreign products just because natural economic efficiencies make
them attractive.
The negotiating record of Article III is also instructive. Recall
that neither Article 111(2) (first sentence) nor 111(4) mention
anything other than that imports must receive the same internal
treatment within an importing GATT state as accorded to like
products produced in the state of importation. Yet curiously
enough, a subcommittee redraft of the United States originally
proposed ITO Charter, considered by the delegates at the London
Conference in 1946, referenced "identical or similar products" in
conjunction with the national treatment obligation.91 Not only
would the fact Article III, as it eventually emerged, failed to
reference similar products indicate a restrictive meaning of like,
but the very scope of likeness would seem informed by the
subcommittee's use of the term "identical." Evidence from the
Geneva Conference of 1947 further supports this restrictive
reading. In the debates regarding Article III, both the United
States delegate, Mr. Winthrop Brown, and the British delegate,
Mr. Shackle, clearly indicated that an importing state was not
free to levy internal charges on an imported item when the same
kind of item was not produced by the importing state.92 The
obvious reason for insisting that imports not be subjected to
internal burdens in such situations is to avoid disadvantaging
imports vis-4-vis domestic goods.93 In this respect, the overlap
91. See Draft Report of the Technical Subcomm. of Committee 11 (Nov. 16,
1946), U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/54 at 4-5 (1946) (U.S. Suggested Charter. Articles
9( 1)-(2). as redrafted by the Subcommittee).
92. See U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/TAC/PV.10 at 37 (Mr. Winthrop Brown), 40 (Mr.
Shackle) (1947).
93. See Id. (Brown objecting to internal taxes on imports when the effect is to
protect a similar domestic product that is untaxed; Shackle arguing that a state
importing natural products should not be able to tax such so as to allow untaxed
domestic synthetics an economic advantage); see also U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/TAC/PV.10 at 14-15 (1947) (comments of Chinese delegate, Mr. Wunsz
King).
It should be noted that the negotiating record referenced above is interpreted
as saying that if a domestic item exactly the same as (or very closely similar to) a
taxed imported item is not also being taxed, then the state of importation is
violating 111(2), first sentence. Thus, the record is viewed as reading like
restrictively. Admittedly, however, it could also be read as viewing like more
flexibly. That is, the comments by the delegates from the United States and
United Kingdom suggest importing states are not permitted to impose internal
taxes on imports (when those states do not even produce items the same as what
is imported) in order to favor domestic production of similar, competitive, or
substitutable items. Therefore, Article III's reference to like must be understood
in a broad sense. See discussion of 111(2), second sentence, Infra part III.C. A part
of the record of the 1948 Havana Conference, however, seems to undercut this
position. See Reports of Committees and Principal Subcommittees, UN Conference
on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. ICITO/I/8 at 64 (1948) (rejecting an
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with some of the other like product provisions is quite
pronounced.
B. Likeness Read With Some Flexibility
As suggested earlier, Article I(1)'s MFN reference to like might
be construed as encompassing items that are interchangeable
with, or able to take the place of, other items. This provision's
negotiating history supports reading likeness flexibly in the
context of that Article. This would distinguish it from the
provisions surveyed in the preceding subsection, all of which
appear capable of supporting nothing more than a narrow
reading. Nonetheless, it does not appear that Article I(1)'s history
suggests like may be read as covering items that share the
feature of interchangeability. Such an understanding of likeness
would allow even totally distinct or different items to be
considered like, as long as they could be used in place of the
other items.
There are two pieces of evidence in the record of Article l(1)'s
formulation that support the foregoing assessment. At the
twelfth meeting of Committee II during the 1946 London
Conference, the delegate from France, Mr. Nathan, inquired
whether the reference to MFN for like products (in what
ultimately became Article I(1)) applied when one state was
involved with shipments of wheat cereal and another with
shipments of different cereals. Were "all cereals ... considered
'like products' or only wheat?" In response, the Rapporteur, Mr.
Leddy, from the United States, indicated that only wheat cereals
would be viewed as like products.94 Clearly, by excluding not
only nonwheat cereals but, more importantly, noncereals capable
of being used instead of wheat cereals, the conception of like
voiced at the Conference did not extend to products merely
interchangeable with others. Conversely, as the response was
not confined to cover only wheat cereals identical or strikingly
similar to those of the other state, it would appear like was
envisioned as applying to nonidentical, dissimilar wheat cereals
that are able to replace other wheat cereals. Indeed, reaching
any other conclusion would be difficult, given the fact that the
delegates to the very same Committee at the very same
Conference understood likeness, in the context of what became
importing state's right, under article 18 of the ITO Charter, the analogue of GATT
article Ill, to impose regulations or taxes on imports of an item (i.e.,
oleomargarine) unless there is "substantial domestic production" of the same item
(i.e., oleomargarine)).
94. See U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.11/65 at 2 (1946).
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Article XI(2)(c), to mean identical or very closely similar.9 5 With
this understanding in mind, it would seem strange that the
United States delegate's response to the French delegate's inquiry
failed to show adequate sensitivity to the distinctions between
very closely similar items and distinct yet interchangeable items.
The second piece of evidence comes from the fifth meeting of
Committee III during the Havana Conference. At that session,
Mr. Zorlu, the delegate from Turkey, asked about the meaning of
likeness in Article I(1). In response, Mr. Wilgress, the Canadian
delegate and Chair of the Committee, posed the hypothetical of a
state with a tariff schedule distinguishing between automobiles
under and over 1500 kilograms. He then observed that, as these
items were different, Article I would not treat the vehicles as
like. 96  Again, the suggestion is • that neither mere
interchangeability nor exact or virtual identity are required by
Article I(1). Interchangeabflity is surely excluded by the fact that
the delegates spoke of automobiles of a certain weight not being
like those weighing less. The latter seemingly would also be
excluded because the exchange between Mr. Zorlu and Mr.
Wilgress focused on but one difference between automobiles from
distinct states. It did not degenerate into nit-picking about other
sure differences between autos shipped from different states of
export. This indicates an awareness that, as long as the vehicles
are interchangeable, perhaps they need not be the same in all
respects.
The professed objective of Article I(1) confirms a slightly
flexible reading of the term like. It also verifies the idea that this
GATT common language provision is based on the theme of
effectuating natural productive efficiencies. From the earliest
sessions of the London Conference in 1946, it was apparent that
any final proposal for an international trade regime would include
an MFN obligation. The seminal proposal for an ITO Charter,
submitted at that Conference by the United States, included MFN
as one of five basic principles.9 7 It was clear from at least the
time of President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" in 1918
that equal treatment between trading states was seen as an
essential condition of trade, 98 presumably because it would allow
95. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
96. See Third Committee: Commercial Policy, Summary Record of the Fifth
Meeting, U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, 3d Comm., 5th mtg., U.N.
Doc. E/Conf. 2/C.3/SR.5 at 4 (1947).
97. See U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/PV.2 at 2 (1947); see also U.S. Proposals, supra
note 83, chapter II(A) at 11 (earliest U.S. proposal).
98. See Commercial Policy In the Interwar Period: International Proposals and
National Policies League of Nations Doc. II ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 1942 II.A.6, at
15 (1942).
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each state to take full advantage of its indigenous economic
strengths. At the Geneva Conference in 1947 the United States
again reiterated its position that MFN was an essential part of
any negotiation leading to an agreement establishing normal
trade.99 Throughout the process, few delegations disagreed; most
attention concentrated on the scope of MFN, rather than whether
MFN itself should be included in the final product. 100
With regard to the other GATT like product articles, at least
those which textually seem to merit a construction flexible
enough to include interchangable items, the negotiating record
reveals a dearth of information about the drafters' conception of
like. The most that can be said on Articles IX(1) and XIII(1) is
that, since these were designed to apply MFN or at least fair and
equal treatment to both the problems of marks of origin and
quotas, they should be interpreted like Article I(1). On Article
XVI(4), the other provision using like in a fashion seeming to
merit flexible reading, two points merit notation.
First, it must be recalled that Article XVI(4) did not find its
way into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade until 1955,
when the Contracting Parties amended Article XVI to add Section
B; they added not only paragraph 4, but also paragraphs 2, 3,
and 5.101 There was little discussion about that amendment
relevant to the term like. Nonetheless, it is clear from the
language of paragraph 2 of Article XVI that the principal objective
of the drafting parties was to address, in some manner, the
disruptive effect of subsidization on "normal commercial"
patterns. To this extent, it would then seem most appropriate to
view the reference to like in paragraph 4 as encompassing
interchangeable items. A more restrictive reading could well
frustrate the attainment of the Article's basic goal. Further,
Article XVI(2)'s articulation of this goal suggests once again a
central theme binding the GATT common language provisions, a
theme of allowing natural market efficiencies to function with as
few impediments possible. Obviously, had the architects of
Article XVI been very serious about effectuating this idea they
would have drawn the provision much more tightly. That they
subjected subsidization to some restriction, nonetheless
evidences a genuine commitment to the theme.
99. See U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/TAC/PV.2 at 29. 46; U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/TAC/PV.23 at 8 (1947).
100. See generally U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/CJI/3 at 6,7 (1946); U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.IU/PV.2
at 10, 12 (1946); U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/TAC/PV.2 at 12,23 (1947).
101. Protocol Amending The Preamble and Parts II and III of the GATT (1955):
Reports Relating to the Review of the Agreement. Other Barriers to Trade, GATT
L/334 (Mar. 3, 1955), BID 3d Supp. 222, at 224-27.
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The second point about Article XVI(4) worthy of notation
concerns an observation proffered during the 1946 London
Conference, found in a report of a joint drafting subcommittee of
Committees II and IV. Commenting on then Article 25 of the
proposed United States Charter for the ITO, the subcommittee
indicated it would violate one's undertakings to subsidize exports
of a certain product and then argue it was permissible because
the practice resulted in an export price lower than the home
market price, but on a product "differ[ing] slightly from [the]
product sold in the [home] market."' 0 2 The restrictions on export
subsidization could not be escaped that easily. Like products, as
used in Article 25 of the United States proposal, encompassed
more than just identical or very closely similar items. Since
Article XVI(4) hinged an obligation on export subsidies and price
relationships on the concept of likeness, l0 3 the somewhat flexible
understanding evidenced in the London Conference's negotiating
history proves valuable in confIrming the interpretations of like
suggested above.
C. Phraseology of Broadest Meaning
Article I(2) (second sentence) as well as Articles XI(2)(c)(i)
and (ii) (last clause) and XIX(1)(a) and (b) go well beyond the
conceptions of likeness just discussed. By using the notions of
competitive or substitutable goods, seemingly they could be read
to cover items sharing absolutely no similarity with another, as
long as the items appeal to the consumers of (or can be used in
place of) the other item. The negotiating record of these three
provisions supports that conclusion.
For Article I(2) (second sentence) at least two evidentiary
items in the history of the provision's language are of distinct
relevance. Before discussing these, however, it must be recalled
that Article 111(2) and its explanatory note were incorporated into
GATT by a 1948 amendment'0 4 designed to revise the original
GATT Article H11,105 thereby bringing it more in line with the
102. See Report of the Joint Drafting Subcommittee of Committees 11 and IV on
Subsidies on Primary Products, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/61 at 4-5 (1947).
103. Although the United States had proposed limits on export subsidies in its
draft ITO Charter, such did not originally make their way into the GATT because
of the United States delegation's position that it lacked authority to enter a trade
agreement containing limitations of this sort. See U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.VI/46 at 2
(1947).
104. See GATT Doc. GATr/CP.2/22/Rev. 1, report adopted Sept. 2, 1948;
Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the GATT.
105. Article III was first adopted at the Geneva Conference in late 1947. See
55 U.N.T.S. 188, 204 (1947). The Geneva version read in relevant part:
19941
72 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 27:33
corresponding provision of the Havana Conference's ITO
Charter. o6 This is significant because Article III(2)'s development
suggests that the notions of competitive and substitutable are
entirely novel to any possible understanding of likeness seen so
far. The reference to competitive and substitutable is made in the
Addendum, rather than in the second sentence of Article I(2),
where it would exist in clear juxtaposition to the concept of
likeness appearing in the first sentence. While this placement
might suggest the terms refer to items that share characteristics
with, yet can be used in place of, other relevant items, this
conclusion seems erroneous. The drafting record associated with
the Addendum explanatory to Article 111(2) (second sentence) is
contrary to any reading of competitive and substitutable that
tracks Article I(1)'s, IX(1)'s, XIII(1)'s or XVI(4's earlier discussion
of like as an item interchangeable with some other.'0 7 True,
before the Havana Conference, the actual language of what
became Article III did contrast like and competitive or
substitutable. 10 8  Nothing in the records of the Havana
Conference, however, suggests the relocation was designed to
narrow the distinction between those two terms and the concept
of likeness articulated at the precursor Geneva Conference.' 0 9
That distinction was said to prohibit imposing internal charges
imposed on imported goods entirely different from domestically
[I]n cases in which there is no substantial domestic production of like
products of national origin, no contracting party shall apply new or
increased internal taxes on the products of the territories of other
contracting parties for the purpose of affording protection to the
production of directly competitive or substitutable products which are not
similarly taxed; and existing internal taxes of this kind shall be subject to
negotiation for their reduction or elimination.
55 U.N.T.S. at 264.
106. See U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 3/78, Havana ITO Charter art. 18 (1948).
107. See supra part II.B.
108. It read:
In cases in which there is no substantive domestic production of like
product of national origin, no contracting party shall apply new or
increased taxes on the products of the territories of other contracting
parties for the purpose of affording protection to the production of directly
competitive or substitutable products which are not similarly taxed....
109. At the Geneva Conference, it was specifically indicated that the provision
which eventually became the second sentence of Article 111(2), and its explanatory
Addendum, were intended to encompass distinctly different kinds of goods. With
regard to an importing state that imposes an internal tax on oranges, which It
does not produce but has given a tariff binding on, the consequent protection
resulting to apples, which the importing state does produce but does not tax, was
resoundingly condemned. See U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV.9 at 7 (1947).
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produced goods that were used instead of the imports due to the
imports' added cost.110
The second piece of evidence on the meaning of competitive
and substitutable is much more direct. Specifically, it concerns
statements of the delegates involved in the drafting of Article 111(2)
about the meaning of those very words. For instance, there
seemed to be some agreement at the Havana Conference that
tung oil (an item occasionally used in finishing furniture) would
be considered competitive with or substitutable for linseed oil,
and that coal in certain cases would be considered competitive
with or substitutable for fuel oil. 1i n  Given the obvious
dissimilarities between these items, in particular the last two, one
would seem hard pressed to show that competitive and
substitutable have the same meaning as like in its most flexible
sense.
Moving to the negotiations on Article XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) (last
clause), there is little information on the idea of substitutable as
explicit as that regarding the explanatory Note on Article 111(2)
(second sentence). Nonetheless, the New York Conference draft of
the GATT contained, in what ultimately became Article XI(2)(c)(i)
and (ii), no reference beyond like products. 112 The Geneva
Conference draft ITO Charter provided the first reference to the
broader concept of "substitutable."' 13  There is some
indication' 1 4 that Article x's use of likeness is not to be read, as
it might in other contexts, as connoting mere competitiveness.
Understanding likeness as the equivalent of competitiveness is
unwarranted. This is true even under the more flexible usages of
110. See supra note 94, regarding wheat cereals and Article I(1). Like in
Article 1(1) encompasses wheat cereals of different, non-closely similar sorts, but
not nonwheat cereals. The justification for this assessment rested on the fact that
a negative response had been given to a query, made during the London
Conference in 1946, regarding whether nonwheat cereals would be considered like
wheat cereals for the purposes of I(1). If like in Article I(1) encompasses non-
identical or nonsimilar wheat cereals, but not those nonwheat in content (or
noncereals), then any conception of competitive and substitutable that covers
oranges replaced with apples (let alone a citrus fruit replaced with a noncitrus
fruit), signifies a usage vastly different from the "flexible" meaning of like.
111. See Third Committee: Commercial Policy, Summary Record of the Fourtleth
Meeting, U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, 3d Comm., 40th mtg., U.N.
Doc. E/Conf. 2/C.3/SR.40 at 1 (1947).
112. New York Report, supra note 78, art. IX(2)(e), at 70.
113. Geneva Report, supra note 79, art. 20(2)(c)(i), at 20. In the context of the
Conference's draft ITO Charter, Article 25, replicating Article IX of the draft GATT,
it had been proposed that the broader notion of "directly competitive" be included.
New York Report, supra note 78, at 20, cmt. g (commenting on art. 25(2)(e)(1)).
114. This is alluded to above in the discussion of Article XI(2](c)'s reference to
like. See supra part H.A.
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that term in Articles I(1), IX(l), XIII(1), and XVI(4). 115 However,
since in common parlance substitutable is seen as synonymous
with likeness, that the architects of Article XI employ both
concepts in the same provision suggests substitutable was
intended to include all competitive products, even though they
share few characteristics.
Some support for this position can be gleaned from the
record of the 1947 New York Conference. The draft of GATT to
emerge from that round of meetings did not refer in Article
XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) (last clause) to anything other than like
products. Despite that fact, discussion did occur at the fifth
meeting of the Drafting Committee on January 24, 1947 about
inserting the broader concept of directly competitive goods. What
precipitated the discussion was a proposal by Mr. Shackle, the
United Kingdom's delegate, that the draft of Article XI refer to the
permissibility of using import restrictions in cases when there
exist domestic marketing or production limitations on products
"directly competitive" with the restricted products from abroad.
This proposal stimulated Mr. Guerra of Cuba to point out that
products "may be competing for the same market and yet may be
entirely different in form."116 Guerra's observation is significant
for its recognition that competitive can include products that are
entirely different in form. Ultimately GATT Article XI(2)(c) opted
for "directly substituted," rather than "directly competitive" as Mr.
Shackle had proposed. Nevertheless, the two concepts, though
admittedly somewhat different, are very closely related. The early
recognition by delegates negotiating GATT that even items vastly
dissimilar in form could be brought within the ambit of Article XI
by the use of language more expansive than like, is extremely
instructive when it comes to divining the concept of substitutable.
At the very least, substitutable is not to be seen as a merely
redundant synonym of like.
With respect to Article XIX, its basic purpose should point
toward the exact same conclusion on the meaning of competitive.
Any product that can be interchanged with or used in place of
another product is considered competitive, notwithstanding that
it is entirely distinct and different. The idea behind the provision
is to allow GATT parties to safeguard their economic well-being by
escaping the general obligations of the Agreement in certain
specific cases. Overall the GATT seeks to promote freer trade
than had previously existed; it does not seek totally free trade.
This is evident in both the terms of Article XIX (and Part IV on
Trade and Development), as well as in the fact that Article XIX
115. See supra part HIA. for discussion of these provisions.
116. See U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.VI/17 at 4 (1947).
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found its way into the agreement at the behest of the United
States, which was clearly concerned about entering any
commitment that might prove fatally debilitating to economic
health.1 1 7 This background suggests that the term competitive
could well allow states to respond to increased imports that
injure producers of items vastly different from those from abroad
which have captured the attention of purchasers in the state of
importation. 1 18 Absent this understanding of Article XIX, the
GATT could indeed result in the undoing of a nation's economic
well-being, by compelling importing states to refrain from
responding to increased shipments of foreign items that take
away the market of local producers of goods not identical or
similar to those from abroad.
Article XIX confirms that GATT is not an economic suicide
pact. It strives to fashion a liberalization in trade nonexistent
during the interwar years, while preserving in limited and
restricted cases the right to utilize protectionist devices. The very
fact that Article XIX preserves the opportunity for protectionist
action drives home the significance of the changes that GATT
rules seek to make in the international trading regime. All along
it has been observed that the General Agreement like product and
associated language provisions look toward allowing natural
economic efficiencies to reshape the world commercial
environment. Article XIX may not have even been needed had
such an ambitious goal not been set. That it found its way into
the GATT does not in the least alter the fact that such a lofty goal
exists. The terms competitive and substitutable in Articles XIX,
XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) (last clause), and 111(2) (second sentence) lend
themselves to extremely broad readings. The theme of promoting
the growth of trading partners' strengths is made clear. The
117. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2411, PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION OF
WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT 13. § B3 (Commercial Policy Series 79) (1945)
(proposing an Article XIX-like provision); see also London Report, supra note 77,
annex 11, 52, 59, art. 29; U.N. Doc E/PC/T/C.Il/PV.7 at 3 (1946) (statement by
United States delegate at London Conference, expressing fear that freer trade
might undermine economic health); 91 CONG. REC. 4,870-72 (1945) (remarks of
Rep. Doughton); 1945 Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act: Before the
Committee on Finance, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 84, 86, 90, 179-80, 459-60 (1945)
(insisting on an escape provision in any trade agreement).
118. This conclusion seems further supported by the fact that the London
draft ITO Charter contained in its emergency provision the words like or similar
products. See London Report, supra note 77, app., at 33, art. 34 (1946). This
parallels the United States Draft Charter, Id. annex 11, 52, 59, art. 29. The New
York Conference included the phrase like or directly competitive in both the draft
ITO Charter, New York Report, supra note 78. at 29, art. 34(1); and the draft
GATT, td. at 76, art. XVIII(1). If this shift signifies anything, it certainly signifies
that competitive encompasses items that may be entirely dissimilar from the items
made by producers who are injured by increased imports.
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central and recurring motif of the GATT common language
provisions is comparative efficiencies.
D. In Any Form
The negotiating record indicates that the reference in Article
XI(2)(c) to restricting imports of agricultural or fisheries products
"in any form" when the government has adopted measures
limiting domestic production or removing temporary surpluses
has been in the various versions of the ITO Charter and the GATT
from the beginning. This language appears in both Article 25 of
the London Conference's ITO Charter n1 9 and Article 19 of the
earlier United States draft Charter, which served as the basis for
discussions at the 1946 London Conference. 120  With the
adoption of the draft ITO Charter emerging from the Geneva
Conference, the interpretative Note now located in the GATT
Addendum relative to Article XI(2)(c) made its first appearance. 1 21
The obvious intent is to prohibit importing states from imposing
restrictions on incoming agricultural or fisheries products when
these imports are in some advanced stage of processing.1 22 In
fact, during the 1947 Geneva Conference it was observed that in
any form was not seen as extending to products so far along the
processing spectrum that they are "tinned" or "capable of being
stocked."'2 Nonetheless, by allowing restrictions on products
that are still in the early stages of processing, it is clear the
phrase corroborates the more generous readings of like and
substitutable articulated above. In so doing, it implicitly
reaffirms that the theory of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade is directed toward favoring inherent productive efficiencies.Article XI(2)(c)'s overall thrust has been described as
empowering importing states to deal with: the "capricious bounty
of nature, which will sometimes give you a huge catch of fish or a
huge crop;" and the problem of "a multitude of small unorganized
producers that cannot organize themselves"124 and so produce
surpluses. It was not aimed at protecting the industrial
processing sector. As the Havana Conference records indicate,
the Article "should not be construed as permitting the use of
quantitative restrictions as a method of protecting the industrial
119. London Report, supra note 77, at 29, art. 25(e).
120. Id. at 57, art. 19(2](e). The United States draft, however, only included
restrictions on agricultural products. Id.
121. See Geneva Report, supra note 79, at 20, art. 20, interpretative note.
122. See GATT, supra note 5, annex I, addendum to art. XI(2)(c).
123. See U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/19 (1947).
124. Id.
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processing of agriculture or fisheries products."125 While in any
form may indeed be susceptible to a broad and generous reading,
it seems the drafters' desire to refrain from providing protection to
the domestic processing industry confirms the need for the
restricted imports to be at one of the first stages of processing. In
fact, the Havana Conference's ITO Charter version of the GATT
Addendum Note on Article XI(2)(c)'s reference to in any form not
only indicated the imports must be in "such processed forms...
as are . . . closely related to the original product," but that the
relationship must be "as regards utilization."
12 6
IV. GATT PANEL DECISIONS
The first four plus decades of GATT decisional law have seen
no less than twenty cases dealing with the concept of like
products. That figure represents roughly one-fifth of all the panel
decisions reported during that period.12 7 Of the seventeen GATT
provisions that in one form or another reference the concept of
likeness, the cases decided have only addressed six: Articles I,
III, VI, XI, XIII, and XVI. In this Part, the opinions connected with
those cases will be considered, and some attempt will be made to
ascertain whether they emphasize themes consonant with the
previously reviewed language and negotiating history of the
relevant GATT provisions.
A. Article I. Most Favored Nation Treatment
Five principal decisions have been rendered on Article I's
obligation that a contracting party accord to products from
another party treatment no less favorable than that accorded to
like products from any other state. In one of the earliest panel
decisions, it was stated that the notion of likeness differed from
competitive or substitutable,328 the implication being that
125. U.N. Doc. ICITO/I/8 at 93-94, para. 39 (1948), Reports of Committees
and Principal Sub-committees.
126. See Final Act and Related Documents, U.N. Conference on Trade and
Employment, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78, annex P, at 63, interpretative note on art.
20, para. 2(c) (1948).
127. Approximately one hundred GATT decisions have been reported during
the referenced four-plus decade span (1947-1990).
128. The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, GATT Doc. C.P.4/39
(Apr. 3, 1950) (Chile-Austrl.), 2 BISD 188, 8 [hereinafter Australian Subsidy]. In
this case, Chile complained that an Australian subsidy scheme designed to
stimulate the purchase and use of fertilizer by Australians violated, Inter alia,
Article I by subsidizing sales of domestic and foreign ammonium sulphate but not
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likeness in the context of MFN envisions a closer degree of
identity than in some other contexts. Subsequent decisions have
accepted this proposition. 129  This narrower reading makes
eminently good sense in view that both competitive and
substitutable are alluded to in other GATT provisions referencing
like products.' 30
Another important consideration that has appeared in the
MFN like product cases is tariff classification. The idea is that,
while the GATT does not impose a particular classification system
on the contracting parties, the discretion left to them is limited by
the obligation of Article I to treat like products alike.' 3 1 States
are free to introduce into their tariff schedules any number of
subcategories.' 3 2 It appears, however, that if an imported item
falls within the ambit of a particular tariff classification
description, its importation cannot be subjected to less favorable
terms than those accorded to another state's imports under that
tariff category.' 33 Additionally, when the product fails to meet
the specific terms of a particular tariff description, the limiting
effect of Article I nonetheless may result in the product being
sales of domestic and foreign sodium nitrate, a product Chile considered to be like
ammonium sulphate. The panel found these products not to be like. Id.
129. Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, GATT Doc. G/26 (Oct. 31,
1952) (Nor. v. F.R.G.), BISD Ist Supp. 53. 56. 1 8 [hereinafter Treatment by
Germany].
130. See e.g., GATT, supra note 5, arts. 111(2), annex I. explanatory addendum
to art. XU(2)(c), and art. XIX. For analysis of the textual language of GATT
provisions using competitive and substitutable, see supra part I.C.
131. Spain-Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, GATT Doc. L/5135 (June 11, 1981)
(Braz. v. Spain), BISD 28th Supp. 102, 111, 4.4 [hereinafter Tariff Treatment];
Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber, GATT Doc. L/6470
(July 19, 1989) (Can. v. Japan), BISD 36th Supp. 167. 198, 1 5.8-5.10
[hereinafter Tarff on Imports].
132. It should be noted, however, that if the introduction results in a violation
of a basic commitment under a concession on a "bound" item, then GATT Article
11(5) becomes relevant.
133. Imports of Beef from Canada, GATT Doc. L/5099 (Mar. 10, 1981) (Can. v.
E.E.C.), BISD 28th Supp. 92, 98, 4.2(a) [hereinafter Imports of Bee. In this
case, Canada alleged that the EEC violated Article I through the imposition of an
import levy, over and above a 20% ad valorem tariff, on high quality grain-fed beef
from Canada, while permitting the levy free entry of high quality grain fed beef
from the United States. Id. § 2.2. Under EEC Commission Regulation No.
2972/79, such "levy" free beef was described and said to automatically meet the
description provided if graded as choice or prime by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Food Safety and Quality Service (FSQS). Id. § 2.4. This Regulation
implemented a concession negotiated between the EC and the United States
during the Tokyo Round of the MTN. Beef could be imported levy free only under
a Certificate of Authenticity issued by the FSQS. Id. § 2.5. The practical effect of
requiring certification by a United States agency was that Canadian beef
otherwise within the described tariff category was subject to the import "levy." Id.
§§ 3.5-3.7.
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eligible to receive the same favorable treatment granted to
products within that description. From the standpoint of tariff
classification, the important factors consulted by the panel
decisions in such instances include: whether the importing
nation accused of contravening Article I classifies the product of
concern in another distinct category; and whether other states
maintain these distinctions in their own tariff classification
systems. The idea of course is that in some instances an
importing state may have failed to accord like products like
treatment. The fact the importing state itself maintains a distinct
classification category is not determinative of whether the product
of concern is unlike and different from products within other
categories receiving more favorable treatment. Nevertheless, the
maintenance of such a highly detailed system of classification has
resulted in decisions that find differing treatment to be in
conformance with Article 1.134 The exact reverse has also been
found when the evidence suggests the product involved has been
slotted into another tariff classification under circumstances
which appear akin to those that might ring of estoppel.
135
Obviously, though, how states other than the one allegedly
contravening MFN classify the imported item would seem just a
bit more significant in deciding likeness. Perhaps in recognition
of this self-evident truth, several panel decisions have
134. See Australlan Subsidy, supra note 128, at 191, 8.
135. See Treatment by Germany, supra note 129, at 57, t 13. This case
involved, inter alla, German tariffs on two members of the clupeoid family of fish
(i.e., spratts and herrings) that were higher than on the third (i.e., sardines).
Since all three fish were of the same family, Norway contended like products were
being treated differently. The decision discusses like products, and mentions both
the idea of like and competitive/substitutable. Germany historically classified
spratts and herrings differently from sardines. However, for other reasons, the
panel concluded that Article I had not been violated. The panel stated:
Although the Norwegian complaint rested to a large extent on the concept
of "like" products as set out in the Agreement and the German reply
addressed itself also to that concept, the Panel was satisfied that it would
be sufficient to consider whether in the conduct of the negotiations
[between Norway and Germany in 19481 at Torquay the two parties agreed
expressly or tacitly to treat these preparations [of fish] as if they were "like
products."
Id. at 57, 12. The panel found that the evidence indicated that the parties
understood the products to be different for tariff purposes. Id. 13. Thus, the
panel stated that any argument for Norway's position had to be based on
.assurances which it considered it [had] obtained in the course of the negotiation
rather than on the automatic operation of the most-favored-nation clause." Id. at 57-
58, 13 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the panel found nullification and
impairment under Article XXII(2), because Germany had assured Norway that
though spratts and herrings were different from sardines, they would be accorded
similar tariff treatment. Id. at 58-59, 16-17.
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emphasized the importance of examining whether other states, in
their own tariff systems, employ the same kind of differentiations
as employed by the importing states whose practices are under
scrutiny.'36 When classification differentiation by the importing
state and other states coincides, the case against likeness Is
strengthened. I3 7 On the other hand, when other states do not
construct their tariff schedules to differentiate in the same
manner as the particular importing nation, the case against
likeness is weakened. 138
Aside from the distinction between competitive or
substitutable and like, and the factor of specific tariff
classification (whether in the importing nation or elsewhere), a
third element that has been consulted in deciding Article I like
product cases is the existence of discrimination based on the
origin of the products. The absence of any evidence suggesting
that a particular item is being treated differently than some other
because of its state of origin undercuts claims that MFN Is being
violated.13 9 At the same time, concrete evidence affording the
opportunity to draw inferences regarding the existence of some
discriminatory motive, that is evidence of de jure discrimination,
has gone a long way toward building a case for a GATT
infraction. 14°  Discrimination in effect, that is, de facto
discrimination, is also an available contention for one
complaining to a GATT panel about a presumed contravention of
Article 1.14 1
136. See Australian Subsidy. supra note 128, at 191, 8; Tariff Treatment,
supra note 131. at 112, 8; Tariffs on Imports, supra note 131. at 183. 3.27 (for
an argument to this effect advanced by a party to a dispute) and at 199, 1 5.14
(for the apparent recognition of this factor by the panel).
137. See, e.g., Australian Subsidy, supra note 128, at 191. 8.
138. See, e.g., Tariff Treatment. supra note 131, at 112, 4.8.
139. See Treatment by Germany, supra note 129, at 57, 11. Arguments of
this sort were advanced by the parties in Tariffs on Imports, supra note 131, at
184, 3.31, 192, 3.55-3.57. The decision of the panel in that case, however,
does not take up in absolutely clear terms discussion of the arguments. Nowhere
does it follow a straightforward statement of the arguments with a plain and
unequivocal articulation that it views the arguments as fundamentally sound.
There is language in the decision, though, intimating the panel endorses the idea.
See Infra notes 148-161 and accompanying text.
140. See Imports of Beef, supra note 133, 4.2(b), 4.5(a) (holding out
possibility that some tariff systems may be so structured that prohibited
discrimination is obvious; reference in Article II(1)(b) of GATT to "terms.
conditions, or qualifications." is not a limitation on Article I); see also id. 4.3
(finding the violation in this case to be more of the de facto sort); cf. Tariff
Treatment, supra note 131, 3.4 (indicating tariff applied without regard to
product origin).
141. See Tariff Treatment, supra note 131, at 112, 4.6-4.10.
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Palpable physical characteristics, end use, and consumer
perceptions constitute another important group of factors in the
MFN like product cases. Though the early Article I cases seem to
dwell on the other factors referenced above, the recent cases have
devoted at least as much, if not more, attention to the three
instant factors. With regard to shared physical characteristics,
the panel decisions indicate that so-called organoleptic
differences, that is differences of taste, texture, aroma, and
general aesthetic appearance deriving from genetic, chemical, or
morphological features that impress the senses, are open for
consideration. 142 At least one decision suggests such differences
are certainly not determinative of whether products are dislike; it
suggests they may even be somewhat unimportant when
conjoined with practices like product-blending that aim to mix
several items together to produce a commodity available for
public purchase. 143 On end use, the decisions of various GATT
panels find the case for likeness strengthened whenever the
products being compared have a single end use. That is, when
one imported item is argued to be like some other item benefiting
from more favorable treatment, panels seem to be more inclined
to agree with the argument if both items are put to the same
single use.144 If several disparate uses exist for the products,
there would seem to be less of an inclination to agree with an
argument of likeness.' 4 5 As for consumer perceptions, this factor
has been both inferentially and explicitly alluded to by panel
decisions. 146 While some have suggested that only "objective
142. See Id. at 107-08, 3.6-3.10; Tariff on Imports, supra note 131. at 187-
90, 3.40-3.48 (evidence on physical characteristics heard by panels).
143. See Tariff Treatment, supra note 131, at 112, TV 4.6-4.7. This case
involved a dispute between Brazil and Spain concerning the latter's imposition of
a 7% ad valorem tariff on coffee classified as "unwashed Arabica," "Robusta," or
"other," while admitting tariff free coffee classified as "Colombian mild" and "other
mild." Spain's tariff classification system came about as a result of a 1979 change
in its schedule that replaced the former unbound 22.5% tariff on all items
classified simply as "coffee" with a zero or lower rate, depending within which of
five categories of coffee an item fell. In finding in favor of Brazil's claim of violation
of Article I, the panel gave particular attention to arguments about the physical
characteristics of the various types of coffees involved, being the first time a panel
called upon to decide an Article I case took up that matter at length.
144. See Id. at 109, 1 3.13 (Brazilian argument), 112, t 4.7 (finding of panel);
see also Tariff on Imports, supra note 131. at 190, 1 3.49 (Canada argues single
end use as one basis for a finding of likeness).
145. See Tariff on Imports, supra note 131. at 190, T9 3.50-3.51 (Japan refers
to several end uses in arguments against finding of likeness). Although the SPF
Dimension Lumber panel reached a judgment against Canada, it did not rely on
Japan's argument regarding several end uses. See Id. at 197-99, 44 5.1-5.16.
146. See Id. at 191, TV 3.52-3.53 (explicit reference to consumer perception
argued by disputants: the case is not decided on this factor). See also Tariff
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criteria" should be consulted, 147 there is no doubt that knowledge
of consumer perceptions provides an additional criteria for
helping panels decide whether two products are like.
The panel decision involving the most intricate and elaborate
exposition of matters raised by a MFN like product complaint is
the Tariff on Imports of SPF Dimension Lumber (1989) case
between Canada and Japan.148  At the risk of serious
oversimplification, and without attempting to summarize all the
claims and counterclaims regarding the Japanese practice of
subjecting planed or sanded spruce, pine, or fir (SPF) lumber to
an eight percent ad valorem tariff, Canada alleged the tariff
violated Article I because it fell on SPF "dimension lumber" (i.e.,
standard cut two by fours, two by sixes) but not non-SPF
"dimension lumber" (e.g., hemlock, douglas fir). As the evidence
suggested Canada was the dominant supplier of SPF dimension
lumber and possessed a heavy concentration of spruce, pine, and
fir in comparison with other species, 149 the Japanese failure to
treat all dimension lumber the same meant like products were
not being treated alike. 150 Moreover, supplies of dimension
lumber from other states, particularly the United States, tended
to be less concentrated in SPF, and these suppliers, particularly
in the northwestern part of the United States, tended to have
larger stands of non-SPF species. 151 Consequently, the eight
percent tariff on Canadian SPF dimension lumber, and the free-
entry status of United States non-SPF dimension lumber, meant
the different treatment of like products resulted in injurious
discrimination between states of supply.' 52 Obviously, as Japan
appeared to be according SPF and non-SPF lumber different
treatment in order to protect its own economically sensitive SPF
Treatment, supra note 131, at 108, T 3.8 (Spanish argument of distinctiveness
based partly on consumer perceptions), 108-09, 3.12-13 (Brazilian counter-
argument based on "blending"), 112, T 4.7 (panel acceptance of Brazilian
argument).
147. See Tariff on Imports, supra note 131, at 191. V 3.53 (Canadian
suggestion).
148. Id.
149. See Id. T 2.19-2.22 (approximately 73% of Canada's dimension lumber
shipments to Japan are SPF, 19% hemlock and douglas fir; approximately 76% of
Canada's standing timber is SPF, 12% hemlock and dotiglas fir).
150. See Canada's argument, id. 9 3.1-3.2.
151. See Id. TT 2.19-2.22 (approximately 55% of the United States shipments
of dimension lumber to Japan are SPF, 31% hemlock and douglas fir;
approximately 55% of the United States standing timber Is SPF, and 33% hemlock
and douglas fir).
152. See Id. at TV 3.4-3.5.
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lumber industry,1 5 3 the Canadian argument was of de facto
discrimination. 154
The Canadians contended the state of origin nondiscrimi-
nation requirement of Article I, referenced above, is part of a
larger obligation requiring that all products considered like be
treated alike, irrespective of the absence of state of origin dis-
crimination. 155 Given that at least one earlier Article I case did
not address state of origin discrimination, 156 while another
mentioned it only after making findings with regard to like-
ness,1 5 7 it is understandable this contention might be advanced.
In essence, the significance of this claim meant that discrimina-
tion between like products coming from the same state of supply
would contravene Article I. This fact largely accounts for the SPF
Dimension Lumber panel's lengthy consideration of the physical
characteristics of different species of dimension lumber.
However, both the contention of de facto state of origin discrimi-
nation, as well as discrimination between like products ir-
respective of differences in treatment based on state of origin,
turn on the supposition that dimension lumber is a universally
acknowledged standard form of product presentation. That is to
say, it is a presentation so widely embraced that it evidences it-
self in the form of an extant customs classification category.
Because the panel in the SPF Dimension Lumber case was unable
to find any evidence in the Japanese tariff schedule of such
universality, 15 8 it proceeded to enter judgment against Canada,
without taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the
dispute to hold forth on the important matters of physical
characteristics, end use, and consumer perceptions. On the even
more important matter of whether Article I requires like treatment
for like products, the most the decision provides are some oblique
153. Japan essentially claimed that the 10% tariff on SPF lumber was the
product of post-1962 economic expansion that resulted in huge strains on its
indigenous lumber industry. In order to address such strains, there was a
general liberalization on imports of foreign lumber. But seeing as how the
domestic preference for locally produced cedar and cypress provided a large
margin of jhrofitability, it was thought liberalization could be even more generous
regarding imported hemlock and douglas fir (the logical competitors with cedar
and cypress) than regarding SPF, species where local producers had very small
profit margins. See Id. 3.21-3.26.
154. See Id. 3.54 ("gave preference to United States suppliers and
discriminated against Canadian suppliers.").
155. See Id. 1 3.30 and 3.54.
156. See AustralIan Subsidy, supra note 128.
157. See Tariff Treatment, supra note 131, 4.9-4.10.
158. See Taryffon Imports, supra note 131, I 5.11-5.14.
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references, which could be read as indicating state of origin
discrimination is absolutely essential. 159
In the wake of the SPF Dimension Lumber case, several points
about the law of Article I's like product provision can be advanced
with a modicum of certainty. At the outset, while like probably
does not mean absolute identity (as even the Article I cases
finding likeness have involved products with some differences), it
clearly means something more than just competitive or
substitutable. Additionally, a product will be found to be like
another if it falls within the other's specific tariff description.
When it falls within a different and distinct description, however,
it may still be considered a like product. That an importing state
classifies the item in another category is illuminating, but not
determinative. More important is whether the classification Is
consonant with the practice of other states, and whether the
relations between the importing and supplying states suggest the
possibility of estoppel. Further, there is the element of state of
origin discrimination. Though not definitively addressed, there is
language in the like product cases to suggest that reliance on
Article I requires proof of this discrimination. It would seem proof
could take either the de jure or de facto form. If the former, a
violation of Article I will be acknowledged. If the latter, at least
the case for a violation will be viewed as substantially supported.
Finally, end use and consumer perceptions affect determinations
about contravention of the like product provision. Comparisons
of the products' physical characteristics are meaningful, but seem
less influential than findings about the singularity or multiplicity
of uses available and the consistency or diversity of consumer
perceptions regarding the products.
All of this argues that Article I's like product provision allows
products from one state of supply to compete on the same terms
with products from another state of supply, whenever the
products from the two, looked at from a multifactor perspective,
can be considered comparable. Though the items need not be
exact duplicates, it is not enough that they are able to simply be
used instead of, or displace the sales of, each other. Basically,
the products involved must be understood to be largely the same.
From the vantage of a unifying theme or theory, the
emphasis on comparability says much. According MFN
protection only to products that are essentially the same gives
effect to the idea of perfecting an international economic system
that promotes trade in a setting of respect for the natural
productive efficiencies of trading partners. Were concern about
159. See td. 5.9 ("originating in different contracting parties"), 5.10
("different extraneous sources").
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guaranteeing the rights of nations naturally able to supply certain
products more cheaply than other nations not a matter of top
priority, the need for the products to be nothing more than largely
the same would not have emerged so clearly. Product protection
under Article I could have been limited to those completely
identical with others, undercutting efficiencies of production by
allowing extremely slight and insignificant differences between
items to be used to justify discriminatory treatment. By
emphasizing that the degree to which the products involved are
alike need satisfy nothing more than comparability, the GATT like
products provision of Article I endorses the concept of trade
promotion through a regime that greatly values permitting
natural productive advantages largely to have free reign. Mere
superficial differences between items from distinct states of
supply fail to authorize disparate treatment by the state of
import. If products are so much alike that they are generally
regarded as the same, then the states supplying them should
battle head-to-head for consumers without one being
disadvantaged by artificial and extraneous government
intervention by the state to which the products are supplied.
The arguments proffered in the SPF Dimension Lumber case
appear to indicate unanimity, among those involved, on the
paramount importance of increased trade and competition be-
tween exporting states. The Japanese, with the European
Economic Community (EC) as intervener, contended like should
be interpreted to exclude SPF dimension lumber, because the
opposite interpretation would compel Japan to extend the same
favorable treatment to SPF that it extended to dimension lumber
of the non-SPF variety. As a consequence, impediments would be
erected to trade liberalization because states would incline
against negotiating tariff concessions at multilateral rounds, as
the benefit of any concessions negotiated could be extended
through the like products provision to a large variety of items
without any corresponding quid pro quo concessions. 160 After
all, if a state knew a concession it granted could be extended to
cover a different item as well, would not its reluctance to offer
concessions be increased? And, if a state looking for concessions
knew the like products provision could result in any concession
grant being extended to many products other than those on
which it was actually negotiated, would not its inclination to offer
corresponding quid pro quo concessions be reduced?
The Canadians also acknowledged the trade-creating and
competitive notion underpinning Article I's use of likeness. 161
160. See Id. 9 4.1-4.6 (EEC) and 9 3.35 (Japan).
161. See Id. IT 3.37-3.38; see also Id. T 3.33.
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Approaching the issue from an entirely different angle, they
argued that a broader, more liberal interpretation of the term like
than that sought by Japan and the EC would serve the purpose
of enhancing trade and competition. In Canada's estimation, this
approach was dictated by the fact the like products reference of
the MFN provision was a statement of an obligation of the GATT,
and obligations, unlike exceptions, should be construed broadly.
Moreover, the Canadians also submitted that the greater danger
to trade and competition came from construing like in accordance
with the tariff line description given by a certain importing state,
rather than from any effect a broad interpretation might have on
multilateral tariff negotiations. 162  Notwithstanding Canada's
difference in perception concerning a broad or narrow
interpretation, it is absolutely clear that all the parties concerned
accepted the trade and competition notion behind the concept of
likeness. The only obvious reason for accepting this fundamental
foundational principle appears to be the promotion of a trading
regime favoring natural productive efficiencies. Though
ultimately the panel found in favor of Japan, even a decision
supporting the Canadian position could be construed to accept
competitive advantage.
B. Article III: National Treatment
A variety of extremely interesting Article III decisions have
been handed down by GATT dispute panels over the years. Some
have addressed the interrelationship between the national
treatment obligation of Article III and the most favored nation
obligation of Article 1.163 Others have elaborated on the range of
practices prohibited by Article III. Essentially, this range extends
beyond even direct limits on the conditions of sale, to any official
action impacting the circumstances of competition between
indigenous and foreign products. 164  It includes monetary
bestowals made to those not involved in the growth or production
of an item subjected to further processing, though the grower or
producer may indirectly benefit therefrom. 165 It also reaches a
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Belgian Family Allowances, GATT Doc. G/32 (Nov. 7, 1952)
(Nor. & Den. v. BeIg.), BISD 1st Supp. 59.
164. See Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, GATT
Doc. L/833 (Oct. 23, 1958) (U.K. v. Italy), BISD 7th Supp. 60 (hereinafter Italian
Discrimination Case].
165. See European Economic Community-Payments and Subsidies Paid to
Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, GATT Doc.
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diverse spectrum of other regulations affording protection to
domestic goods. 16 6 It does not include, at least within the
concept of equality in internal tax or charge treatment, the
discontinuation of government payments on imported as opposed
to domestic items, despite the fact the discontinuation affects
price relationships in the same way as the imposition of a tax or
charge. 167 However, when it comes to the meaning of Article III's
references to the concept of likeness, or its interpretive Note's
reference in the GATT Addendum to "directly competitive or
substitutable," there are four principal decisions. Two of them
stand out with clarity and add to the jurisprudence evidenced in
the decisions concerning the MFN obligation of Article I.
The Australian Subsidy case was the first case to elaborate on
the interpretation of like in the context of national treatment. 168
It foreshadowed the decision in the Italian Discrimination case
eight years later. The Italian case expressly acknowledged that
the language of paragraph 4 of Article III, prohibiting
discriminatory laws, regulations, or requirements "affecting"
internal sale or purchase, extended beyond direct limitations
(e.g., "no sales of imported goods on Fridays") to limitations
adversely impacting the conditions of competition (e.g., no
favorable government financing to purchasers of imported
goods). 16 9 It conceived likeness in Article III to have the same
meaning as in Article 1.170 In essence, it meant something
distinct from competitive or substitutable, with attention
accorded to how the product was classified in the tariff schedule
of the importing state and other states as well.17 1 There is reason
to believe that subsequent decisions, and expressed positions of
L/6627 (Jan. 25, 1990) (U.S. v. EEC), BISD 37th Supp. 86, 136-41 [hereinafter
Oilseeds Case].
166. See EEC-Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, GATT Doc. L/4599 (Mar. 14,
1978) (U.S. v. E.E.C.), BISD 25th Supp. 49.
167. See Australian Subsidy, supra note 128, V 7 (concluding Article I(2) is
not relevant).
168. Id. 9.
169. Italian Dlscrimlnatlon Case, supra note 164. See Id. 91 11-13. The earlier
Australian Subsidy case appears to have accepted the same kind of broad
interpretation of the word "affecting" in Article Ill(4). See supra note 128. Without
discussion of that matter, it proceeded to address the issue of whether a subsidy
on domestic ammonium sulphate fertilizer, not also given to imported sodium
nitrate fertilizer, violated the prohibition on discriminatory laws, regulations, or
requirements affecting the sale or purchase of like products. Obviously, for the
panel to have addressed the concept of likeness there, it must have envisioned the
Australian laws on subsidization as a law affecting sales or purchases, even
though it did not directly limit such. Id.
170. See Australian Subsidy, supra note 128, 44 8-9.
171. Id. T 8.
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some states-party to the General Agreement, confirm the
parallelism between likeness in Articles III and 1.172
In addition to tariff classification, other so-called objective
factors have received attention by dispute panels in Article III
cases. 173 These include the physical properties, the nature, and
the quality of the products being compared, 174 as well as the end
use of the products, 175 all indicators of likeness consulted in
MFN cases. 176 An identical or substantially identical end use Is
satisfactory to suggest likeness. 1 77  Price differences between
172. With reference to the positions of states-party to the GATT. see. e.g.,
Tariff on Imports, supra note 131, 1 3.37 (Canada's position regarding how panels
have viewed like in Articles I and III as the same). But see Id. T 3.39 (Japan
indicating the meaning not the same, though perhaps intending to suggest
nothing more than internal Identical treatment does not necessitate identical
treatment at the border). See also Id. 991 4.3-4.6 (EEC position that like be read "to
avoid an interpretation which would make the distinction between Article I and
other provisions, such as [Article]... III... unclear," though perhaps focusing on
the substantive obligations of these respective provisions, not the meaning of like
as such). With reference to panel decisions, see Treatment by Germany, supra
note 129, 11 15; Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported
Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, GATT Doc. 46216 (Nov. 10, 1987) (U.S. v. Japan),
BISD 34th Supp. 83, 9191 5.5 (a)-(b), 5.6 [hereinafter Japanese Tax on Alcoholic
Beverages]. In the Japanese Tax on Alcoholic Beverages case the panel does not
explicitly state that like in Article III means the same thing as it does in Article I.
Id. 99 3.2, 3.10. Nonetheless, frequent reference is made to the elements that
comprise likeness under Article I when the panel is attempting to understand the
meaning of the same term in the context of Article Il. Id. In the Sardines case
the panel initially determined that Article I's MFN obligation had not been violated
because the different ad valorem rates were imposed on different or unlike
products coming from different states. See supra note 135. It then refused to
address the matter of whether an internal charge on the same products violated
III(2)'s national treatment obligation, since the products had already been found
not like under Article I. Id.
173. The notion of "objective" factors appears in Japanese Tax on Alcoholic
Beverages, supra note 172, 1 5.7.
174. Id. 7 5.6.
175. Id. 111 5.5(d)-5.6; United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, GATT Doc. L/6175 (June 17, 1987) (Can., EEC & Mex. v. U.S.). BISD
34th Supp. 136, T 5. 1.1 [hereinafter United States-Taxes on Petroleum].
176. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
177. See United States-Taxes on Petroleum, supra note 175, 1 5. 1.1. This case
involved a challenge to a United States charge on petroleum imposed under the
1986 Superfund Act (i.e., environmental "cleanup" legislation). Among other
things, the Act imposed an 11.7 cents per barrel charge on imported crude oil,
crude oil condensates, natural gasoline, refined and residual oil, and liquid
hydrocarbon products. A corresponding 8.2 cents per barrel charge was imposed
on domestic crude oil, crude oil condensates, and natural gasoline. There was no
charge on domestic refined and residual oil or liquid hydrocarbon products. In a
complaint brought by Canada, EEC, and Mexico, a decision was entered that, Inter
alla, the United States charge violated Article 111(2), first sentence, In that
imported products were treated less favorably than like domestic products.
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products are insufficient to make otherwise like products
unlike. 178 Similarly, as in the case of Article 1, 179 minor
differences in things like taste, color, and aroma have no affect
upon whether products can be considered alike. 18 0
The subjective factors most frequently referenced have been
consumer preference, habit, or taste. 18 1 To the extent various
items are perceived by the purchasing and using public as
virtually the same, decisions regarding likeness are thereby
influenced. Whenever the perception of consumers regards two
products as clearly different, the exact opposite influence is
exerted. However, that distinct preferences exist with respect to
products that are otherwise alike does not mean that
governmental action ossifying or permanently entrenching these
perceptions is to be tolerated under the national treatment
obligation. In a free and open market, consumer perceptions can,
and do, change. Given that, official actions addressed by Article
III are intolerable if they make it unlikely perceptions will catch
up with the reality that products thought of as different are
actually the same.182
A very important aspect of Article III is found in the second
sentence of paragraph 2. It provides that, even though internal
taxes or charges are not discriminatorily applied to imported
items that are like domestic items, taxes and charges shall not
"otherwise apply" to afford protection to domestic production.' s3
The Addendum's interpretive Note to Article 111(2) indicates the
idea is to prevent a contracting party from structuring a system
that treats imports that are like domestic products in the same
way the domestic products are treated, when at the same time
treatment involving a tax on the imports leaves directly
competitive or substitutable domestic products untaxed. 18 4 This
Domestic and imported petroleum products were like because they served
identical or substantially identical end uses. Id.
178. See Japanese Tax on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 172, 9 5.9(b).
179. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
180. See Japanese Tax on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 172, V 5.6.
181. Id. IT 5.6-5.7.
182. Id. 9 5.7 ("Since consumer habits are variable in time and space and the
aim of Article 111:2 of ensuring neutrality of internal taxation ... between imported
and domestic like products could not be achieved if differential taxes could be
used to crystallize consumer preferences for traditional domestic products, the
Panel found that the traditional ... consumer habits... provided no reason for not
considering" certain products to be like. (emphasis added).
183. See GATr, supra note 5, art. 111(2) [second sentence], art. III(1).
184. See GATT, addendum, Note to art. Ill(2), [second sentence] which reads:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of
paragraph would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of
the second sentence only In cases where competition was involved
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notion of competitive or substitutable products clearly extends
the scope of Article 111(2). That point seems to have been
recognized by panel decisions.' 8 5 As a consequence, products
not identical or virtually identical are entitled to
nondiscriminatory internal tax treatment. By emphasizing that
identity or virtual identity is not imperative, it has been decided
that the phrase directly competitive or substitutable envisions
consideration of the extent to which the products concerned are
flexible in terms of use and common characteristics. 1 8 6
Essentially, this means alcoholic beverages that are clean and
white, made from the same raw materials, and drunk straight or
in mixed form (e.g., Japanese shochu and western vodka) could
be considered competitive and substitutable, while beverages
with distinctly.different features and a smaller range of uses (e.g.,
beer and brandy) could not.
Perhaps the most significant of the Article III like product
cases is the Japanese Tax on Alcoholic Beverages case.187 In this
1987 dispute between the EC and Japan, it was determined that
a variety of Japanese internal tax practices contravened, inter
alia, the provisions of Article II(2). The first sentence was
violated because several imported products (e.g., European gin,
whiskey, wines) were taxed at different rates than like domestic
products (e.g., Japanese gin, whiskey, wines). The second
sentence was violated because imported products (e.g., European
vodka) were taxed at different rates than directly competitive or
substitutable domestic products (e.g., shochu A), affording
protection to the domestic goods. The Japanese argued their
internal tax system was consistent with Article 111(2) in that it was
based not on the object of discrimination, but on assuring that
higher priced and higher quality beverages bore a higher tax
burden than lower priced and lower quality beverages. Moreover,
they noted that, while their tax system separated alcoholic
beverages into ten categories (i.e., sake, sake compound, shochu,
mirin, beer, wines, whiskeys, spirits, liqueurs, and other liquors)
and thirteen subcategories (i.e., shochu: A and B; mirin: A and B;
between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand, a
directly competitive or substitutable product which was not similarly
taxed.
id.
185. See Australian Subsidy, supra note 128, 7; Japanese Tax on Alcoholic
Beverages, supra note 172, 5.6-5.7 (first, determining that one could conclude
that Japanese shochu A and imported vodka could be considered like, and
secondly, determining that even were that conclusion not accepted, shochu A and
vodka could be considered directly competitive and substitutable).
186. See Japanese Tax on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 172, 5.7.
187. See supra note 172.
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wines: wine and sweet; whiskeys: whiskey and brandy; spirits:
spirits and raw material alcohol; other liquors: sparkling,
powdered, and other miscellaneous), with the category sake being
separated into three grades (i.e., special, first, and second), and
the subcategories whiskey and brandy into the same three
grades, the exact same rate of taxation was applied irrespective of
whether a beverage subject to tax under any of these
classifications was imported or domestic.' s8
The European Community argued that the Japanese system
of classification tended to separate traditional Japanese
beverages (i.e., sake, shochu, and mirin) from western beverages
(i.e., beer, wine, whiskeys, spirits, and liqueurs). The system
then subjected the latter to a higher level of taxation than the
former, and imposed still higher levels on beverages falling within
the most elite grades, which frequently tended to be of foreign
origin. Comparatively, imports in the various classifications of
traditional alcoholic beverages amounted to only a very small
fraction of the total Japanese production, 18 9 and, generally,
domestically produced beverages clearly represented the
overwhelming amount of so-called western style alcohol
consumed in Japan.190 This meant imported western style
alcoholic beverages never benefited from the lower levels of
taxation enjoyed by traditional Japanese beverages. As they also
tended to fall into the more elite grades in the classification
system, they never even enjoyed the lower rates the western style
beverages produced in Japan could claim.' 9 ' As the EC felt
many of the products the classification system considered to be
different were really either like or directly competitive or
substitutable, the disparity in treatment between domestics and
imports contravened Article III, paragraph 2.
In determining that the Japanese internal tax system violated
Article llI(2)'s like product provision,' 9 2 the panel ruled that gin
as well as whiskey, grape brandy, fruit brandy, classic liqueurs,
unsweetened still wine, and sparkling wines formed distinctive
product classifications in which the imports in that classification
were like the Japanese product of the same sort.19 3 The panel
also found Article III(2's prohibition on protective practices
188. See Id. 3.9-3.12.
189. See, e.g., Id. 3.5 (imported shochu represented only .4% of domestic
production).
190. See, e.g., Id. 3.10(a) (91% of the whiskeys and 94% of the spirits
consumed in Japan were domestically produced).
191. See, e.g., Id. 5.9(a)-(d) (panel's discussion of how like products treated
differently).
192. See Id. 5.6-5.11.
193. Id. 5.6.
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violated in view of the Japanese system's practice of affording
protection to domestic items that were competitive with or
substitutable for unlike imported products. 194 With regard to
this specific finding, the panel noted that more than a de minimis
difference in tax levels is enough to produce a violation. This
statement is especially informative given that Article III(2)'s notion
of prohibiting practices that afford protection to competitive or
substitutable domestic products might be seen as necessitating
proof of trade distortion. 195 The panel also noted that the
domestic competitive or substitutable product at issue (shochu)
was almost exclusively produced in Japan; it was not a case in
which several other states were producing and shipping the same
product into Japan. 196 The relevance is that Japan would not
have been protecting domestic production in the latter
situation. 197
The most profound point to emerge from the Alcoholic
Beverages case, however, involved the panel's response to
Japan's position regarding Article 111(2). Essentially, Japan
argued Article 111(2) could never be considered contravened when
imported products falling into the same categories, subcategories,
and grades as domestically produced items were subjected to the
exact same rate of taxation as the domestics. This was said to be
so despite the fact an incredibly large amount of the imports were
subjected to taxation at the highest levels. The Japanese argued
as long as domestic production also existed within the
classifications taxed at the highest levels, the importing state
fulfilled what Article I(2) required. Japan considered this
especially true when the amount of domestic production, as a
percentage of total consumption, represented the clear
overwhehnling bulk of what was consumed. 198 In rejecting this
argument, the panel's decision leaves no doubt that Article III's
like and directly competitive or substitutable standards limit the
ability of GATT states-parties to employ ever more refined internal
tax classification systems to discriminate against imports. This
view is not at all surprising considering the decision six years
earlier that tariff classifications were limited by the like product
194. See Id. Again, the panel held open the possibility that items (e.g. vodka
and shochu A) in distinctive and separate categories could also be considered like.
Id. 95.7.
195. See Id. ST 5.7, 5.10-5.12. Here, too, vodka and shochu A were
compared. The panel's position was that even if the two were not like they were at
least competitive or substitutable. Id.
196. See Id. 9 5.10-5.12.
197. See Id. 15.11.
198. See Id. 9 5.4 (panel's characterization of Japan's argument), 3.11
(Japan's statement of its position).
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provision of Article I(1). 19 9 Even when all the products falling
within an unfavorable internal tax classification are not imported
from abroad, the methodology employed to determine compliance
with Article III(2)'s nondiscrimination (first sentence) and
nonprotective (second sentence) obligations involves inquiring
into the likeness and competitiveness or substitutability of the
products concerned. Lest states be entitled to use artifice and
deception to unfairly burden others, that facial consonance with
Article I(2) should be regarded as nothing more than some
evidence of adherence to the standards of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade.2 0 0
Consider the obligation under Article I(2) and its
interpretive Note to avoid protecting domestic production of
directly competitive or substitutable items. There is little
question that it condemns stratagems affecting market
disadvantage. Couple this with the panel's refusal to accept the
Japanese claim that Article I(2) is inapplicable when the
treatment is facially equal, in spite of the existence of both
domestic production and imports in allegedly discriminatory
internal tax categories. It is then apparent that the objective of
the nonprotective (second sentence) and nondiscrimination (first
sentence) provisions of Article III is to proscribe governmental
internal tax interventions that distort natural trade relationships.
Whether in the context of like products 20 ' or directly competitive
or substitutable products, 20 2 the distortive practices prohibited
extend beyond those which can be shown to negatively impact
international trade. The prohibited practices also extend to those
that displace expectations about how domestic and imported
products compare with each other. The theory behind the actual
equality required by the first sentence of II(2), and the avoidance
of practices that protect domestic production required by the
second sentence of that same article, is the theory of trade
neutrality.2 0 3 Not only does it mean neutrality in the sense of
governments of importing states staying away from internal
taxation or charges that adversely affect the level of international
trade flowing between competitor states. It also means neutrality
in the sense of refraining from any practice interfering with or
altering the conditions of competition that emerge naturally
199. TariffTreatment, supra note 131, 1 4.4.
200. See Japanese Tax on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 172, ST 5.3-5.5(d).
201. See Id. T 5.7. The seminal case here is United States-Taxes on Petroleum,
supra note 175, T 5.1.1, 5.1.9.
202. See Japanese Tax on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 172, 5.11.
203. See, e.g., Id. 5.7 (stating that the "aim of Article IMl(2) [is] ensuring
neutrality of internal taxation").
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between various products. As the panel so succinctly put It,
"Article 111:2 protects expectations on the competitive relationship
between imported and domestic products rather than
expectations on trade volumes." 20 4 Consequently, even in a
situation in which the volume of trade between two GATT parties
may be increasing, Article 111(2) may have been violated "because,
inter alia, an increase in imports [says] nothing about what the
trade might have been in the absence of the inconsistent trade
restrictions."20
5
While the General Agreement's MFN and national treatment
obligations may be directed at distinct practices-the one being
tariffs, and the other being internal measures-they both emerge
from the exact same theoretical premise. Both accept the notion
that products traded between states on the world market should
possess or lack appeal to potential consumers due to their
natural competitive efficiencies. Interventions at the border or
within the internal confines of a customs territory that skew the
competitive relationship which would otherwise obtain are to be
condemned. Whatever attractions products normally possess
should be left free to exert their influence on the decisions of the
marketplace. Official practices burdening the decisions that are
made by the consuming public are to be scrupulously avoided.
C. Article V: Dumping and Antidumping Duties
There has been a real dearth of GATT panel decisions under
the dumping provision of Article VI. Of the most prominent
cases, one suggests assertions that products imported from
abroad at prices below the home market price cause material
injury to domestic industry in the importing state will be
subjected to an independent evaluation and not just
unquestioningly accepted. 20 6  However, none of the other
decisions, though addressing matters beyond injury, directly
comment on the like product language of paragraphs 1, 4, or 7 of
204. See Id. 5.11 (statement made in regard to directly competitive or
substitutable). See also Id. 5.7 (similar kind of statement made with regard to
the like products language), and United States-Taxes on Petroleum, supra note
175, 5.1.9. The result is that any tax difference under the nondiscrlmination
obligation, and even a very small (though not de minimils) difference under the
non-protection obligation, is prohibited.
205. Japanese Tax on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 172, 5.16.
206. New Zealand-Imports of Electrical Transformers from Finland, GAIT Doc.
L15814 (July 19, 1985) (Fin. v. N.Z.), BISD 32nd Supp. 55 [hereinafter New
Zealand Imports ).
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Article VI. 20 7 Yet some decisions do refer to the notion of
likeness, 20 8 and at least one report from a group of experts called
together to consider various aspects of Article VI offers some
explicit understanding about its use of the word like.20 9
The earliest panel decision on dumping claims decided that
the MFN obligation of Article I does not require a state invoking
antidumping duty action against one state to invoke it against
other states engaging in the same practice.2 1 0 But once the
action has been triggered, the use of "rules and formalities"
connected with any investigation may not be employed to delay
the entry of products from one state and not those from
another. 2 11 The parties to the dispute may well have felt that
products with the same physical properties and end use were not
to be considered like if something about one of them served as a
basis for commanding a better-heeled or somehow distinct
clientele. 212 The panel itself, however, refrained from offering any
207. See Swedish Anti-Dumping Duties, GATT Doc. L/328 (Feb. 26, 1955) (Italy
v. Swed.), BISD 3rd Supp. 91 [hereinafter Swedish Anti-Dumping Duties]; European
Community-Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, GATT Doc. L/6657
(May 16. 1990) (Japan v. EEC), BISD 37th Supp. 132 [hereinafter Regulation on
Imports].
208. See Swedish Anti-Dumplng Duties, supra note 207, 4 27-28; Regulation
on Imports, supra note 207, 4 3.88 (comments by EEC). 3.98 (comments by
Japan), 4.7 (comments by Canada), 4.18-4.20 (comments by Hong Kong), 4.29-
4.30 (comments by Singapore).
209. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, GATT Doc. L/978 (May 13,
1959), Report adopted, BISD 8th Supp. 145. 149 [hereinafter Report].
210. See Swedish Anti-Dumping Duties, supra note 207, 7-8. The case
involved a claim by Italy that Sweden maintained an anti-dumping system for
imported stockings which determined (initially) whether an anti-dumping duty
would be imposed, and (later) whether an anti-dumping investigation would be
started and entry of goods thereby delayed, on the basis of the stockings' invoice
price being less than a so-called basic price calculated by Sweden through the
averaging of home market prices. In deciding that Italy's complaint might have
some merit, the panel addressed several matters, including the Italian
observations that Article VI was violated because the basic price was not reflective
of the "home market price," thus leaving some low-cost producers subject to
duties notwithstanding the absence actual dumping; and Article I was violated
because producers in low cost countries were deprived of the competitive
advantages they were entitled to under MFN.
211. See id. 9.
212. See Id. VV 25-30. The Swedish basic prices were apparently to be a
substitute for the so-called home market price, i.e., the price at which products
like those imported into Sweden sold for when destined for consumption in the
country of export-here Italy. The evidence indicated. Sweden arrived at its basic
prices by averaging, for each variety of stocking, the prices on the Italian market
of trademarked and unmarked stockings. That is to say, a price for each variety
was determined by combining the prices of the marked and unmarked stockings
and then calculating an average price. However, since Italy exported only
unmarked stockings to Sweden, it complained that the price of many of the
imported items would naturally be below Sweden's basic price but perhaps, no
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opinion on this matter. Nonetheless, to the extent that Article VI
aims to limit the situations in which trading partners are entitled
to augment regular tariff impositions with supplemental duties
designed to protect against injurious dumping, it prevents
importing states from distorting the price relationships that affect
patterns of commerce. Given the panel's basic support for that
provision, one could infer that its decision at least implicitly
endorsed the idea that any product difference, including simple
ones that appeal to distinct groups of purchasers, undercuts the
existence of likeness. Were that not so, importing states would
have more freedom to levy antidumping duties, thereby depriving
trading partners of the natural advantages incident to making
one product slightly different from another. Products should
carry with them the price they would normally bear. If that is a
figure sensitive to small product differences, then importing
states should not have the liberty to disregard those differences
and skew the normal pricing patterns.
This strict, narrow interpretation of like clearly appears in
the report of the group of experts alluded to above,2 13 though it
expressed caution about construction so stingy as to elude the
application of Article VI(1)(a). 2 14 The report suggests that the two
products being compared should be exactly the same. 2 15 Of
course, comparison is undertaken to determine whether dumping
of the import is occurring, that is, whether the price of the import
is below the price of the same item when sold for consumption on
the home market. Thus, the experts' reference to identity "in
physical characteristics" 2 16 might not depart from the idea that
products sharing the same physical properties and end use can
be different when something about one of them allows the
targeting of an economically distinct clientele. Variations in
product presentation that leave physical properties and end use
unaffected, but create appeal to clear segments of the consuming
public, cannot be said to permit direct cross-comparisons of
price. It would not seem to matter whether one argues that such
less than the home market price for the like unmarked stockings. To Italy, even if
one were to view the Swedish basic price as the attempted reflection of the home
market price, the price of imported unmarked stockings was being compared with
a price of something other than a like product, The Swedes apparently realized
that it would be inappropriate under Article VI (1)(a) to make the kind of
comparison the Italians suggested was occurring. The panel indicated as much,
see id. 1 28, when it noted Sweden was really resting its case on Article VI
(1)(b](fl). cost of production; see Id. 28, 30.
213. See Report, supra note 209, 12-14.
214. Id. 13.
215. Id. T 12 (the members of the group agreed that "like product" should be
interpreted to mean "a product which is identical in physical characteristics").
216. Id.
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products are: "unlike," thereby opening recourse to some
constructed price under Article VI(1)(b);2 17 or like, yet subject to
adjustments in the prices being compared. 2 18 Under either
approach, the focus is on price. To determine the existence of
dumping, it is imperative to ascertain whether an imported item
is priced lower than it is, or would be, priced if sold for
consumption in the state of supply. The basic goal is to assure
the price paid by consumers reflects the price controlling in the
state of supply.
One of the most recent Article VI antidumping cases is
entitled European Economic Community-Regulation on Imports of
Parts and Components.21 9 This 1990 dispute between Japan and
the EC grew out of an attempt by the Community to deal with a
shift to Europe of assembly operations by Japanese companies
involved in the manufacturing of items like electric typewriters,
videocassette recorders, and hydraulic excavators. The
background to the dispute indicated that originally these
products had been assembled in and exported from Japan for
some time. Earlier investigations by the EC upon complaints
from competitive producers within the Community had resulted
in determinations of Japanese dumping and the imposition of
antidumping duties. 22 0 Though denied, 2 2 1 there were claims that
the Japanese producers had attempted to circumvent these
antidumping duties by relocating their assembly operations to
facilities situated within the borders of Member States. 2 22 Parts
necessary to produce a finished product were supplied by those
same Japanese companies formerly exporting completed goods.
The parts were then brought together to make finished products,
which, because not assembled outside the EC, were insulated
from the original antidumping impositions.
This all changed when the Community adopted legal
directives subjecting finished products assembled in the EC by
the Japanese firms that were exporting parts and components to
proportional antidumping duties based on the value of the parts
or components utilized. 22 3 It must be emphasized that the
217. This is the approach suggested by Swedish Anti-Dumping Duties, supra
note 207. See also supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
218. Id. (noting that adjustments in product presentation might leave
products like, but requires adjustments in the prices used to determine the
existence of dumping).
219. See Regulation on Imports, supra note 207, at 132.
220. See Id. 3.5-3.28 (general observations of both parties)
221. See Id. 3.6 (setting forth Japan's explanation of the shift of assembly
operations).
222. See Id. 3.17-3.18 (EC position on the impetus for the shift).
223. See Id. 2.1-2.3.
1994]
98 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 27:33
Community's proportional duties were imposed on the products
finally assembled in EC Member States from parts and
components imported from those against whom dumping
determinations had previously been entered. The duties were not
imposed on the parts or components crossing into the EC
customs area. The duties brought assertions by Japan that the
EC was violating the GATT. Japan maintained, inter alla, that
because the duties were applied to products finished in the
Community, rather than to the parts incorporated into the
finished products as those parts entered the Community, they
were not duties under Article VI, as that provision focused on
duties applied to items finished as of the time of importation.
Even if one conceived the duties as really imposed on finished
imported parts and components, the imposition still did not occur
until well after import. Further, it was made without a dumping
determination relative to parts, or any regard to some dumping
margin exemplified by the price at which the parts sold.2 2 4 To
think of the duties, on the other hand, as some form of customs
levy meant they violated both Article I, as only the Japanese faced
them, and Article I, as all the parts involved benefited from tariff
bindings.22 5 If they were internal charges, the duties ran afoul of
Article I() and (2) because they were not imposed on, and
therefore necessarily afforded protection to, indigenous domestic
producers. These duties also contravened Articles I and 111 (4)
because they did not apply to imports from other states.2 26 The
Japanese also argued the duties did not fall within the narrow
exception of Article XX(d), which is applicable only in instances in
which efforts were made to obtain compliance with laws "not
inconsistent" with the GATT. 2 2 7
Needless to say, the EC vigorously disagreed with Japan's
assertions. The Community insisted that the duties imposed on
finished products assembled in EC Member States were indeed
consistent with the thrust of Article VI, as they simply
substituted for antidumping duties that would have been
imposed had the Japanese not created a substitute way for
introducing goods into the Community.2 8 Further, the EC
stressed that it was not imposing duties on the imported parts,2 29
even though it had considered doing so, but had rejected the
approach for several reasons. One reason for rejecting the
224. See td. 3.30.
225. See Id. T 3.32.
226. See Id. 1 3.40-3.42.
227. See td. 3.56-3.69.
228. See id. 3.35-3.36.
229. See Id. 3.35, 3.88.
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approach was because, without a separate dumping finding on
parts alone, any imposition would have to be justified by making
the uncomfortable argument that parts were like the imported
finished products against which dumping findings had already
been entered.230  The Community also stated that, in its
estimation, the real source for the anticircumvention tack it was
taking was Article XX(d), not Article VI,23 and submitted that
this tack was perfectly consistent with the terms of that general
exception provision. 232
Ruling against the EC, the panel determined not to examine
the anticircumvention duties as customs impositions on imported
parts and components under Article VI, because the EC claimed
it was not justifying its actions by this GATT provision. 233
Instead the panel looked at the duties as internal charges 2- 4 and
found them to be both violative of Article 111235 and unprotected
by the exception contained in Article XX(d).2a 6  Despite the
panel's refusal to examine the matter in controversy on the basis
of Article VI, several relevant observations by the disputants and
intervenors on the term like were offered during the proceedings.
Some comment therefore is warranted with regard to the various
suggestions put forward on the concept of likeness by those who
participated in the anticircumvention case.
Perhaps the most important comment that can be advanced
focuses on the irrelevance, at least as to an analysis of Article VI,
of any of the observations offered about the meaning of the term
like during the proceedings against the EC. When Article VI of
the General Agreement employs the term like, it does so by
calling for a comparison of the price of the imported product with
the price of a like product sold for domestic consumption in the
state of supply. Yet the observations about this term put forward
by participants and intervenors during the panel deliberations
conceived of like in one of two entirely distinct contexts: a
230. See Id. 9 3.86-3.88. Other reasons for rejecting the approach included:
dumping determinations on parts might not be possible because finished products
may be dumped while parts are not dumped; dumping of parts might not be
injuring domestic parts manufacturers; and, even if parts dumped with
consequent injury, all exporting parts suppliers would be subject to anti-dumping
duties, not just those associated with assembling electric typewriters, video
cassette recorders, hydraulic excavators, etc. See Id. 3.87.
231. See Id. TT 3.20, 3.37; see also Id. 3.76 (emphasizing United States view
that anti-circumvention is based on the total framework of Articles VI, XX(d), and
their related histories, while the EC based its view specifically on Article XX(d)).
232. See Id. TT 3.70-3.92.
233. See Id. 5.11.
234. See Id. 5.4-5.8.
235. See Id. 5.9-5. 10.
236. See Id. 5.12-5.18.
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comparison of the imported parts and components of items
assembled in the EC to finished imported items already subject to
antidumping determinations;2 7 and, a comparison of indigenous
domestic items produced in the EC to the imported items
subjected to levy.23 8 Obviously, neither of these conceptions use
like in the sense in which it appears in Article VI. The first
envisions proceeding against imported parts and components
whenever they are like the imported finished items under
dumping duties. The second envisions a proceeding whenever
the parts and components (or, for that matter, imported finished
items) are like some item produced by a domestic industry in the
state of importation. Article VI links dumping to discrepancies
between the price of items as imported from a particular state of
supply and as sold for consumption within the very same
supplying state '39
Even though the comments offered on the term like seem
inapposite to understanding its use in Article VI, and
notwithstanding the panel's determination to refrain from
examining the EC's action from the vantage of this specific GATT
provision, the final opinion of the panel does contain some
language that is at least suggestive of how likeness in Article VI is
currently interpreted. This language appears in the context of the
panel's consideration of the thrust of Article XX(d)'s reference to
-an exemption being available when a party adopts or enforces
measures necessary "to secure compliance with laws or
regulations" consistent with the GATT. 40 The Panel found the
Community's anticircumvention duties were not within the ambit
237. See Id. 3.88 (discussing EC position that if parts and components were
to be seen as imported finished items, then like would be extended beyond what
GATT has viewed as acceptable); see also Id. 3.98 (stating the Japanese position
that, while the EC refuses to acknowledge it is engaged in the preceding over
extension, such is nonetheless occurring); Id. 4.18-4.19 (Hong Kong's position
that parts could be viewed as finished items only where parts were so significant
in the final product that it was substitutable with the final product").
238. See Id. 4.7 (describing Canada's understanding that any item
proceeded against must cause injury to a corresponding like domestic item); see
also Id. 4.29 (discussing Singapore taking a similar approach).
239. GATT does not use like in either of the two ways suggested. The 1979
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, see BISD 26th Supp. at 171, and the EC Regulations in dispute in the
instant case, however, both use like in the second sense. Since both legal
instruments were in play in the EC/Japan dispute, the use of like in that fashion
is explicable. The use of like in the first sense does not appear in the instruments
of concern, though there is some indication that such a use had been put forward
by the Community at an earlier point. Regulation on Imports, supra note 207, 1
4.19 n.1 (noting Hong Kong's observation that the EC had raised this in the
context of a 1988 GATT Committee meeting).
240. See td. 5.14-5.18.
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of this quoted terminology. The Panel stated that this exemption
extended only to measures essential to ensure antidumping
duties on imported finished products were enforced; it did not
include measures (i.e., anticircumvention duties) designed to
attain the spirit or objective of laws and regulations consistent
with the General Agreement (i.e., the EC's antidumping laws for
imported finished products). The Panel thus expressed a
preference for construing GATT exception provisions narrowly.2 4'
The Panel's perception was that, in addition to other provisions
(e.g., Articles XII and XIX), Article VI's authorization on the
imposition of entry duties to adjust the price of imports was a
departure or exception from the idea of no entry duties in excess
of those appearing in the schedule of concessions. If Article XX(d)
could be construed to mean importing states were at liberty to
pursue the spirit or objective of Article VI, then whenever laws or
regulations consistent with that provision were unable to attain
the spirit or objective, measures totally inconsistent with GATT
would be permissible. Yet Article VI is clear in attaching specific
conditions to its invocation. Thus, the panel concluded, Article
XX(d) cannot be given a construction that renders nugatory
Article VI's character as a specifically conditioned exception.
242
The Panel, though scrupulously avoiding consideration of the
Community's action in light of Article VI, nevertheless illuminated
the meaning of that Article's terms by its discussion of the
interaction between Article XX(d) and GATT exceptions. Quite
obviously the Panel saw Article VI, and other exceptions, as
subject to a very limited and conservative reading. This position
was shared by those states participating in the proceedings who
241. See Id. 5.17; see also United States-Countervalling Duties on Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, GATT Doc. D57/R (July 11, 1991) (U.S. v.
Can.), BISD 38th Supp. 30. 4.6 (again reiterating a narrow construction, this
time preventing "such product" in Article VI3) from being construed to allow
countervailing duties on pork products when subsidies were granted on live
swine).
242. The panel explicitly stated:
Each of the exceptions in the General Agreement-such as Articles
VI, XII or XIX-recognizes the legitimacy of a policy objective but at the
same time sets out conditions as to the obligations which may be imposed
to secure the attainment of that objective. These conditions would no
longer be effective if it were possible to justify under Article XX(d) the
enforcement of obligations that may not be imposed consistently with
these exceptions on the grounds that the objective recognized to be
legitimate by the exception cannot be attained within the framework of the
conditions set out in the exception.
See Regulation on Imports, supra note 207.
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ventured any comment on the matter. 2 43 This circumscribed
approach to Article VI would appear completely consonant with
its goal or purpose. Specifically, by interpreting the antidumping
authority in a strict fashion, the balance of trade that naturally
emerges from tariff concessions negotiated during any particular
round is allowed to surface in an unfettered way. The apparent
acceptance by the disputants of this objective in the Japan/EC
case is evidenced by their proffered observations about the
relationship between Article VI, protectionism, and trade flows
resulting from the overall liberalization effected by the GATT. 24 4
Given this consensus regarding a narrow construction of the anti-
dumping provision, and the prevention of abusive duty practices
by importing states as a principal focus of that very same
provision, it would seem best to read the term like in Article VI as
referring to products that are identical or very closely similar.
Doing so characterizes as dumping only pricing practices that
result in the importation of products at a price below what the
same products are sold for when destined for consumption in the
supplying state. Down-grade differences resulting in lower price
figures for imports prevent the receiving state from ignoring the
lack of identity or close similarity and proceeding to impose an
antidumping duty. The possibility of abuse by exporting states Is
kept in check by the fact that slight differences may render
products unlike, although the effect is to allow the importing
state to make pricing comparisons on the basis of cost of
production.2 4 5 From the standpoint of theory, all this promotes
consumer purchasing in an environment of competitive
advantage. Producers best able to satisfy the needs and desires
of the purchasing public at prices that are attractive are allowed
to capitalize on that position. Disruptions consequent to skewed
243. See Id. 3.57-3.58 (stating comment by Japan on Article VI being a
"limited exception" invocable "only in exceptional circumstances"); 3.70
(discussing comment by EC that Article XX(d), which the Community argues
interacts with or supplements VI, is to be invoked only "as a last resort" ) ; 4.14
(describing Hong Kong's observation that Article VI was "specifically
circumscribed" and that general exceptions like Article XX(d) should be
interpreted "narrowly" so as to avoid approaches "inconsistent with specific
provisions" like Article VI); 4.26 (describing statement by Singapore that Article VI
appears only in "exceptional circumstances" and is to be "interpreted narrowly").
244. To be sure, there was disagreement between the Community and Japan
about what this relationship meant vis-&-vis the EC's anti-circumvention duties.
The Community insisted the relationship meant Article XX(d) could be used to
stamp out unfair trade practice strategies designed to get around Article VI. See
Id. 3.73, 3.99. Japan asserted, on the other hand, that any action resulting in
duties above the bound rates had to be justified on the basis of meeting Article
VI's specific requirements. See Id. 3.68, 3.93.
245. See GATT, supra note 5. art. VI (1)(b)(ii) (applying whenever likeness Is
absent).
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pricing practices or complicating supplemental fiscal impositions
are impermissible.
D. Article XI: Quantitative Limitations
There have been a number of GATT panel decisions
concerning the proscription of quantitative limitations contained
in Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. No
less than seven decisions have offered insight about the meaning
of the like products language appearing in paragraph 2 of Article
XI, the portion setting forth the exceptional circumstances under
which quantitative limitations may be imposed. Two points need
to be noted before proceeding to examine the GATT jurisprudence
on Article X's conception of likeness. The first is that a broad
range of measures have been utilized by importing states to affect
shipments from supplying states. The spectrum range includes
quotas,246 permits,247 minimum import prices, 248 and state
licensed import monopolies. 249 In each and every case, however,
claims that the measures employed fell within the ambit of the
exceptional language of Article XI(2)(c)(i) or (ii) have been
rejected. 250 The second point relates to the reference in the
246. In chronological order, see EEC Restrictions on Imports of Apples from
Chile, GATT Doc. L/5047 (Nov. 10, 1980) (Chile v. EEC). BISD 27th Supp. 98
[hereinafter Chilean Apples I Case]; Japan-Restrictions on Imports of Certain
Agricultural Products, GATT Doc. L/6253 (Mar. 22, 1988) (U.S. v. Japan), BISD
35th Supp. 163 [hereinafter Japan-Restrictions on Imports]; European Economic
Community Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples-Complaint by Chile, GATT Doc.
L/6491 (June 22, 1989) (Chile v. EEC), BISD 36th Supp. 93 [hereinafter Chilean
Apple H Case]; European Economic Community Restrictions on Imports of Apples-
Complaint by the United States. GATT Doc. L/6513 (June 22, 1989) (U.S. v. EEC).
Id. at 135 [hereinafter EEC/US Apple Case]; Canada-Import Restrictions on Ice
Cream and Yoghurt, GATT Doc. L/6568 (Dec. 5. 1989) (U.S. v. EEC), Id. at 68
[hereinafter Ice Cream and Yoghurt Case]
247. See Ice Cream and Yoghurt Case, supra note 246.
248. See EEC-Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licenses and Surety
Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, GATT Doc. L/4687 (Oct. 15,
1978) (U.S. v. EEC). BISD 25th Supp. 68 [hereinafter Tomato Case].
249. See Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, GATT Doc. D510/R (Nov. 7, 1990) (U.S. v. Thail.), BISD 37th Supp. 200
[hereinafter Cigarette Case].
250. Beginning with the earliest case, see Tomato Case, supra note 248,
4.14; Chilean Apple I Case, supra note 246, 1 4.10; Japan-Restrctions on Imports,
supra note 246, 6.1-6.9; Chilean Apple H1 Case, supra note 246, 13; EEC/US
Apple Case, supra note 246, 5.26; Ice Cream and Yoghurt Case, supra note 246.
84. Cigarette Case, supra note 249, 87; see also Chilean Apple H Case, supra
note 246, 12.4 (comment by Panel to effect that no contracting party has been
able to satisfy the stringent requirements of Article x's exceptions). Further, it
bears noting that the panel decisions have drawn a distinction between
prohibitions imposed by the importing country and mere restrictions. The
exceptional language of Article XI(2)(c) only protects the latter. See, e.g., Id. 12.5
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opening terminology of Article XI(2)(c) to the concept of in any
form. As discussed above, 251 this configuration enlarges or
expands the idea of likeness, though focusing on how the
imported item compares with an item produced in the -state
imposing a quantitative limitation. (It will be recalled that Article
XI uses the term like in regard to focusing on how an item
produced in the importing state compares with the one supplied
from abroad.) Several panel decisions taken up below have gone
to great pains to deal with the significance and meaning of the
words in any form.25 2 In keeping with that emphasis, this
concept will be discussed separately from the notion of like
products.
The place to begin in understanding Article XI's use of the
term like, and the related idea of in any form, is with the
constructional perspective of those involved in disputes
precipitated by the imposition of quantitative limitations. The
provisions of Article XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) have been characterized by
complainants as narrowly drawn 253 or, more confining, lending
themselves to narrow construction.26 This presumably results
because the provisions are exceptions. Basic obligations might
be construed judiciously, but derogations from these obligations
are to receive a circumscribed reading. At first, the panel
decisions refrained from going further than to observe the
extreme difficulty faced by states in meeting all the requirements
connected with the exceptions of Article XI(2)(c). 25 5 Recently,
however, there has been at least one clear expression that both
Article XI(2)(c)'s exception for supporting a parallel domestic
production or marketing limit and for dealing with temporary
surpluses are to be read very narrowly.2 56
(suggesting though imports are stopped when a quota level is reached, the action
is still a "restriction"); Japan-Restrictions on Imports, supra note 246, V 5.3.1.2
(allowing importation for limited purposes is a de facto "prohibition"); Cigarette
Case, supra note 249. VT 19(a) (United States. argument of state import monopoly
not importing for many years constituting "de facto prohibition"), 67 (panel view
that state import monopolies, not just quotas, have to satisfy "restriction" v.
prohibition" distinction).
251. See supra text accompanying parts I.D.. II.D. (In Any Form).
252. See Tomato Case, supra note 248; Japan-Restrictions on Imports, supra
note 246; Ice Cream and Yoghurt Case, supra note 246; Cigarette Case. supra note
249.
253. EECIUS Apple Case, supra note 246, 7 3.3.
254. See Tomato Case, supra note 248, 3.27 (assertion by United States);
Japan-Restrctons on Imports, supra note 246, 3.2.2 (assertion by United States);
Cigarette Case. supra note 249, 18 (argument by United States).
255. See Chilean Apple H Case, supra note 246, 12.4.
256. See Ice Cream and Yoghurt Case. supra note 246, 5 59.
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How has that approach played itself out with regard to Article
x's use of the term like product? Essentially it has meant that
panels have distinguished between products competitive with one
another, and those that may not be but yet are "practically
identical." A competitive relationship between items is neither
necessary nor sufficient to result in likeness.25 7 What is essential
is a sharing of characteristics that permits the items to be
considered virtually the same.25 8 In perhaps the earliest of the
Article XI like product cases, this approach meant that fresh
tomatoes were questionable as a like product to tomato
concentrate, when the latter was subjected to import restriction
and the former to domestic limitation. Clearly, were domestic
tomato concentrate limited, the product in the state of
importation could have been considered like the imported
product subject to restriction.25 9 The identity between such
products would have been marked; 2 60 the same is true with
respect to a pairing of imported fresh tomatoes and domestic
fresh tomatoes. Though there can be differences among types of
tomato concentrates, it appears that practically identical is
adequately flexible to accommodate products with some degree of
difference. It has been argued that varietal differences between
items of the same class or type (i.e., Valencia oranges versus
257. See Japan-Restrictions on Imports, supra note 246. 9 5.1.3.4 (relying on
negotiating history for this position).
258. See Tomato Case, supra note 248. 9 4.12; Japan-Restrctons on Imports,
supra note 246. TT 5.1.3.4.
259. See Tomato Case, supra note 248, 9 4.12. The Tomato Case is one of two
categories of Article X like/product in any form cases reviewed herein. As noted
below, the cases concern import restrictions on either "fresh" products or on
"processed" products, when limitations on domestic agricultural or fisheries
products happen to be in place. See Infra notes 268-79. The Tomato Case
involved an EC system of minimum import prices, licenses and surety deposits on
imported tomato concentrate. Tomato Case, supra note 248. Among other things,
the minimum import price was said by the EC to work in tandem with a
production and marketing limitation on domestic tomatoes that operated through
a system of intervention prices resulting in withdrawals of such tomatoes from
availability. The fear was that low priced imported tomato concentrate would be
purchased by those otherwise interested in purchasing the limited domestic fresh
tomatoes. Obviously the case falls in the category of cases on processed imports.
Nonetheless, the panel took the occasion, as others have from time to time, to
comment on the idea of likeness. For our purposes, however, the cases stressed
with regard to like products involve restrictions on imports of fresh items.
Processed items are stressed in connection with my discussion of in any form.
260. This is not to say that restrictions on imports of processed goods are
permissible under Article XI 2(c)(i) and (ii) when virtually identical domestic
processed goods face limitation. As is noted below, the permissibility of such
restrictions hinges on whether Article XI contemplates the use of import
restrictions in relation to protecting domestic processing industries. See Infra
notes 271-75.
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Naval oranges) result in the items concerned being thought of as
unlike. 261 On several occasions, GATT panels have flatly rejected
this argument.262  They have also rejected the idea that
differences in price, quality, and freshness render products
unlike.2 63 Indeed, it seems that while the exceptions of Article
XI(2)(c) referring to the concept of likeness may be subject to a
narrow reading, GATT panels considering quantitative restrictions
on imports under the exceptional language of Article XI have
261. See Chilean Apple I Case, supra note 246. T 3.10.
262. See Id. T 4.4; Chilean Apple fI Case, supra note 246, 1 12.7; EEC/US
Apple Case, supra note 246, T 5.7. The Chilean Apple I Case is the earliest
expression by a panel on this point. There. Chile complained. Inter alia, that the
European Community's quota restrictions on imports of apples, to support the
Community's system of intervention prices resulting in withdrawals of domestic
apples from availability, could not be justified by Article XI(2)(c). as Chilean apples
were not of the same variety as the EC apples under limitation. In finding in favor
of Chile, the panel nonetheless determined that varietal differences were
insignificant. For consistency with Article I MFN, see rejection of organoleptic
differences as a basis for distinguishing between products in supra notes 141-43.
263. See Chilean Apple 11 Case. supra note 246, 9 12.7; EEC/US Apple Case,
supra note 246, T 5.7. In the Chilean Apple II Case, decided nine years after the
original apple dispute between Chile and the EC, it was argued that the earlier
decision against the EC in the Chilean Apple I case, though implemented by the
Europeans. had not completely disposed of all Article XI issues. While Chilean
Apple I decided that the Community's Golden Delicious apples were like Chile's
Red Delicious and Granny Smith apples, it found reliance on paragraphs 2(c)(i)
and (1i) of Article XI to be inappropriate. The requirement of governmental
measures operating to restrict domestic quantities was presumably met by the
EC's system of private producer withdrawals (though there was little discussion of
this point, see Chilean Apple I Case, supra note 246, T 4.6). but those mandating
public notice of the quantities or values of permissible imports, the maintenance
of a proportion that would be expected to rule without import restrictions, and the
existence of a surplus that is temporary were not satisfied. See Id. 1T 4.7-4.9. In
Chilean Apple II, Chile pressed for a decision adverse to the EC on issues such as
governmental measures operating to restrict domestic quantities, the extent to
which the import restrictions could be viewed as necessary to the enforcement of
the domestic governmental quantitative restrictions, and the existence of a
surplus that is temporary when a sudden aberrational spike occurs in domestic
quantities that appear to show a condition of structural surplusage. The panel
found that the voluntary nature of the domestic withdrawal system did not
prevent It from being considered a governmental measure, as the crux was
whether the program was "essentially dependent" on governmental initiative. See
td. TT 12.8-12.9; Japan-Restrictions on Imports, supra note 246, TT 5.1.3.3, 5.3.5.1,
5.4.1.4. But see Tomato Case, supra note 246, T 4.13 (opposite conclusion eleven
years earlier under the same EC program). The measure, however, was not found
to restrict domestic quantities, as its thrust was aimed principally at supporting
domestic prices, while the exceptions of Article XI exempt actions aimed
principally at limiting supply, though price is consequentially affected. See
Chilean Apple if Case, supra note 246, 12.10-12.18. The panel offered no
response to Chile's contentions on the necessity of the quantitative import limits,
but it did express some skepticism about the matter of upward supply blips
during periods of structural surplusage. See Id. 41 12.19.
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generally been satisfied that products are like whenever, from a
consumer and marketing perspective, their essential character
allows them to be seen as "substantially similar."264  This
appears to mean that even after-season, storage-fresh items can
be viewed as like recently-picked, fresh items of the same sort.2 65
While the juxtaposition of like and directly substituted in Articles
XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) suggests to some the inappropriateness of this
approach in the absence of a finding of "no substantial domestic
production of the like product,"266 a GATT panel as recently as
1989 refused to accept the call for construing like as meaning
anything more narrow and confining than "substantial
similarity."267  There is no doubt that the use of directly
264. See Chilean Apple 1 Case, supra note 246, 12.7; EEC/US Apple Case.
supra note 246. 5.7. The Chilean Apple 11 and the EC/US Apple cases were
decided by the same panelists and adopted by the GATT Council on the same day.
265. Chile seems to have made an argument against that kind interpretation
of like in the Chilean Apple ll Case. See Chilean Apple if Case, supra note 246, 1
3.14-3.16 (emphasizing that recently-picked fresh Red Delicious and Granny
Smith apples from Chile were competing during the spring and summer with
after-season, storage-fresh Golden Delicious apples grown in the EC). See Id.
12.7 (not accepting Chilean argument).
266. See EEC/US Apple Case, supra note 246, 3.13-3.15 (submission by
the United States). This case involved a complaint by the United States against
the European Community concerning quantitative limitations on imported apples
imposed under the program involved in the Chilean Apple ff case. The essential
argument advanced by the United States was that the panel should rethink its
position in the earlier Chilean Apple I case about varietal, price, quality, and
freshness differences not providing an adequate Justification for considering
products of the same general sort to be unlike. Rejecting the invitation, the panel
continued to follow what had been done in Chilean Apple I and ff. Any doubt
extant from the language in the Chilean Apple 1f Case with regard to the inability
of intermittent upward spikes in domestic supply constituting a surplus that is
temporary when there exists substantial structural surplusage, is completely
eliminated in the EEC/US Apple Case. The panel concluded that, since supply
variations are to be expected from year-to-year, such upward blips do not satisfy
the concept of temporary. EEC/US Apple Case, supra note 246, 5.19. Many of
the other points made in the case replicate what appeared in Chilean Apple ff.
267. Id. 5.7 (not accepting the United States position). It should be
observed that in the EEC/US Apple Case, two northern hemisphere growing areas
with the same growing season were involved. The Chilean Apple if Case (as wel as
the earlier Chilean Apple I Case) matched a southern hemisphere area against the
EC in the north, and thus pitted recently-picked fresh against after-season,
storage-fresh apples. While it might have been possible to structure an argument
that the Chilean Apple I and ff cases hinged on directly substituted (i.e., at the
time recently-picked apples from Chile were imported there existed "no
substantial domestic production of the like product"), the panels in both cases
focused only on the concept of like products. In the EEC/US Apple Case, since
there was simultaneous production in the Community, like was the only concept
available. The United States argument was, as pointed out in supra note 266,
that the panel should reconsider the whole idea, accepted in the Chilean Apple I
Case, of an apple being an apple, despite differences in variety, quality, etc. By
refusing to do so, the panel clearly indicated substantial similarity is the standard
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substituted, a somewhat commodious standard, in conjunction
with reference to like indicates that the latter term be read
narrowly. Nonetheless, recourse cannot be had to the broader
concept if there is domestic production of the same product as
that being subjected to import restriction. Thus, the correctness
of refraining in such a situation from using nonessential
differences between items being compared as a basis for finding
the items fail to satisfy the test of likeness at least suggests itself
as a distinct possibility.
One should not be led to conclude that, because It has been
found questionable whether domestic fresh tomatoes are like
imported tomato concentrate, 2 68 processed imports made out of
the same kinds of domestic fresh items subject to limitation
within the state of importation cannot be restricted in accordance
with the exceptions of paragraph 2(c) of Article X. This
implicates the major point alluded to earlier about Article
XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii)'s use of like and in any form.269 To stress the
distinction between these concepts, likeness refers to situations
in which the imported products subject to restriction are fresh,
and there exists a governmental measure in the importing state
placing limitations on the same fresh product of domestic origin.
In any form, on the other hand, refers to situations in which the
restricted imports are items that have been processed from fresh
products, while the governmental measure in the state of import
limits the same fresh products of domestic origin. In sum, like
covers comparisons of fresh to fresh, and in any form covers
comparisons of processed to fresh. 270 Consequently, despite
expressed reservations about finding fresh items (such as
tomatoes) to be like processed items (such as tomato
concentrate), 271 Article XI(2)(c) contains in the concept in any
form a mechanism that provides importing states with an
authorization for restricting incoming shipments of processed
products.272
for likeness, whether the products concerned find themselves facing each other in
or out of season. One might have been in a position of understanding "substantial
similarity" after the Chilean Apple 11 Case as somehow relating to situations in
which the operative standard is that of directly substituted. With the EEC/US
Apple Case, it is quite apparent the test applies even if the comparatively narrower
standard of likeness is in play.
268. See Tomato Case, supra note 248, 4.12 ("unable to decide if fresh
tomatoes grown within the Community would also qualify.").
269. See supra text accompanying notes 250-56.
270. See Japan-Restrictions on Imports, supra note 246, 5.3.1.4; Ice Cream
and Yoghurt Case, supra note 246, 67.
271. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. In addition to the Ice Cream
and Yoghurt Case, Japan-Restrictions on Imports Case, and the Tomato Case, the
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One may observe that like refers to or covers comparisons
between domestic fresh and imported fresh, while in any form
does the same for comparisons between domestic fresh and,
imported processed goods. However, that should not be thought
of as leaving open the possibility that one of these two notions
might also allow comparisons between domestic processed and
imported processed, and thus the imposition of import
restrictions in a case when domestic processed goods are subject
to some form of government limitation program. 273 If the idea of
likeness must defer to in any form when import restrictions are
imposed on processed goods from abroad, then it would seem the
restrictions could not be justified on the basis of the existence of
a governmental program limiting like domestic processed
goods.274 A GATT panel in 1990 found it completely misplaced to
rely on in any form to justify restrictions on imported processed
goods when the same kinds of domestic processed goods are
under an internal limitation scheme.275 Both with regard to like,
as well as to in any form, these conclusions are supported by the
fact that Article XI(2)(c) was designed to provide protection to the
producers of agricultural and fisheries products, not to those
involved in the processing of these products.27 6 In conjunction
with stressing the differentiation between when the concept of
like applies and when that of in any form applies, this latter point
is integral to a thorough understanding of Article XI(2)(c).
Imports of processed goods from trading partners cannot be
GATT decisions involving restrictions on processed, rather than fresh products is
rounded out by the Cigarette Case, supra note 249.
273. See Tomato Case, supra note 248, 4.12 ("the Panel considered that
tomato concentrate produced within the Community would qualify as 'the like
domestic product' .... "). It should be pointed out that on at least two occasions
GATT parties have suggested theories about like including processed to fresh
comparisons. See, e.g., Japan-Restrictions on Imports, supra note 246, 3.2.8
(Japanese argument from the absence of a definitive understanding of like). See
also Id. 3.4.4, 3.4.16, 3.4.28, 3.4.34, 3.4.44; Ice Cream and Yoghurt Case, supra
note 246, V 55 (arguing that like includes some processed dairy items because
they can be "converted" back to fresh milk); Id. 99 23-24 (Canada arguing that like
might include some processed items).
274. There are no GATT panel decisions specifically addressing whether like
can or cannot include comparisons of processed to processed. Nonetheless, the
very idea of restrictions on processed imports being dealt with by the phrase "in
any form" certainly suggests the proposition stated in the text.
275. See Cigarette Case, supra note 249, T 70 (where restrictions are imposed
on imported cigarettes, "the only domestic marketing and production restrictions
that would be relevant.., were those... imposed on the production of leaf
tobacco-not those on cigarettes .... ."). Though the panel in paragraph 70
speaks in terms of like, the panel's reference to "Note ad Article XI:2(c)" clearly
indicates this is an in any form case.
276. See Japan-Restrictions on Imports, supra note 246, 9 5.1.2; Ice Cream and
Yoghurt Case, supra note 246, T7 59, 60.
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restricted under Article XI(2)(c) because domestic processed
goods of the same sort happen to be under government
limitation. The agricultural and fisheries, exception from the
general prohibition on quantitative limitations was not designed
to protect the domestic processing industry.
If the concept of likeness applies to situations in which
comparisons are between fresh and fresh, and the very meaning
of like is satisfied when, from a marketing and consumer
perspective, products are considered substantially similar, what
do in any form and directly substituted mean when they apply?
Specifically, what do they mean in comparisons between domestic
fresh and imported processed, and when insufficient domestic
production exists to allow comparisons on the basis of likeness?
Though there have been occasions when the concept of
substitutable has been referenced in Article X(2)(c) cases, 2 7 7 it
appears that the panel decisions have not addressed its meaning.
However, as alluded to above, given that substitutable appears in
conjunction with the reference to like, it seems safe to conclude
that the former term is broader and more inclusive. Thus, if like
has been perceived as meaning substantially similar and
discounting differences in price, quality, freshness, and
variety,2 78 then substitutable might be viewed as meaning items
with definitely distinct basic character differences that are
nonetheless viewed by consumers as capable of meeting the same
essential purposes (e.g., mangoes and oranges, mutton and beef).
The meaning of in any form has been quite plainly elaborated by
several GATT panels. The technical requirements found in Article
XI(2)(c's interpretive Note in the Addendum to the General
Agreement define the concept itself, and the panel decisions
dealing with in any form flesh out those technicalities. Most
instrumental in this respect have been the 1988 Japan-
Restrictions on Imports case 2 79 and the 1989 Ice Cream and
Yoghurt case.2 80
The Japan-Restrictions case involved import restrictions on
numerous agricultural products supplied by the United States to
Japanese consumers. The domestic production restrictions
themselves were largely nonmandatory, nonstatutory,
"administrative guidance" designed to reduce the amount of
acreage cultivated by local farmers; they were enforced through
reliance on persuasion and peer pressure rather than through
277. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (observing that in the Chilean
Apple I and Chilean Apple H Cases directly substituted was theoretically available).
278. See supra notes 264-67.
279. See supra note 246.
280. See Id. ef
[Vol. 27.33
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specific civil penalties.281  Nonetheless, given the compliant
nature of social actors within Japan, the restrictions were found
by the panel to be the kinds of governmental measures contem-
plated by Article XI(2)(c). 282 The case establishes at least three
prominent points with regard to satisfying the requirements in
the GATT Addendum's definition of in any form, requirements
that the imported product be in an "early stage of processing" so
that, if not restricted, imports would "tend to make the restriction
on the fresh [domestic] product ineffective."283 First, the case
makes clear that whenever import restrictions are imposed on
processed goods, the restrictions are unjustifiable if lesser
processed competitive or even like fresh goods are permitted
entry without restriction.2,84 Any other conclusion would render
the requirement connecting import restrictions on processed
goods with the effectiveness of domestic limitations on fresh
goods completely and totally meaningless. Second, the process-
ing of imports that results in the agricultural or fisheries
products being made "consumer-ready" goes beyond leaving the
end product in an early stage of processing.285 Only items that
have undergone initial processing from the fresh state fall within
the concept of in any form.s 86 Third, and directly related to the
last point, the notion of a product being in an "early stage of
281. See Japan-Restrlctlons on Imports, supra note 246, 3.25-3.26 (United
Sttes contentions and Japan's responses).
282. Id. 5.3.5.1 (panel's view that "effectiveness" in actually reducing
production is more important than the method used to accomplish such); see also
Ic. 5.4.1.4 (panel's view that social organization, though irrelevant in some
instances, can be important in the context of "effectiveness"). 5.1.3.3 (concept
of "effectiveness" derives from negotiating history of Article XI(2)(c)). Compare ci
5.4.1.4, on largely voluntary measures meeting the requirement of the addendum
to Article Xl(2)(c)'s concept of in any form, with the rejection of this possibility in
the Tomato Case, supra note 248, 4.13. The seeming inconsistency is explicable
in light of the panel's assumptions about the nature of Japanese society.
Attention should also be called to two other points. Paragraph 5.3.5.1 of the
Japan-Restrictions on Imports Case is so focused on the test of effectiveness that it
endorses the idea that the withholding by the government of a subsidy from
farmers who fall to meet government reduction objectives may satisfy the need for
an enforceable program to limit production. Further, it would also appear that
the panel has little concern with the fact a program is aimed at acreage reduction
instead of limits on production as such, since effectiveness can be achieved
through measures indirectly reducing actual production available.
283. See supra note 75.
284. See Japan-Restrictions on Imports, supra note 246. 5.3.11 (processed
canned pineapple imports cannot be restricted if imports of frozen pineapple are
not restricted).
285. Id. 5.3.4 (comments made in context of dairy products).
286. Id.
1994]
112 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 27:33
processing" means that it requires further processing.287 In the
event no additional processing is contemplated, then the product
concerned cannot qualify for the processed product exception
under Article XI(2)(c)(i) and (i). 288
The 1989 Ice Cream and Yoghurt case28 9 involved a United
States complaint about a Canadian program to restrict imports of
ice cream and yoghurt. The restrictions were said to be part of an
overall plan by Canadian dairy farmers to control milk
production. Essentially the plan required that all raw milk
produced by those farmers be sold to government marketing
groups, who provided compensation to the extent of compliance
with individual production quotas. Imports of ice cream and
yoghurt were restricted because it was thought that, if left
unrestricted, they would displace sales of domestically produced
ice cream and yoghurt made from government-controlled
domestic milk, thereby undermining the economic benefits from
the Canadian dairy program. 2 90  The panel ruled against
Canada's contention that the restriction on these processed
imports was permissible under the reference to in any form. The
panel disagreed with the conclusion in the Japan-Restrlctions
case that "consumer-readiness" prevents processed products
287. Id. t 5.3.2.2 (panel observations made in context of Japan's restrictions
on processed cheese). The essentialness of finding that a processed product must
look toward further processing in order to be considered in an "early stage of
processing" under the concept in any form, was confirmed in the 1990 Cigarette
Case, supra note 249. 70 ("Since cigarettes could not be described as 'leaf
tobacco in an early stage of processing' because they... were not intended for
further processing, the Panel found that they were not among the products
eligible for import restrictions under Article XI:2(c)(i).") The Thai Cigarette case
involved a 1989 claim by the United States that Thailand was violating. Inter alla,
Article X of the GATT by maintaining an Import licensing system that granted
import licenses to no one but the Thai Tobacco Monopoly, which had Imported on
only three occasions since 1966. Thailand contended the system was part of an
overall program directed at reducing smoking by its population. In finding against
the Thai contention that the restrictions were exempt by Article XI(2)(c), the Panel
not only reiterated the point that, for a processed Item to meet the standard
spelled out in the GATT Addendum for the concept in any form, the Item must
look toward further processing (and cigarettes certainly do not), but went on and
made the additional point, noted earlier, at supra note 275, that Article XI(2)(c)
does not contemplate import restrictions on processed goods being Justified by the
fact that a system of government controls exists on comparable domestic
processed goods.
288. The Japan-Restrictions on Imports, supra note 246, also determined that
the Japanese practices inconsistent with Article X could not by Justified by
reference to the state-trading provisions of Article XVII, or the general exception
provisions of Article XX, in particular paragraph (d) thereof. See Id. TV 5.2.1-
5.2.2.3. For arguments by the opposing parties on this front, see Id. TV 3.3.1-
3.3.8.
289. See supra note 246.
290. Japan-Restrictions onlmports, supra note 246, TV 5-12, 25, 28, 35.
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from being in an "early stage" and thus within Article X's
exceptions.2 91 This seems to make sense in that consumer-ready
goods are not necessarily synonymous with goods that have
undergone extensive processing. This conclusion also is
supported by an even more recent Article XI decision that
stressed the intention of further processing as the real standard
for determining whether goods were still in an early stage of
processing, not consumer-readiness. 292
Aside from the important point about consumer-readiness,
the Ice Cream and Yoghurt case notes another especially
significant point. Specifically, the overall objective of in any form
is to assure a close degree of consumer use between the
processed imported product being restricted and the domestic
fresh product subject to government limitation. 293 This makes
sense from the perspective of the definition of in any form, which
speaks of a processed product that competes with the limited
domestic fresh. It also makes sense from the perspective of in
any form offering an opportunity to restrict imports of processed
goods, as imports of fresh goods can be restricted only when the
like kinds of domestic fresh items are subject to limitation.
Likeness exists whenever, from a marketing or consumer
perspective, the products being compared are substantially
similar. It seems quite natural that processed products bearing
close consumer similarity to certain domestic fresh items should
be subject to import restrictions.
The strikingly close relationship required for both likeness
and in any form suggests a basic theme for Article X and its
exceptions. By generally prohibiting quantitative restrictions,
paragraph 1 of Article X reflects an antiprotectionist theme, one
that seeks to allow those with natural economic advantages to
capitalize on their position. States are not free to employ
quantitative restrictions to compensate for disadvantages they
face. The exceptions contained in Article XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii) do
create departures from antiprotectionism. The departures,
though, still operate within the overall theme or theory of favoring
normal competitive relationships. This is evident from the fact
the exceptions are not generally available to overtake the basic
prohibition in other than pressing circumstances. Further,
291. See Id. 71 (rejection of U.S. argument that consumer-ready goods were
not in an "early stage of processing").
292. See supra notes 287-88, discussing Cigarette Case. But see Japan-
Restrictions on Imports, supra note 246, 5.3.12.3, where the panel apparently
took the position that consumer-ready goods were not normally subject to further
processing and, therefore, could not be in a "early stage" of processing.
293. See Ice Cream and Yoghurt Case, supra note 246, 69; see also Id. 29
(United States taking same position).
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unless the specific conditions of the exceptions are met, the
quantitative restrictions authorized cannot lawfully be imposed.
The conditions themselves are severely confined in paragraph
2(c)(i) and (ii) to instances of supporting domestic production or
marketing limitations, or addressing temporary domestic
surpluses. The idea, of course, is that in the case of a surplus,
restrictions on imports seem explicable; in the case of domestic
production and marketing limits, import restrictions make sense
if they are in an amount in line with the domestic limits
themselves. 294
The GATT panel decisions reviewed above provide cor-
roboration for the suggestions that Article XI(2](c)(i) and (ii), and
its references to like, directly substituted, and in any form, strives
to establish an international trading regime based on the
promotion of comparative economic advantage. The domestic
limitation and temporary surplus exceptions of paragraph 2(c)
have been deemed unavailable, as stated above, to provide pro-
tection to the domestic processing industry.295 They also have
been held unavailable to allow producers of fresh domestic agri-
cultural or fisheries products to expand production. 296  In
nonsurplus situations, the domestic limitation exceptions ad-
ditionally have been held unavailable to allow government pro-
grams designed to limit supply simply by. supporting a certain
producer price level.2 9 7 This does not mean, however, that
import restrictions imposed in situations of surplusage are in-
congruous with the theme of comparative advantage. The
restrictions respond to an aberrant and temporary situation and
have nothing to do with supporting prices at historically high
artificial levels. Several panels have stated that the fundamental
294. Restrictions on imports would not seem inconsistent with anti-
protectionism in cases of surpluses that are temporary, or the use of domestic
production and marketing limits, since the temporary nature of the surpluses
suggest a short-term aberration, and use of domestic limits cannot serve as ajustification for distorting the normal balance of trade. See GATT, supra note 5,
art. XI(2](cJ(i)-(ii).
295. See supra note 275.
296. See, e.g., Japan-Restrictions on Imports, supra note 246, 6.3 (conditions
of Article X12(c) imposed "to prevent the use of this provision for import
restrictions that have the effect of expanding domestic production").
297. Obviously, the thrust of Article XI(2)(c)(il), which applies in cases of
temporary domestic surplus, may be seen as having a direct connection to
supporting prices in order to help sustain domestic producers in somewhat
aberrational situations. For non-surplus cases, the proposition stated in the text
is voiced in the Chilean Apple if Case, supra note 246, 1 12.12-12.18; EEC/US
Apple Case, supra note 246, 5.12-5.18. Note that both cases implicitly
acknowledge the permissibility of domestic limitation programs not tied to
production amount, rather than product selling price, though even programs of
that nature tend indirectly to support price.
[Vol. 27.33
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theory underpinning refusals to allow the like product and the in
any form exceptions to be extended to these situations is to avoid
the use of quantitative restrictions to protect noncompetitive
domestic industry. In the earliest Article XI like product or in any
form case, even the representative arguing the position of the
party that had imposed quantitative restrictions and justified
them by reference to the exceptional language of Article XI,
acknowledged that paragraph 2(c) was not aimed at disrupting
the "balance of advantages" that trading partners normally
enjoyed.298  Several of the succeeding decisions, up to the
present, confirm at least the public fidelity of the GATT parties to
the basic principle of competitive advantage. 299
E. Articles XIII(1) and XVI(4): Nondiscrimination and Subsidization
When it comes to Articles XIII(1) and XVI(4), the relevant
GATT panel decisions are not terribly helpful in deciphering the
meaning of like products. These two provisions fix obligations on
the parties to the General Agreement in regard to quantitative
limitations and subsidies. Article XIII(1) requires states to
refrain, when using authorized quantitative limitations, from
discriminating against one party to the advantage of another. 30°
Article XVI(4) requires that states exporting nonprimary products
refrain from using export subsidies that result in the price of the
exported product being lower than its price when sold in the
home market of the exporting state.3 01 Despite the failure of
panel decisions to elaborate on the concept of likeness in these
GATT provisions, they have shed some light on the basic theory
underpinning the obligations the provisions articulate. Therefore,
it Is useful to devote at least a brief amount of space to a review
of the propositions established by the decisions.
In the case of Article XIII(1), it is clear its requirements apply
whenever a GATT party imposes quantitative limitations
consistent with the provisions of the General Agreement.
298 See the Tomato Case, supra note 248, 3.80 (submission by the
European Community).
299. See Japan-Restrictions on Imports, supra note 246, 5.4.3 ("Article XI
protected expectations on competitive conditions"), 3.2.11, 3.2.13 (United States
argument to same effect); Chilean Apple Hi Case, supra note 246, 12.15 (Article
XI(2)c)(I) "not intended to be a provision permitting protective actions"), 12.16
("not intended to provide a means of protecting domestic producers against foreign
competition"); EEC/US Apple Case, supra note 246, 5.16; Cigarette Case, supra
note 249, 19(c) (United States argument that the exceptions of Article XI not
intended to be protective), 69 (panel agreeing that protective actions are to be
avoided).
300. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
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Limitations imposed inconsistent with Article XI, for instance,
often result in determinations not to examine the measures
under the prescriptions of Article XIII. 30 2 On the occasions when
panels have looked beyond inconsistency with provisions such as
Article X and examined quantitative restrictions in the context of
Article XIlI(1), important principles of substantive law have been
announced. For instance, a panel has decided that the use of
restrictions mandatorily keeping out imports, and unilaterally
imposed by the importing state against one specific state, are
violative of Article XIII(1}'s nondiscrimination obligation, even
when the same state imposes on other trading partners voluntary
restrictions bilaterally negotiated. 30 3 Likewise, suspensions of
import licenses entitling states to supply quantities of desired
products violate Article XII(l) whenever aimed at only one
particular state.3 0 4 The usual quota limits made effective by
importing states can also prove violative of this article if some
supplying states are left unaffected.3 0 5
With regard to the concept of like, virtually all the Article
XIII(1) decisions take the term to mean whatever it means in the
context of the operative prohibitory provision under which the
acting state's restriction is challenged. Those challenges resting
on Article XI evidence an understanding of Article XIII(1)'s
reference to like that replicates the meaning of that term in
Article XI(2)(c)(i) and (ii).3 0 6 Similarly, challenges raising Article I
apparently have taken Article XIII(l's use of like to mean the
same thing that it means in the opening provision of the General
Agreement.30 7 Presumably, because the overall thrust-of Article
XIII is that of nondiscrimination, 30 8 the theme or theory running
through the Article XIII(l) cases is allowing natural economic
advantages to function without interference.
302. See e.g., Japan-Restrictions on Imports. supra note 246, 5.4.2 (no need
to examine Japanese import restrictions under Article XIII. since they are
impermissible under the exceptions of Article XI(2)(c)); Ice Cream and Yoghurt
Case, supra note 246, 82 (taking same position).
303. See Chilean Apple I Case, supra note 246, 4.11.
304. See Chilean Apple II Case, supra note 246, 12.21.
305. See Treatment by Germany, supra note 129, 11 (but here, even though
Portugal was receiving different treatment, it "was not based on the origin of the
goods.")
306. This is not explicitly stated by the panel decisions, but it seems to be
implicit. See, e.g., supra notes 303 and 304.
307. See Treatment by Germany, supra note 129, 10-12 (examining both
Articles I and XIII in same context).
308. See, e.g.. Chilean Apple H Case, supra note 246, 12.25 ("Article XIU's
overall concern with the non-discriminatory application of quantitative
restrictions"); EECIUS Apple Case, supra note 246, 5.23.
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In the case of Article XVI(4), no particular panel decisions
focusing on likeness exist. There have been decisions of the
GATT dealing with the issue of subsidization, however, and these
certainly illuminate the basic theory that resonates throughout
Article XVI. One of the early GATT cases commented on domestic
subsidization available to locally produced items, but not to those
produced in foreign states.3 0 9 Although the practice involved
implicated paragraph 1 of Article XVI, likeness in the context of
subsidization was not addressed. The panel nevertheless did
take the opportunity to observe that the practice of subsidization,
albeit in this case internal, was not to be employed in a fashion
upsetting the competitive relationships that would otherwise
obtain between trading partners or competitors.3 1 0 A 1958 panel
decision involving export subsidies on primary products
displacing sales of a competitor state in third-party markets3 1 '
found a similar violation, this time under Article XVI(3).3 12 Again,
the decision spoke of subsidy permissibility inquiries keeping in
mind the satisfaction of importer needs in "the most effective and
309. See Australian Subsidy, supra note 128. The case involved the
withdrawal of a domestic subsidy that had previously been available to the foreign
produced item from Chile. The chief challenges raised by Chile, though,
concerned the MFN provision of Article I, and the national treatment obligation of
Article Ill. As reviewed above, see part III.A., these challenges hinged on the
concept of "likeness." The panel however, also held forth on Article XVI.
310. Id. 1 10 ("improve its competitive position either on the domestic market
or on foreign markets").
311. Export subsidy cases typically involve sales within another state
displacing sales by domestic producers within that country, or, as here, sales in a
third state displacing those made by a competitor nation which markets Its goods
in the third state. The former type of situation often leads to explorations about
the possibility of imposing countervailing duties pursuant to GATT Article VI. The
latter, however, tends to focus only on claims that Article XVI has been violated,
accompanied by assertions of nullification and impairment under Article XXIII.
Article XVI(3) is raised whenever the subsidization is on primary products, while
Article XVI(4) is raised whenever the products are of a nonprimary nature.
312. See French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour, GATT Doc.
L/924 (Nov. 21, 1958) (Austl. v. Fr.), BISD 7th Supp. 46, T 19 [hereinafter French
Assistance Case] (the test under Article XVI(3) is whether subsidization results in
one obtaining more than "equitable share" in world exports, and the "present
French share.., Is more than equitable"). The French Assistance Case involved
a dispute between Australia and France concerning export subsidies granted by
France on wheat and wheat flour exports to traditional Australian markets in
Ceylon, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The Australian complaint was based on the
claim that the subsidized sales displaced sales Australian wheat and wheat flour
exporters would have otherwise made, resulting in France obtaining more than an
equitable share of the world market. On the need to show acquisition of more
than an equitable share of the world v. individual market, compare td. 15 with
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, BISD 26th Sup. 56, art. 10(3) (1980).
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economic manner."3 1 3  Given the factual peculiarities of this
particular case, the panel decision also spoke of sensitivity to the
impact nonprice and agricultural policy considerations were
having on exports to the markets involved.3 14
One of the more recent decisions involving subsidies was
rendered in the Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal Feed-Proteins case.3 15
This case concerned internal subsidies provided by the EC to the
domestic agricultural sector within the Community; therefore, it
involved another dispute not specifically addressed to Article
XVI(4) and its reference to like products.3 16 Article XVI is
implicated by virtue of the relationship between paragraph 1 of
this Article and the language of Article III(8)(b). The latter
provision authorizing subsidies to domestic producers alone,
despite the general obligation to avoid treating foreign entities
less favorably; the former provision condemning only those
domestic subsidies that operate to reduce imports. In rejecting
the EC's contention that Articles III(8)(b) and XVI(1), in
authorizing the subsidies at issue, created an expectation that
trade could be affected,3 17 the panel held nullification and
impairment of tariff concessions to exist.3 18 The panel's central
observation was that tariff concessions were designed to "improve
price competition,"3 19 and subsidies were not to be used to
adversely impact the "competitive relationship" between domestic
313. Id. 15. This is the language used by the panel when discussing the
question of whether France had used subsidization to obtain more than an
equitable share of the world market, and in setting forth the considerations that
the GATT parties involved in drafting Article XVI thought essential to be kept in
mind when determining the lawfulness of subsidization.
314. Id. 26. As the panel observed, the entire Southeast Asian market was
in a state of change ("disequilibrium"). France was shifting from sales to
Indochina, to sales to Ceylon, Malaysia and Indonesia. Other European exporters
were entering the markets. Many of those involved were allowing "other than
strict commercial considerations and... agriculturial] policy... [enabling]
exporters to obtain substantial assistance" to shape their role. These factors
suggested to the panel that organizing measures needed to be taken.
315. This case was referred to in the earlier discussion of the national
treatment obligation. See Oilseeds Case, supra note 165.
316. The primary concern in the so-called Oilseeds Case is Article Il1. The
United States Article III case is founded largely on the fact the European
Community subsidized processors of domestic oilseeds, but not those processing
"like" imported oilseeds. Article II is also raised in the claim that the EC's
subsidization impaired tariff concessions granted by the EC to the United States
in the 1962 Dillon Round.
317. See Oilseeds Case, supra note 165, TV 115-16. For the panel's
characterization of the EC argument, see Id. T 147.
318. See Id. 148-52, 156.
319. Id. 91148.
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and imported products.3 2 0 Clearly, then, a theme of comparative
advantage pervades many of the GATT subsidy decisions.
F. Article XIX(1): Temporary Departures.
Another relevant provision is GATT Article XIX(1). 3 2 1 This
provision authorizes, in certain unusual cases, the temporary use
of measures escaping from the obligations of the General
Agreement to safeguard or protect producers in the importing
state who make "like or directly competitive" items.
The earliest and perhaps most relevant decision dealing with
Article XIX(1) is the 1951 Report on the Withdrawal by the United
States of a Tariff Concession Under Article XIX of the General
Agreement, the so-called Hatters' Fur case; it involved a complaint
against the United States by the then state of Czechoslovakia.3 2 2
In this case, the Czechs had obtained a rather large tariff
concession on women's fur felt hats during the 1948 Geneva
Round. Hats of this sort made by domestic producers in the
United States tended to have plain finishes, because of the costs
connected with the extensive hard labor necessary to give the
hats nap, or pile finishes. Czech producers, on the other hand,
enjoyed cheaper labor costs and thus could supply specially
finished hats at an attractive price. At the time of the Geneva
Round, United States negotiators had realized that a style shift
from plain finished hats to specially finished hats was afoot.
They had no idea, however, about the degree, scope, or
magnitude the shift would eventually encompass. The GATT
decision, therefore, focused on whether the requirement of Article
XIX(1), that domestic producers suffer an injury because of
increased imports arising from some "unforeseen
development," 323 included situations in which the development
itself was foreseen, but not its extent. Though the working party
rejected the acceptability of the United States position on that
matter, 3 24 it ultimately held that import limiting action taken on
320. Id.
321. This provision has already been addressed, though not in the context of
a panel decision specifically elaborating on the meaning of likeness or an
associated concept. See supra note 66.
322. Report on the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession Under
Article XIX of the GATT (Nov. 1951) (Czech. v. U.S.), Sales No. GATT/ 1951-53
[hereinafter Hatters' Fur Case], reprinted In JOiHm H. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TExT 618-20 (1977).
323. See supra note 66 for the text of Article XIX(1).
324. See Hatters' Fur Case, supra note 322, at 619, 9.
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the basis of a good faith or reasonable misinterpretation of Article
XIX(1) did not constitute a violation of the General Agreement. 325
Without pretending the case represents the definitive gloss
on Article XIX(1)'s reference to like or directly competitive
products, one would seem able inferentially to conclude the
report of the working party understands the reference to cover
both identical as well as closely similar goods. The mere fact that
the fur felt hats from Czechoslovakia were not exactly the same
(i.e., plain or nonspecial-finish hats) as those produced by the
United States companies complaining of injury was not a point of
significance in the decision. Indeed, given the language of
directly competitive used in juxtaposition with the word like, the
differences between the products concerned could well have been
even more pronounced without any suggestion by the working
party of great discomfort. Perhaps any product consumers decide
to purchase instead of another is one that is directly competitive.
A product capable of being used in place of another would seem
to satisfy the notion of substitutable. Nevertheless, competitive
might well bring within its ambit an even larger number of items,
not by virtue of requiring that one item be something that can be
used in place of another (e.g., pipe tobacco as opposed to cigars),
but by requiring that an item simply be one consumers would
purchase instead of another (e.g., chewing gum as opposed
tobacco). The intimation is that in the case of competitive, the
items compared could be vastly different and involve a complete
shift in consumer preference to some clearly distinguishable
product line. While with regard to substitutable, the items must
be basically similar so that no shift in preference to a new and
distinct product line would be involved.
Obviously, Article XIX represents a tremendous departure
from the notion seen in the other like product common language
provisions of allowing the natural productive efficiencies inherited
by competitor states to fully manifest themselves in a way that
divides production responsibilities in the most economically
sensible fashion. By allowing competitors to escape their
international trade law commitments, Article XIX opens the door
to avoidance of a trading regime otherwise seeming to rest on the
promotion of inherent national efficiencies. It is beyond
contravention, however, that the very way in which the Article's
allowance is framed suggests a reaffirmation of the theory of
comparative advantage that appears to run throughout the
common language panel decisions analyzed in this part of the
paper. States are not left wholly free to decide on their own
325. Id. 48-49.
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whether they may escape their GATT commitments. In each case
specific factors must exist, not the least of which is that
producers of like or directly competitive items must suffer or be
threatened with injury.3 2 6 Surely, if the dedication of the GATT
parties to the idea of promoting competitive advantage was less
than ardent, it would seem hard to fathom why these- limiting
factors were imposed on the exercise of this exception. The
restriction to like or directly competitive assures that
nonproductive and inefficient enterprises, in no way remotely
associated with items subject to import, cannot be protected from
economically better organized and dominant foreign competitors,
unless the importing state can show that the strictures of Article
XIX are met by those very enterprises. The escape provision of
the General Agreement is not designed to eviscerate comparative
advantage. To the contrary, by refusing to somehow read out of
Article XIX(1) the requirement of likeness, the working party in
the Hatters' Fur case confirmed the vibrancy of the theory.3 27
V. CONCLUSION
At this juncture, a manuscript traditionally turns its
attention to recapitulating the essential thoughts scattered
throughout the preceding pages. But in this case these can be
summed up by observing: the meaning of like products is
broader in situations involving GAIT prohibitions than in
situations involving exceptions therefrom (while competitive and
substitutable are always broader than like); and the panel
decisions dealirfg with these concepts seem to rest on the theory
of comparative economic advantage. What therefore follows is an
examination of some entirely distinct questions in light of these
thoughts. Specifically, in light of what is known about the like
product common language provisions of Articles I, III, VI, X, XIII,
and XVI from the panel decisions, is it possible to suggest how
like or its related phraseology might be interpreted in a dispute
raising one of the other provisions of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade containing the same common language?
326. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XIX.
327. See also Hatters' Fur Case, supra note 322, 50, where it is observed
that action under Article XIX is essentially emergency in nature and therefore
"should be of limited duration." Accepting this as a given, another indication
exists, apparently in Article XIX itself, and'in the opinion of the working party
report on the case, regarding prominence of comparative economic advantage.
Specifically, if safeguard action is to be of a temporary nature, it would seem
contemplated that industries finding themselves incapable of developing to a more
competitive position are not entitled to perpetual protection.
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Further, if the GATT like product common language decisions
turn on the central theme of comparative economic advantage, is
this reflective of the fact the theme serves to join all the
provisions of the General Agreement and the panel decisions
concerning them through a single unifying theory?
Quite obviously, this is not the place to attempt an
examination of all the other GATT provisions and each of the
panel decisions exploring their unarticulated parameters.
Moreover, any suggestion about how other like product common
language provisions in the GAT might be construed in the
context of a genuine dispute must admit to being highly
speculative. Nevertheless, a quick look at a few of the other GATT
provisions and their decisional refinements can lay a foundation
that might indicate if inquiry into whether all GATT decisions
revolve around comparative economic advantage merits in-depth
exploration. Despite its admittedly speculative nature,
suggestions about how the GATT like product provisions in
Articles Hf(2), VI(7), VII(2)(a) and (b), and IX(l) might be construed
in the context of panel decisions is not simple, ungrounded, rank
conjecture, but well-based, half-intelligent prognostication.
A. Likeness in Unaddressed GATT Articles
Recall that the like product language of Articles II(2), VI(7),
VII, and IX of the GATT focus, respectively, on allowing tariff
bindings to be exceeded in limited circumstances,328 imposing
countervailing duties on primary products in certain cases,3 29
ascribing a value to imports for tariff assessment purposes,330
and treating all trading partners the same when it comes to
requiring marks of origin on imports.3 31 Article H(2) notes that
tariff bindings may be exceeded only as a result of a charge
equivalent to an internal tax being imposed on like domestic
products. Article VI(7) speaks of CVDs not being imposed when
there exists a domestic price system only occasionally resulting in
exports at prices below those charged for the like commodity in
the exporting state. In the case of valuation, Article VII(2)(a) and
(b) provides that imports should be ascribed their actual value,
and that should be the price at which items the same as, or like,
that imported are sold in an ordinary trade transaction. With
regard to Article IX(1), it requires GATT parties to accord to each
328. See supra text accompanying note 31.
329. See supra text accompanying note 32.
330. See supra text accompanying note 33.
331. See supra text accompanying note 16.
GATT "LIKE" PRODUCT CASES
other marks of origin treatment that is no less favorable than
what is accorded to like products from third states.
One would presume that both Articles VII(2) and IX(l)
establish basic obligations of the GATT and that Article VI(7)
states some exception therefrom. Article VII obligates a certain
valuation approach be used, just as Article IX obligates states to
refrain from discriminatory marking requirements. Article VI(7),
on the other hand, simply elaborates further on the notion that
only under exceptional circumstances may charges beyond
normal customs duties be imposed on products from one GATT
party seeking to enter another. Therefore, it would appear that
Articles VII(2) and IX(l) should have their references to like
construed broadly, while Article VI(7) should have its reference
construed narrowly.
In actuality, even though Article VII(2) should be viewed as a
basic obligation of the GATT because valuing products for tariff
purposes can result in the establishment of indirect impediments
to trade, a strong argument can be made that the liberties Article
VII accords to importing states in the valuation context should be
read in a strict and narrow fashion. Similarly, a strong argument
can be made that Article VI(7), though part of a GATT exceptional
provision, is best interpreted in a broad and liberal fashion. This
is because it serves to restrict importing states in their exercise of
the exceptional power to impose duties over and above normal
customs charges, thereby advancing the free flow of trade.
Accepting this reconceptualization of these provisions means that
Articles VI(7) and IX(l) are associated with each other, while
Article VII(2) stands alone as a narrowly construed provision.
Regarding Article VII(2)(a) and (b) and the valuation of
imports, it would seem to matter little that the concept of likeness
is connected to the term merchandise instead of product,3a 2 as
product is the term used elsewhere in Article VII without any
indication of a distinct meaning.33 3 If Arabica coffee beans
present themselves at customs for entry into a GATT state, they
could be valued for tariff purposes at the value ascribed to
Robusto coffee beans.3 3 4  Despite organoleptic differences
332. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 448 (1969)
("must certainly be related").
333. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 5, art. VII. 3, 5.
334. See generally Tariff Treatment, supra note 131, which focused on Article
I's MFN provision. While this is clearly a basic obligation of the GATT, and
therefore entitled to a more generous form of construction than exceptions to
GATT, even in cases dealing with exceptions, differences of the nature between
Arabica and Robusto beans have not resulted in determinations that the products
failed to meet the likeness test. See also Chilean Apple I and Chilean Apple H1
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between the two items, and even though the invoice figures may
differ on prices, they could be deemed like products because of
essential similarity. Obviously, the state determining value must
uniformly proceed on the basis of like product comparisons, or by
looking at the product actually imported. It cannot vacillate back
and forth between these two alternative bases of valuation. 335
The harder case would involve comparisons of products that
either are different yet fall within the same general category (e.g.,
oranges and tangerines, grapefruit and tangelos, or peaches and
watermelons),3 36 or are different because one has undergone
some minimal level of processing (e.g., crude oil and anhydrous
crude oil, or cob corn and kernel corn) or some slightly distinct
form of processing (e.g., canned crushed tomatoes and canned
tomato sauce, or moderate climate bricks and severe climate
bricks, or rough milled lumber and smooth milled lumber). In
such cases it would seem the circumscribed nature of Article VII,
which suggests like receive a narrow reading, inclines in the
direction of looking for a degree of resemblance not present when
comparisons are between unprocessed and processed goods, or
goods processed in different ways. Here pricing disparities, which
valuations should reflect, can be accounted for by the existence of
processing or differences in processing. When unprocessed
original or raw products are not sufficiently different to result in
their being thought of as in distinct product categories (e.g., the
oranges and tangerines series of examples), pricing disparities
cannot be explained by reference to processing. Nonetheless,
weather, growing care, and other factors affect price. The
question is whether these factors should be allowed to evidence
themselves through different valuations, or whether states should
be left free to take neutralizing action by ascribing the same
valuations. Bearing in mind that the theme of comparative
advantage pervades all the panel decisions reviewed herein, it
could be argued that the narrow interpretive approach to the like
products concept in Article VII(2)(a) and (b) might best be
captured by considering unprocessed original or raw products
that fall together into a more general product category, despite
obvious differences between the items compared (e.g., again, the
oranges and tangerines series), as not like. It cannot be disputed
Cases, supra note 246 (finding Golden Delicious, Red Delicious, and Granny
Smith apples to all be like under Article XI(2)).
335. See GATT, supra note 5, art. VI, addendum, V 2 n.4.
336. These examples are graduated in degree of difficulty from the easiest to
the most challenging. Both oranges and tangerines are dessert citrus fruit,
though each is distinct from the other. Grapefruit and tangelos are both citrus
fruit, though only the latter might be considered a dessert fruit. And peaches and
watermelons, while both fruit, vary widely in terms of characteristics.
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that comparative advantage is more apparently connected with
the obvious GATT exceptional provisions of Articles I(1) and XI(2).
Thus, each supplying state should be able to capitalize on
whatever natural efficiencies it enjoys.
Comparative advantage also operates in the product
valuation setting to accord producers within a single state the
efficiencies they have vis-&-vis their competitors. 337 Allowance of
valuations failing to distinguish between different kinds of items
all falling into the same general category, or between unprocessed
versus minimally processed items, or different items processed in
slightly distinct ways, would result in the loss of economic
advantages associated with competition within a product line that
runs a modest gamut loosely thought of as containing similar
items (e.g., apples and bananas both thought of as fruit). The
basic theory underlying the GATT concept of likeness suggests
the rejection of such an approach to valuation.3 38 Clearly, the
most-favored-nation obligation of Article I would prohibit an
importing state from distinguishing between items in a product
line coming from one trading partner and not those coming from
another.
What about the fact that in the context of the GATT Article
XI(2) exception, which is also construed narrowly, the element of
price is not viewed as instrumental in determining likeness? Is it
not inconsistent therefore to suggest the importance of price in
determining likeness under Article VII(2)(a) and (b)? The answer
is not really, the reason being that products which are plainly
different, from each other are not to be considered like, for
purposes of Article VII, just because they carry the same price.
Conversely, products plainly the same are not to be considered
unlike if they carry different prices. In neither the context of
Article XI nor Article VII is likeness determined by price. When
the essential characteristics of items differ, price has no bearing
on making them like or unlike. As far as the valuation provisions
of Article VII(2)(a) and (b) are concerned though, once the
essential characteristics of items are determined to be different,
337. The focus of attention here is on competition existing between producers
selling different yet somewhat substitutable products (e.g.. apples and bananas.
or moderate weather bricks and severe weather bricks). In regard to importing
states valuing products in accordance with the like merchandise standard, it
would seem inappropriate if two suppliers of the exact same product (e.g.,
mangoes) had different values ascribed to what they supplied.
338. Taking particular end uses into consideration, there is no doubt that
some products cannot really be substituted for others. Nevertheless, for other
uses, even Items as distinct as apples and bananas or peaches and watermelons
can be substituted. Substitution of such a sort would clearly be influenced by
considerations of overall consumer cost.
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price differences should be reflected in the valuations the items
are ascribed.
Articles VI(7) and IX(l), as already observed, state basic
GATT obligations; therefore, they are entitled to a much more
generous construction than that given the language of Article
VII(2)(a) and (b). Article IX(l) is very much like the MFN
obligations of Articles I and XIII, in that it prohibits a
practice-marks of origin-that discriminates between states of
supply. Thus it is seemingly easy to construe this provision's
reference to like in exactly the same way as that term is
construed in the contexts of Articles I and XIII, in which
consumer considerations of the close similarities in products
control whether likeness exists.3 3 9 As for Article VI(7), the same
type of approach would seem useful; it would preclude importing
states from imposing CVDs adding a further measure of
protection for their own domestic industries whenever slight and
insignificant differences are found to exist between the subsidized
import and allegedly like products sold in the home market of the
supplying state. By interpreting the term like in paragraph 7 of
Article VI to mean closely similar though not identical products,
the authorization to subject imports to protective countervailing
charges is restricted. The effect of this broader approach to both
Articles IX(1). and VI(7) is to reaffirm the commitment to the
notion of comparative economic advantage so indubitably
manifest in the General Agreement's decisional law.
From the practical perspective of application, construing
Articles IX(l) and VI(7) in the manner suggested could well mean
that certain differences between distinct raw or original products
would result in unlikeness. Comparisons of raw and minimally
processed items from the same raw ingredients, or of processed
items that might be somewhat different because processed in
slightly different ways, would not necessarily result in unlikeness.
Raw items of the same sort that are simply of different varieties
(e.g., American long-grain rice and Asian basmati rice, or acorn
squash and butternut squash, or red seedless grapes and green
or white seedless grapes) easily could be thought of as alike. To
switch to raw items of completely different sorts (e.g., grapefruit
and tangelos, or peaches and watermelons, or sweet natural gas
and sour natural gas), however, not only implicates consumer
product considerations (e.g., consumption setting, amount, and
method of preparation), but also the fact that the concept of like
is to be kept clearly distinct from that of substitutable. As long
as products are obviously of a different sort and regarded as such
339. For the importance of this and other elements considered in the context
of Article (1), see supra notes 141-47.
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by those who would purchase them, it is easy to view them as
unlike. That consumers may think of the products in such
circumstances as subject to being switched (e.g., peaches rather
than watermelons, or sweet natural gas rather than sour natural
gas) is not enough to prevent this from happening. After all,
switching is substitution, and substitution would seem to suggest
the products are not perceived as like.
With regard to raw as opposed to slightly processed items
made from the raw ingredient itself (e.g., the crude oil and
anhydrous crude oil series of examples alluded to above), or
processed items that are different because the ingredients are
subjected to slightly differing processes (e.g., the canned crushed
tomatoes and canned tomato sauce series), the distinction
between like and substitutable again seems to surface. Here,
however, the switching or substituting behavior of consumers is
probably undertaken in many cases with a plainly different
attitude towards the alternative item selected. Because what is
selected is a slightly different form of what one may have
preferred to obtain, rather than something of an entirely different
sort, the switching may not be seen as the kind of substitution
contemplated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade by
the term substitutable. 3 4°  In one sense, this is how the
subjectivity associated with consumer product considerations
becomes entwined with what the term substitutable conveys.
Whenever a purchaser looking for one specific item settles for
something else in its stead, the items may be considered unlike, if
of an entirely different sort, especially since the level of
satisfaction associated with the purchase must be markedly
affected. But if the items are of the same sort and differ only in
that they are minimally processed, rather than raw, or processed
in one way rather than another, the reverse should be true,
especially since the level of satisfaction is probably not so
affected. 3 4 1  Again, by restraining importing states from
340. It strikes me that purchasers having to decide on cob corn, rather than
kernel corn (or vice versa), or canned crushed tomatoes, rather than canned
tomato sauce (or vice versa), might have a different degree of satisfaction than
those having to decide on peaches, rather than watermelon (or vice versa). The
reason the text accompanying this note is written in less than unequivocal terms
is to account for the possibility of choices like crude oil, rather than anhydrous
crude oil (or vice versa), or moderate weather bricks, rather than severe weather
bricks (or vice versa), leading to the same degree of satisfaction as peaches, rather
than watermelons.
341. One should recall that several Article XI(2) panel decisions determined
the following: imported processed items were not like the domestic items placed
under limitation by the importing state, see supra notes 250-80. In that context,
does it not seem peculiar to now suggest that likeness is present in connection
with Articles IX(l) and VI(7)? Apart from Article XI(2) being subjected to a narrow
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disregarding the essential similarity of raw goods versus goods
minimally processed from the same raw ingredients, or goods
that are slightly different because subjected to one method of
processing versus another, the General Agreement's theory of
allowing naturally advantaged states to benefit from what
providence has bestowed is allowed full reign. An importing state
is not free to justify different cost-affecting marks of origin or
customs entry duty treatment on the basis of the existence of
minimal or slightly different processing regarding the goods
concerned. To engage in that would contravene either GATT
Article DM(1) or Article VI(7).
The only other like product common language provision not
yet mentioned is Article 11(2). This article allows charges in
excess of tariff bindings whenever those charges are the
equivalent of internal impositions borne by like products
produced domestically in the state of importation. 34 2  This
provision is clearly an exception to the basic GATT obligation on
tariff bindings,3 4 3 and as such is to be subjected to a narrow
interpretation. With regard to the reference in paragraph 2 to
domestic products like the imports subjected to a tariff-exceeding
imposition equivalent to internal charges, the implication is that
the domestic products and the imports must be virtually the
same. Indeed, since the whole notion of negotiated tariff
concessions is to insist that only competitive position is to accord
one protection below agreed-to tariff levels,3 4 the thrust of Article
If(2) could be argued to approve of nothing more than additional
interpretation, and Articles IX(l) and VI7) being subjected to a broad
interpretation, it must be remembered that comparisons of processed and
unprocessed goods are triggered by the reference to in any form, defined by the
GATT Addendum as meaning "in an early stage of processing and still perishable."
The panel decisions alluded to above hinge on this standard, and not on the mere
fact the imported goods are processed.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 327-28 for reference to the fact that
Article 1(2) is not examined.
343. For one of the important early cases on tariff bindings, see Greek
Increase In Bound Duties Case, GATT Doc. L/580 (Nov. 9, 1956) (F.R.G. v. Greece).
reprinted in JOHN JACKSON & WILLIAM DAVEY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 398 (2d ed. 1986) (deciding that "long-playing records"
are to be assimilated to bound "gramophone records" in a situation where the
Greek tariff schedule did not contain an "otherwise not provided" category).
344. See e.g., European Economic Community-Payments and Subsidies Paid to
Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, GATT Doc.
L/6627 (Jan. 25, 1990) (U.S. v EEC), BISD 37th Supp. 86, 148 ("IT]he main
value of a tariff concession is that it provides an assurance of better market
access through improved price competition. Contracting parties negotiate tariff
concessions primarily to obtain that advantage. They must therefore be assumed
to base their tariff negotiations on the expectation that the price effect of the tariff
concessions will not be systematically offset.")
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charges that track internal charges borne by domestically
produced goods of an identical nature. This exceedingly strict
approach would prevent importing states from ignoring
differences between products and proceeding to impose charges
to protect domestic competitors on the basis of an equivalent
charge being imposed on some other economically wel-situated
domestic industry producing a somewhat similar product
considered distinct by the consuming public. Any other
conclusion would allow the internal charges an economically
dominant and well-organized domestic industry absorbed also to
be imposed at entry upon a foreign supplier of items identical to
those produced by a disorganized and economically inefficient
importing-state industry that is not having to absorb such
internal charges. Therefore raw goods could never be paired with
minimally processed goods, nor slightly different goods processed
in one way with those processed in another.
There is no doubt comparative advantage is the theme of
Article 11(2). The fundamental requirement of respecting tariff
concessions and refraining from employing measures that
undermine the economic position established by such
concessions is evident in Article II(2)'s standard regarding
charges equivalent to internal charges borne by domestically
produced goods. In providing that charges of this sort are
appropriate only when domestic products like the products
imported from abroad are subjected to parallel internal charges,
the General Agreement aims at prohibiting circumvention of tariff
bindings and the competitive relationships such bindings are
designed to secure.
B. Comparative Advantage in Non-Like Product Language
Provisions
The second question posed earlier was whether the theory of
comparative economic advantage, evidenced in the like product
common language provisions, appears in other articles of the
General Agreement, and thus serves to unite the many diverse
standards set forth in the GATT. As suggested above, only a
sampling of other articles will be examined, in a brief and limited
fashion. The general objective is to determine whether it might be
profitable to devote additional energy to a more comprehensive
and thorough analysis. For present purposes, the sampling will
be confined to Articles XVII and XX(d).
Article XVII focuses on state-trading enterprises, business
entities given special privileges related to carrying on import and
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export trade.3 45 The idea is that these enterprises must adhere
to the nondiscrimination obligations of the General Agreement,3 46
give due regard to the Agreement's other provisions,3 47 and make
their purchases and sales in accordance with purely commercial
considerations. 348 Moreover, the governments establishing state-
trading enterprises must themselves refrain from preventing
these enterprises from complying with those obligations.3 49 In
recognition of the possibility that the operation of state
enterprises might obstruct trade, negotiations to reduce or limit
obstructions are urged.3 50  Public notice of the products
concerned3 5' and information about any import mark-up are
required to be made available.3 52
Clearly, the basic idea of Article XVII is to allow state-trading
enterprises, even though they may result in the monopolization of
import or export activity. Correlative to this allowance Is the
obligation of these enterprises to refrain from discrimination and
generally respect other relevant provisions of the GATT in their
purchase and sales activities. Essentially, then, these enterprises
are to operate under the same rules that apply to every other
form of commercial endeavor. The principal departure from the
usual scheme of business activity is the centralization in
government-established or recognized enterprises of the right to
engage in all purchasing and sales connected with the
importation or exportation of goods. This leaves both supply and
price subject to greater control, thus opening the possibility for
different quantitative levels of imports or exports than may have
otherwise been the case, and domestic or foreign sales at different
345. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XVII(1)(a). For an interesting case
presenting Article XVII, see Canada-Adminstration of the Foreign Investment
Review Act, GATT Doc. L/5504 (Feb. 7, 1984) (U.S. v. Can.), BISD 30th Supp. 140.
346. GATT, supra note 5. art. XVII(1)(a).
347. Id. art XVII(1)(b).
348. Id.
349. Id. art. XVII(1](c). It should be observed that first sentence of Article
XVIJ(2) provides for an exception to the nondiscrimination obligations of GATT
that runs very much like the government procurement exception of Article Ill.
The government procurement exception allows discrimination in favor of domestic
goods over those of foreign origin. Article XVII's exception, however, seems to
extend to discrimination as between different foreign suppliers as well. The
second sentence of Article XVI(2), however, obligates state-trading enterprises to
pursue government purchase efforts in a way that treats other GATT parties in a
"fair and equitable" manner. In this sense, there really seems to be little
difference between the basic GAT government procurement exception and that
contained in Article XVII(2).
350. Id. art. XVII(3).
351. Id. art. XVII(4)(a).
352. Id. art. XVII(4)((b).
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prices as well. The potential for an adverse effect on domestic
and foreign consumers is self-evident.
Just as Article XVII requires that state-trading operations be
carried on under the same standards applicable to private
trading, it also attempts to deal with the possibility for abuse
incident to centralized importation and exportation. It
accomplishes this by requiring the dissemination of information
about products impacted and import price mark-ups 35 3 and by
urging negotiations to limit or reduce obstacles to trade
expansion.3 5 4 Somewhat like the escape provision of Article
XIX, 53 5 the fact that the state-trading provision of GATT Article
XVII allows departures from the normal private way in which
import and export business would be conducted does not indicate
that this business can be carried on in disregard of the relative
economic position of competitor states. Article XIX strictly limits
"safeguard" measures. They are only available in emergency
situations, can only be applied to remove injury to domestic
industries producing items "like or directly competitive" with
those imported, and are essentially envisioned as nothing more
than measures of a temporary sort. Article XVII is similarly
subject to tight restriction, even though the centralizing aspect of
state-trading admittedly opens the potential for erosion of an
international trading regime based on the rationality of pure
economics. This restriction is embodied in the article's
notification requirements on product identification and price
mark-up and in its negotiation requirement's aim of limiting or
reducing obstacles that state-trading may pose to the expansion
of worldwide commerce.
From Article XvII's interest in erecting standards that ensure
the relative economic position of competitors is largely held
intact, it would seem reasonable to consider this provision as
consonant with the theory of comparative advantage. Even in the
hardest case of a state-trading enterprise that engages in no
discrimination between foreign trading partners, it is clear that
this enterprise generally cannot freely engage in discrimination
favoring domestic industry at the expense of foreign competitors,
especially to neutralize natural economic efficiencies enjoyed by
the latter. In at least one recent GATT panel decision, this seems
to have been the thinking. When it was argued that disruptions
of normal trade flows through import limits were justifiable if
taken by state-trading operations, the panel declared that
"parties cannot escape their obligations with respect to private
353. See Id. art. XVH(4)(a}-(b).
354. Id. art. XVI(3).
355. See supra notes 321-27 and accompanying text.
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trade by establishing state-trading operations."35 6 In another still
more recent decision, discussed in the same context, a panel left
no doubt that state-trading monopolies designed to protect
domestic industries contravened a theme of fundamental
importance. As the opinion stated: "[Clontracting parties may
maintain governmental monopolies . . . on the importation and
domestic sale of products. . . . [pirovided it thereby does not
accord [imports] less favorable treatment than domestic"
products.357
As for paragraph (d) of Article XX, 3 5 8 it contains one of
several general exceptions to the GATT. These exceptions run the
spectrum from trade measures directed at protecting public
morals,3 59 human, animal, or plant life, 36 0 to those dealing with
products of prison labor,3 61  national artistic, historic, or
archaeological artifacts,362 or aimed at situations of short
supply,3 63 or implementation of a domestic price stabilization
plan.364 Article XX(d) itself excepts the adoption or enforcement
of measures "necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations . . . not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Agreement." 365 As with Article XVII's allowance of state-trading
operations and Article XIX's escape provision, this exception
seemingly focuses on permitting practices that might otherwise
be thought prohibited by GATT. The explanation might be that
the very language of the exception suggests, as long as the law or
356. See Japan-Restrctions on Imports, supra note 246, 79.
357. See Cigarette Case, supra note 249, 79. It must be acknowledged that
the basic government procurement exception of Article Ill, as well as that of
Article XVII(2), see supra note 349, appear completely incongruous with the idea
of comparative economic advantage. After all, the whole thrust of these
exceptions is to give a preference to domestically produced goods over those
produced abroad. Thus, less efficient domestic industries could be protected from
more efficient foreign competitors. While this Is neither the time nor the place to
address this matter at length, it is clear that for one to successfully invoke these
exceptions, the goods must be purchased for use or consumption by the
government alone. Consequently, it may be possible that, since the private
consuming markets must remain open to foreign competitors and governments
naturally want to be able to have stable and secure sources of supply available for
goods they need. exceptions for government procurement may be seen as less
destructive of the importance of comparative advantage than might at first be
thought. Query: Can the same be said about the provisions of Part IV of the
General Agreement?
358. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XX.
359. Id. art. XX(a).
360. Id. art. XX(b).
361. Id. art. XX(e).
362. Id. art. XX(f).
363. Id. art. XXj).
364. Id. art. XX(i).
365. Id. art. XX(d).
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regulation the measure in dispute seeks to enforce is allowable
under the GATT, the measure itself is beyond challenge, even
though otherwise objectionable.
That argument appears to have been rejected by GATT
panels. 366 For measures of enforcement to be permissible under
Article XX(d), they must not only be closely linked to securing
compliance with a law or regulation that comports with the
dictates of all the GATT provisions. They also must be of a nature
that does not transform the consistent law or regulation into
something inconsistent with the General Agreement. In other
words, the fact that a law or regulation adopted by a trading state
is consistent with the terms of GATT does not insulate from
attack any measure necessary to secure compliance therewith.
The establishment of an action in accordance with the
requirements of the Agreement does not entitle the establishing
state under Article XX(d) to pursue any measure of compliance it
would choose. 367 The implication is that the basic goal or
objective of GATT is not somehow eroded by Article XX(d).
Further evidence that this is indeed the vantage from which
all of the exceptions of Article XX, not just paragraph (d), should
be approached is found in Article XXs preambular statement. It
states that each and every one of the exceptions of Article XX
must not amount to "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination"
between states, nor a "disguised restriction" on international
trade.3 68 Because the purpose of the GATT's most-favored-nation
provisions is to eliminate disparate treatment between different
trading partners, and the purpose of its national treatment
provisions is to eliminate obstacles to trade that prefer domestic
suppliers at the expense of their foreign competitors, it would
seem the references in the opening language of Article XX could
be characterized as setting forth loose MFN and national
treatment obligations. As has been observed repeatedly in these
pages, the theory underpinning obligations of this sort is one
founded on the promotion of benefits obtained through the
natural economic conditions prevailing within competitor states.
In condemning the use of measures outside what the General
Agreement envisions as appropriate (even though employed to
obtain compliance with legal or regulatory actions deemed
366. See, e.g., Japan-Restrctions on Imports, supra note 246, 5.2.2.3
(holding violative Japanese import controls inconsistent with Article XI(2(c), even
though designed to secure compliance with a state-trading operation consistent
with Article XVII).
367. See, e.g., United Sas-Imports ofCerta nAuomote SpringAssemblfes, GAT Doc.,
L/5333 (May 26, 1983) (Can. v. U.S.), BISD 30th Supp. 107
368. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XX.
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permissible), and in rejecting any measure that operates to
discriminatorily handicap certain trading partners (or all in
relation to domestic sources), Article XX(d) seemingly reiterates
the fundamental theme of comparative economic advantage found
in the like product cases. Presumably, this once again suggests
the possibility that it is on this concept of comparative advantage
that GATT parties and panel decisions, for good or bad, have
rested the development of world commercial relations.
